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The impact of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) on the economic growth of developing 
nations is a subject that has been examined extensively. Attracting FDI has been a top 
priority in the development models adopted by such nations, and most of them had been 
successful in that goal, albeit to different levels. FDI has been given such prominence in 
the policy tool kit of development planners due to its direct and indirect benefits. FDI 
contributes directly with the fresh capital infused into an economy and through other 
peripheral means termed ‘spillover effects’, such as knowledge and technology 
transfers. The consensus is that FDI is growth-enhancing, notwithstanding numerous 
country and region-based studies which challenge that proposition. Such division in 
opinions in the research domain warrants a deeper and broader examination of the FDI-
growth nexus in hitherto undiscovered pathways. This thesis attempts to understand the 
role of FDI in the development of emerging economies in terms of growth channels, 
structural transformation, and income distribution.  
How some of the developing economies in Asia, namely the Asian tiger nations, 
became economic powerhouses in the last few decades has been invariably attributed to 
their success in attracting FDI. Other developing countries in the SAARC (South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation) and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations) regions have also tried to emulate the development blueprints of their more 
successful neighbours, especially their FDI strategies, but with limited success. 
Nevertheless, they were able to record high growth rates from time to time during the 
same period compared to countries with a similar developmental background in other 
parts of the world. Some economists attribute this to the ‘middle-income trap’ 
phenomenon, characterized by frequent slowdowns, inconsistent growth, or stagnation. 
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This makes it research worthy of examining why these countries are economically 
lagging despite successfully attracting FDI. Accordingly, this study focuses on middle-
income countries in the SAARC and ASEAN regions to explore FDI-induced growth in 
depth. Also, in addition to FDI, we examine the role of other determinants of economic 
growth that are widely discussed in the literature, such as human capital development, 
institutions, infrastructure development, and international trade in the development of 
selected countries. 
First, we examine the channels through which FDI inflows give rise to economic 
growth. We argue that each component of growth, capital, labour, and factor 
productivity, act as a transmission channel of growth and examine how FDI inflows 
transmit economic growth through each channel. By employing growth accounting and 
dynamic panel estimation methods, we find that the growth-promoting effect of FDI 
flows operates mainly through the labour accumulation component of growth. However, 
there is no significant direct growth transmission effect of FDI inflows through factor 
productivity and capital accumulation component of growth. Instead, we find that 
human capital development and international trade transmits economic growth through 
the productivity component. This could be attributed to the spillover effects of FDI 
since FDI promotes trade and triggers the need for human capital development through 
the increased demand for skilled labour.  
Next, we analyse the impact of FDI flows on the income distribution of selected 
countries. Using a system generalised methods of moments (GMM) technique, we find 
robust evidence that inequality and FDI relationship in selected countries follows 
modernisation theory. This contends that even though FDI triggers a rise in inequality at 
lower levels of FDI share in GDP, income distribution improves beyond a tipping point 
of 8.1% of FDI share in GDP. Furthermore, infrastructure expansion, human capital 
iii 
 
development, and trade serve as conduits to promote equitable income distribution. 
However, stronger institutions increase income inequality.  
Then, this study analyses the role of FDI in the structural transformation in the selected 
countries. Estimating a system of three simultaneous equations for value-added in each 
of the three sectors and employing the two-stage least square (2SLS) technique, we find 
that FDI has failed to provide the expected impetus for the transformation in the sample 
economies. Notably, FDI flows have reduced the value-added in the manufacturing 
sector. In terms of linkages among the three sectors, we find that the services sector 
positively impacts the agriculture sector whilst the manufacturing sector contributes 
positively to the value-added in the agriculture sector. The human capital development 
and progressive institutions have contributed to the structural transformation with 
significant contributions to the service sector value addition at the expense of the other 
two sectors. International trade has contributed positively to the manufacturing sector 
value-addition whilst constraining that of the services sector. Infrastructure development 
is not effective in helping these economies to progress through various stages of 
development.   
Our results do not find the role of FDI in the development of the selected countries to be 
very compelling, notwithstanding that it has many positives. We find that the true 
growth potential of FDI is yet to be tapped as there had been no significant transmission 
through the two of the three growth components, namely, capital and productivity. Also, 
FDI inflows are essential in improving the income distribution in these countries and 
thereby promoting shared prosperity. Increased income distribution gives rise to more 
economic opportunities and helps people move out of poverty.  
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FDI is no panacea to development, but its many benefits compel policymakers to attract 
more of it. Policies will have to be further streamlined and strengthened to make them 
more conducive for foreign investments. Governments need to avoid policy bias and 
encourage locating offshoots of MNEs in geographically remote areas through incentive 
schemes to address rural poverty and lack of employment opportunities. Also, we find 
that human capital development has been instrumental in reducing income gaps and 
triggering structural transformation. Economic opportunities and better economic 
prospects for educated and skilled employers tend to reduce income distribution gaps. 
International trade, especially new employment opportunities in the manufacturing 
exports sector, has increased the income levels in communities and reduced poverty. 
Accordingly, policymakers will have to invest more in education and promote 
international trade.  
Notwithstanding its role in reducing income inequality, infrastructure development 
plays no significant role in growth transmission or structural transformation. We also 
find that infrastructure development has been a conduit for widespread economic 
growth. Projects such as rural electrification might have created new economic 
opportunities, helped transfer new technology, and efficient diffusion of market 
information. Institutions harming income distribution mean that governments would 
have to rethink the institutional structure related to welfare systems. Despite increasing 
income inequality in the selected countries, institutions have helped promote economic 
growth through the capital component and assisting economies to change for the better.  
This thesis makes several original contributions to the literature. Despite many studies 
which examine the FDI-growth nexus, the exact mechanism through which the FDI 
leads to growth is not extensively researched. This study provides insights to explore 
how exactly the growth impact of FDI translates into real GDP growth. It demonstrates 
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that the growth effect of FDI is transmitted only through labour in the sample of 
countries. This contradicts the proposition that FDI augments the domestic capital, 
which leads to higher growth. It also debunks the idea that FDI plays a vital role in 
enhancing productivity due to its many peripheral benefits termed the spillover effects. 
The structural transformation concerning FDI is an entirely new research topic that 
would ignite many researchers' interest. It demonstrates that FDI has not played any 
significant role in the structural transformation despite the biased nature of the recipient 
sector. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research done on FDI-inequality 
nexus concerning the middle-income economies or any grouping of countries. It was 
found that the FDI contributes to aggravating the economies' income disparities at lower 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS (FDI) IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
A common feature of economic strategies that developing countries resort to during the 
last few decades is the sweeping free market or neoliberal changes to pre-existing 
autarkic policies, a process commonly termed ‘Economic Liberalisation’. The insight 
behind the policy reforms was to engage with the world, producing for large markets to 
enjoy economies of scale, taking part in the global production networks, and thereby 
benefit from the world economy in the belief that such integration would help countries 
grow. The main component of liberalisation drive was to attract Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) due to a lack of domestic capital sources. Developing countries 
generally have low savings, underdeveloped financial systems, and a weak domestic 
capital base (Athukorala 2007). Accordingly, the FDI-led growth hypothesis has 
influenced the economic development strategies of developing countries because FDI 
emerged as the panacea to correct policy issues in the external sector, especially in an 
era of globalisation and greater integration of regional economies.  
A significant reason for host countries preferring FDI over other forms of global capital 
such as portfolio investments or investments in debt instruments is that FDI provides a 
stable source of capital. FDI comes with a long-term investment motive, and there 
would not be any disruption due to any short-run adverse events in a host country 
(Laureti and Postiglion, 2005). Also, FDI is not short of many attractive peripheral 
benefits, called positive externalities, augmenting recipients’ productive capacity (De 
Mello, 1997). Other than contributing to the expansion of domestic capital stock, FDI 
introduces organisational and management know-how to the host country, creates 
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knowledge spillovers through imported technology and skills, introduces new 
production processes, sets up value chains through forward and backward links between 
sectors, and most importantly, establishes connections with foreign markets by 
providing access to domestic goods. In turn, recipient economies provide foreign 
enterprises with natural resources, cheaper labour, tax incentives, subsidies, and hitherto 
untapped markets (Caves, 2007). Accordingly, FDI-related policies of developing 
economies are formulated to benefit from integration with the world economy and 
encourage foreign participation in domestic businesses so that a win-win situation is 
reached. 
 
1.2. BACKGROUND OF SAARC AND ASEAN ECONOMIES AND 
MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
1.2.1. FDI-related economic reforms experiences of the SAARC and ASEAN 
countries  
Liberalisation of the world’s economies since the 1960s has led to economic integration 
and interdependence, helping to promote international specialisation. The SAARC and 
ASEAN countries introduced new policies aimed at economic liberalisation at various 
times in their post-colonial history. From the 1950s to the late 1980s, countries 
generally in these regions followed inward-looking or import substitution policies and 
were not very receptive to FDI, if not hostile. Government authorities did not rule out 
FDI in their policy reform packages but wanted it on their terms. They had to balance 
the two opposing objectives of gaining access to foreign capital and resources and 
minimising foreign economic and political control over domestic policies and 
businesses (Athukorala 2014). However, by the 1990s, all countries began to connect 
with the international economy to varying degrees. During the early stages of 
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liberalisation, they had vague laws that protected foreign investments but poorly 
developed commercial/trade environments where policy consistency was lacking. 
Bureaucrats did not have experience dealing with multinationals, and foreign investors 
considered government officials a problem. However, as the liberalisation drive gained 
momentum, these economies became increasingly conducive and welcoming to foreign 
investors. They learned from successful free market-driven economies (such as 
Singapore) and competed for FDI (Hill and Athukorala, 1998). SAARC and ASEAN 
economies had been at the forefront of this phenomenon (see Figure 1.1). Despite the 
modest FDI inflows in the latter part of the past decade, developing Asia remains one of 
the most attractive destinations of MNEs owing to the region’s economic resilience 
(UNCTAD, 2015). The Annex summarises recent economic liberalisation experiences 
of some of the economies in these two regions. 
In the SAARC region, by the mid-1990s, all countries have accepted economic 
liberalisation following a few decades of policy reforms to emphasise exports over 
imports. By the year 2000, all countries except Bhutan were signatories to Article VII of 
the IMF, which signified the opening up of the current account, including trade. 
Elements of protectionism were still observable, but they were much lower compared to 
the previous decades. Generally, trade liberalisation was followed by FDI liberalisation 
with a substantial time lag. An exception was Sri Lanka, where trade and investment 
policy regimes were liberalised simultaneously (Athukorala & Rajapatirana, 2000). In 
addition to promoting FDI, a range of measures were introduced by all countries to 
create a conducive environment for foreign investments. These measures include 
increasing caps on foreign equity participation, bringing more sectors under automatic 
approval, fast-tracking of FDI approvals, offering financial incentives, relaxing 
restrictions on repatriation of profits and capital, signing investment protection 
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agreements with source countries of FDI and sovereign guarantees against 
nationalisation and expropriation. However, the intra-regional FDI flows are very weak, 
with India being the leading source country (Athukorala, 2014). As Figure 1.1 shows, 
SAARC has recorded steady growth in FDI inflows over the last few decades. SAARC 
was not affected much by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 but did experience 
some stagnation of FDI flows after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008.  
Liberalisation of FDI-related policies in the ASEAN economies such as Malaysia and 
Thailand predates the same of SAARC countries, possibly due to the so-called Asian 
‘Tiger nations’ economic performance. These countries were very successful in 
attracting FDI and were perceived as some of the best investment destinations in the 
world. However, during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis and its aftermath, ASEAN 
countries experienced a slump in FDI inflows. In particular, the crisis severely affected 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, and Malaysia had to resort to capital controls as a 
crisis management strategy. As Figure 1.1 shows, the negative trend in FDI flows 
continued until 2001. However, overall global FDI flows also experienced a slump 
between 2000 and 2003 (UNCTAD 2005). However, all ASEAN nations recovered well 
in the early 2000s to return to pre-crisis economic conditions (Figure 1.2). However, 
unlike SAARC, this positive trend in FDI flows accelerated after the GFC. FDI flows to 
the developing world rose despite the GFC between 2006 and 2008, and this trend 
continued. This is because Asia was the region least affected by the crisis and became 
the engine of global recovery. For the first time, developing and transition economies 
could absorb more than half of the global FDI flows in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2011). FDI 
flows to South-East Asia increased by 3% to an all-time high of US$149 bn in 2008. 
Another critical aspect of ASEAN is the intra-region FDI flows where for example, half 
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of Indonesia’s FDI inflows of US$22 bn in 2018 originated from Singapore (UNCTAD, 
2019). 





1.2.2. Recent economic performance of SAARC and ASEAN 
It is essential to state that the SAARC and ASEAN nations have recorded superior 
economic growth compared to other countries in the developing world (see Figure 1.2). 
Of the two regions, ASEAN countries had been more successful, although SAARC 
countries of late are now in a better position. Both SAARC and ASEAN have reported 
remarkable growth performance that is well above the world average. This could be 
attributed to geographical factors as well. Asia has been the fastest-growing region 
globally in recent years, and geographical proximity to fast-growing neighbours and 
economic integration through such arrangements as SAARC and ASEAN have 








1.2.3. Evidence of the Middle-Income Trap in the ASEAN and SAARC countries 
 
Asia provides strong evidence of economic convergence predicted by economists, 
especially the Asian Tiger nations, namely Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South 
Korea. From the 1960s to the 1990s, they embarked on rapid industrialisation and 
recorded impressive growth rates. However, other countries in the ASEAN region and 
elsewhere in South Asia failed to emulate the tiger nations' success and are caught in a 
‘middle-income trap’ with widespread growth slowdowns. The fact that they have 
achieved only moderate or relatively modest success compared to ‘Asian Tiger’ 
economies such as Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea makes it an 
interesting case to study. Countries such as Malaysia and Thailand are believed to be in 
the middle-income trap because they display weak signs of economic take-off in 
contrast to what was evident in the tiger economies at the same stage of development. 
First coined by Gill and Kharas (2007), the ‘middle-income trap’ phenomenon has been 
widely examined in development economics-related research. Several definitions have 
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been given to the middle-income trap. Ayier et al. (2013) view it as a prolonged period 
of stagnation or recession that a middle-income economy experiences after its high-
growth period. They argue that such slowdowns are disproportionately concentrated on 
middle-income economies. They also observe that middle-income countries are more 
vulnerable to inconsistent growth with frequent slowdowns than other developing 
economies. As Ohno (2009) highlights, ASEAN countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, 
and Malaysia need to overcome the middle-income trap, which he calls a ‘glass ceiling’. 
He demonstrates four stages of development and highlights that FDI and foreign 
guidance could help countries progress, especially at the initial stages.   
Figure 1. 3: Stages of Development and middle-income trap 
 
Source: Ohno 2009 
 
1.2.4. FDI and economic growth-related issues  
In this subsection, the focus is on contemporary growth issues in the middle-income 
economies of SAARC and ASEAN.  
Identifying the channels through which FDI emanates growth is essential to determine 
the effectiveness of FDI as part of outward-oriented policies. The contribution of FDI to 
an economy is two-fold: firstly, by contributing to the capital requirement; and 
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secondly, through the peripheral benefits, which are termed ‘spillover effects’ in the 
empirical literature. These spillover effects involve introducing organisational and 
management know-how to the host country, creating knowledge spillovers through the 
acquisition of technology and skills by domestic labour, introducing new manufacturing 
processes, setting up value chains through forward and backward linkages across 
sectors, and most importantly, establishing links with foreign markets by providing 
access to the domestically produced goods (De Mello, 1997). These spillover effects 
could contribute to widespread productivity improvements in the recipient economies. 
Although many studies concentrate on the FDI-growth nexus, not many studies have 
examined how FDI's direct and indirect effects translate into growth. Makiela and 
Ouattara (2018) demonstrate that these channels could be identified by decomposing 
economic growth into its components and examining the relationship of FDI with each 
such component. Accordingly, determining the growth transmission channels of FDI 
would explain how it contributes to such growth.  
Also, imbalances in income distribution are identified as one of the leading 
developmental issues throughout the world. Since the 1980s, inequality in people’s 
incomes has increased rapidly in North America and Asia, grown moderately in Europe, 
and stabilised at an extremely high level in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and 
Latin America (WIR, 2018). The inequality data for the selected countries show varying 
degrees of inequality and different variations over time. However, the impact of higher 
income inequality on growth is far from conclusive. Barrow (2005) concedes that higher 
income inequality deters growth in developing countries whereas Rodrik, (2014) 
recognises that income inequality in the early stages of industrialisation can encourage 
growth. FDI can trigger income inequality in several ways. First, due to increased 
competition from low-wage countries, there is a resource shift towards biased sectors 
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and in favour of skilled labour in more advanced economies (Borjas & Ramey 1995).  
Second, MNEs are expected to pay higher wages to reflect higher productivity which is 
customary with technology-based production methods. Thus, they will invariably pay 
higher wages than local firms to attract the best-skilled workers from the domestic 
labour pool and enjoy a comparative advantage (Aitken et al., 1996). Third, better 
working environments provided by MNEs might trigger labour moving from domestic 
firms to the MNEs and thereby deprive local industries of better-skilled workers (Lipsey 
& Sjoholm, 2004). Accordingly, FDI could work as an agent that triggers imbalances in 
income distribution.  
 
Another growth issue that is common among developing countries is the slow pace of 
structural change. Mainstream economics generally focuses on growth issues at the 
aggregate level. However, such a holistic approach to examining economic growth 
might hide the important economic phenomenon occurring at the sectoral level. A 
continuous inter-sectoral reallocation of resources within an economic system is defined 
as a structural change or structural transformation. FDI could trigger imbalances in 
resource allocation in developing economies since foreign investments generally target 
manufacturing and services sectors rather than the more dominant agriculture sector 
(UNCTAD, 2019). The transformation of the developed nations, for example, was 
characterised by a transition from agrarian to industrial-based economies before further 
transforming into service sector-dominated industries (Dabla-Norris et al., 2013). 
Further, FDI and foreign-owned firms can cause labour mobility from sector to sector 
triggered by changes in wages. The movement of labour from MNEs to local businesses 
or people wanting to start their enterprise can capitalise on the training they received 
from MNEs; it leads to the dissemination of technical know-how (Blomström et al., 
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2001). Also, foreign acquisition of domestic firms generally leads to increased 
acceptance of new technology, innovations in processes and products, and better sales 
and labour productivity (Guadalupe et al., 2012). Accordingly, FDI can trigger 
structural transformation through different avenues by eliciting resource reallocation 
across the three sectors.  
1.3. SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH  
In this study, we examine the growth issues related to FDI in the middle-income 
economies of SAARC and ASEAN. Middle-income countries have a per capita Gross 
National Income of more than $1,006 but less than $12,235 in 2017, calculated using 
the Atlas method (World Bank, 2017). The period under consideration spans the years 
1993 to 2017. This period was based on the data availability, and because selected 
countries in SAARC and ASEAN have undergone significant structural changes, trying 
a mix of policy reforms in which FDI played an important role and was increasingly 
engaging with the global economy. First, they had been recipients of large amounts of 
FDI during the period under the study. The selected countries provide a relatively 
homogenous sample of countries in terms of per capita income, thereby avoiding a 
grouping of poor and wealthy economies. Bloningen and Wang (2004) assert that this is 
inappropriate for empirical studies relating to FDI. Furthermore, these countries differ 
in terms of policy experiments and their timings, so the sources of growth and the 
effects of FDI will vary from country to country.  
 
1.4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The academic literature related to FDI is dominated by attempts to examine its growth 
impact in economies. However, this thesis focuses on three contemporary growth issues 
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related to FDI. Accordingly, the first objective is to identify the channels through which 
the growth impact of FDI is transmitted. Specifically, it is explored whether FDI 
generates economic growth through factors of production such as capital and labour or 
productivity growth. The second objective is to examine the distributional income 
impact of FDI in the middle-income economies that are members of SAARC and 
ASEAN. This is because of the skill incentives, premiums, and spillover effects caused 
by the presence of foreign-owned companies leading to the distributional impacts of 
income. Finally, the third objective is to assess the impact of FDI on the structural 
transformation of these economies. Also, it is expected that this study will make policy 
recommendations relating to income distribution and structural change based on its 
findings and contribute to the policy debate on the promotion of FDI.  
To address these research objectives, this study intends to answer the following research 
questions.  
1. What are the channels through which FDI transmits its growth impact? 
2. What is the relationship between FDI and income distribution in the recipient 
economy?  
3. What is the role of FDI in structural transformation in developing economies? 
1.5. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
This thesis comprises five chapters. This chapter provides the research background, 
motivation for the study, research objectives and sets out the scope of the analysis.  
Chapter Two addresses the first research objective. It reviews the relevant literature on 
the FDI-growth nexus to highlight how FDI contributes to economic growth and its 
shortcomings that lead to adverse growth effects. It demonstrates that components of 
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economic growth could be also be considered the transmission channels of growth. It 
also shows the methods of decomposing the growth and employs a growth accounting 
approach to decompose the growth. The econometric method involves two steps: first, 
decomposition of growth into components; and second, running regressions using the 
system Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) technique where each component is 
considered a dependent variable against FDI and several other regressors. It presents the 
results of the regressions and makes certain conclusions.  
Chapter Three addresses the second research objective, which is to examine the role of 
FDI in income distribution in recipient economies. First, it uses data illustrations to 
show that emerging Asian economies have high levels of income inequality, and it is 
not abating. Then it reviews the literature related to income inequality and identifies the 
mechanisms of how FDI causes imbalances in income distribution. The econometric 
method involves estimating the coefficients that show the relationship between FDI and 
income inequality using the GMM technique. Also examined is the relationship between 
income inequality and other determinants such as human capital development, 
institutions, infrastructure, and trade is also examined. Robustness tests using fixed and 
random effects to substantiate the findings are performed.  
Chapter Four examines the role of FDI in the structural transformation of the middle-
income economies of SAARC and ASEAN. First, it demonstrates that all these 
economies are changing and characterised by agriculture having a declining share of 
GDP, while manufacturing and services are taking their place. Second, it reviews the 
literature on structural transformation, demonstrates the role of FDI in the transition of 
economies, and explains the other determinants of structural change. The econometrics 
involves running regressions using the 2 Stage Least Squares (2 SLS) method to 
identify the relationship between FDI and structural change. Also examined here are the 
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roles of human capital development, institutions, infrastructure, and trade in structural 
change. 
Chapter Five provides a summary of the conclusions drawn from the empirical findings 
of the preceding chapters. Policy implications are presented, and the study recommends 
policy initiatives that could address the discussed growth issues. This chapter highlights 
the contributions of the thesis to the subject and the significance of the findings. It 
explains the limitations of the research and provides some guidance for future studies to 





CHAPTER 2: GROWTH TRANSMISSION OF FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI): A CROSS-COUNTRY 
ANALYSIS OF MIDDLE-INCOME LEVEL COUNTRIES 




A common tendency observed in the evolution of economic strategies of developing countries 
during the last few decades was the introduction of sweeping economic reforms to replace the 
pre-existing autarkic policies. Most of these reforms aimed to increase trade and investment 
relationships with the rest of the world, becoming more outward-oriented. The Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI)-led growth hypothesis has wielded considerable influence on the economic 
strategies of developing countries as policymakers wanted to use FDI to take advantage of 
rapid globalisation and integration of the world’s economies. This is evident as many 
countries are strengthening their regulatory FDI frameworks, which is evident by streamlining 
the monitoring and screening processes, changing their industrial policies and closely 
examining cross-border mergers and acquisitions (UNCTAD, 2014). This is also a well-
researched area in the empirical literature. 
 
Generally, most of the world’s developing countries have abundant resources such as labour, 
raw materials, and commodities such as oil and gas. Still, they lack the technological know-
how as well as physical and human capital to capitalise on them. Moreover, these countries 
are plagued by weak institutions, corruption, and political instability. Despite these obstacles, 
most governments in their economic policy mandates have identified FDI as a means for 
sustainable development and boosting productive capacity-building. Hence they are keen to 
facilitate and attract them. A significant reason for host countries’ preference for FDI over 
other forms of global capital flows such as portfolio investments or investments in debt 
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instruments is that FDI provides a stable source of capital which comes with a long-term 
investment motive. Stability emanates from the fact there would not be any sudden stops of 
inflows or outflows due to any short-run adverse events in a host country (Laureti and 
Postiglion, 2005). Also, FDI is not short of many attractive peripheral benefits, called positive 
externalities, which augment the recipients’ productive capacity (De Mello, 1997). 
Accordingly, the benefits of FDI to an economy are two-fold: first, through input change by 
contributing to the capital stock; and second, through spillover effects which contribute to 
total factor productivity.   
 
The endogenous growth theory asserts that technological change contributes to economic 
progress. Later refinements to this theory suggest that investments in innovation, human 
capital, and knowledge contribute to technological change and growth (Romer, 1989 and 
1994). FDI enhances countries' economic growth as it brings in these factors along with the 
contribution to the capital. However, according to the empirical research, the argument that 
FDI is growth-enhancing has not been established for all countries and geographical areas. 
Empirical research also highlights many positives of FDI and some of the setbacks in its 
growth outcome. Nevertheless, many studies on the FDI-growth nexus have identified a 
positive relationship (Iamsiraroj and Ulubaşoğlu, 2015). This study brings a different 
approach to the empirical literature as it attempts to identify the channels through which FDI 
transmit economic growth.  
 
The empirical literature relating to FDI in both country-specific and cross-country studies 
focuses mainly on areas such as finding the determinants of FDI flows (Sirr et al., 2018; 
Mistura and Roulet, 2019), FDI-growth nexus (Alguacil, Cuadros and Orts, 2011; Lee, Lee 
and Kim, 2011; Anwar and Cooray, 2012) and causal relationship between FDI and growth 
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(Chowdhury and Mavrotas, 2006; Bermejo Carbonell, and Werner, 2018). However, no 
substantial work has been done on how FDI transmits into growth and the mechanism. 
In this paper, two research questions are addressed: (a) how do FDI inflows translate into 
growth in economies, and (b) through which channels does growth transmission take place. 
This study departs from the existing FDI growth-related literature. It moves a step further to 
examine the transmission channels through which FDI inflows transmit to growth in middle-
income level countries in the SAARC and ASEAN regions, whether it occurs through 
changes in capital, labour, or productivity growth.  
 
Data for this study are obtained from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank 
and Penn World Tables. To identify the transmission channels, the first step is to decompose 
economic growth into input change and total factor productivity components. For this 
purpose, this study employs the Growth Accounting approach. The second step uses the 
Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimation method for the panel data to analyse 
how FDI translates into growth. We find that FDI transmits economic growth mainly through 
the labour component. Capital accumulation path and productivity growth have not been 
effective transmission channels of FDI-induced growth. In addition, strong institutions help 
growth through the capital component. Also, human capital development and international 
trade help the transmission of economic growth through the productivity component.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an extensive review of the 
literature related to FDI and its growth linkages. It reviews both theoretical and empirical 
foundations and the positive and negative growth effects of FDI. Section 3 explains the data, 
econometric model and the methodology employed for the study. Section 4 summarises and 




2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.2.1. Theoretical foundation  
Despite many empirical studies on FDI-led growth hypothesis finding varied results, there 
appears to be a general theoretical consensus in academic circles that FDI inflows play an 
imperative role in determining the economic growth of host economies. The theoretical 
framework of the FDI-growth nexus is an extension of the growth theory and could be 
embodied in endogenous growth models. There are many indirect effects of FDI that 
strengthens the empirical underpinning of endogenous growth theory. According to Romer 
(1990), endogenous technological progress can create long-term growth. He argued that 
economic growth is driven by technological change resulting from profit-maximising agents' 
R&D (research and development). Production is associated with increasing returns to scale as 
ideas are non-rivalrous. New ideas enable firms to produce new products efficiently at lower 
costs making them more profitable. FDI can indirectly contribute to such growth by 
introducing new technology to the recipient economy. Also, Lucas (1988) argues that human 
capital with non-decreasing marginal returns contributes to endogenous growth.  Human 
capital extends not only to formal education but also skills acquired through on the job 
training. Also, human capital provides many positive externalities. Human capital and the 
resulting stock of knowledge can also lead to increasing returns to scale that improves 
production efficiency. Accordingly, the technology and human capital spillovers of FDI are 
highly effective in the long-run growth of the recipient economy.  
 
FDI contributes to growth directly by contributing to the capital stock and through indirect 
venues such as introducing new technology. Once the new technology becomes a part of the 
production function, the technological spillovers could continuously drive the economy 
towards a long-term growth path, offsetting the effects of diminishing returns to capital 
(Borensztein et al., 1998). Also, endogenous growth theory suggests that FDI would 
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contribute to long-run growth by introducing alternative management practices, organisational 
arrangements and augmenting the existing stock of knowledge in the host country by way of 
skills acquisition and labour training. The positive externalities of FDI can include managerial 
skills, organisational know-how, and labour training. Capital accumulation may provide an 
impetus for the economies to grow, making them more productive than domestic investment 
(De Mello, 1999).  
 
2.2.2. Empirical evidence of FDI Growth nexus 
It is pertinent to shed some light on the empirical findings on the FDI and growth nexus. 
Despite the theoretical underpinning, the empirical results in this field of study dominated by 
cross-country work are highly diverse and, at times, limited to specific geographical areas, 
thus making generalisations of the findings difficult if not irrelevant. A positive and 
statistically significant relationship is contended by Thangavelu, Yong and Chongvilaivan 
(2009), Alguacil, Cuadros and Orts (2011), Lee, Lee and Kim (2011), Anwar and Cooray 
(2012), Freckleton, Wright and Craigwell (2012), Kotrajaras (2010) and Kottaridi and 
Stengos (2010). Conversely, a negative relationship is reported by Herzer (2012), Vita and 
Kyaw (2009), and Wang and Wong (2009). Alguacil et al. (2011) assert that the growth 
effects of FDI depend on macroeconomic and institutional factors. Blomström et al. (1994) 
argue that the FDI-growth nexus applies only to countries with high income per capita, whilst 
Borensztein et al. (1998) conclude that the ability of FDI to encourage more significant 
growth depends on the minimum threshold of human capital stock in the host country. The 
meta-analysis study of Iamsiraroj and Ulubaşoğlu (2015) involves a review of 108 empirical 
studies with global coverage on the growth impact of FDI and employs 880 regression 
estimates. They find that 43% of the findings are positive and statistically significant; 26% are 
positive and statistically insignificant; 17% are negative and statistically significant, and 14% 
are negative and statistically insignificant. Accordingly, only two-fifths of the empirical 
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studies detected a statistically significant and positive effect of FDI, whilst a third concluded 
that the relationship was negative. 
 
Such diverse distribution in empirical findings would suggest that the theoretical foundation 
of the FDI growth nexus might be highly optimistic with no support from the empirical data. 
Such mixed results could be explained by estimation methodology (time series versus cross-
section) techniques employed (e.g. OLS, Granger Causality, Cointegration, Error correction 
models), chosen period, sample selection (developed versus less developed countries). 
Alguacil et al. (2011) attribute the diverse nature of conclusions in the literature to the 
treatment of host countries as a homogenous group, which are diverse mainly due to the 
different absorptive capacities. The following section presents some insights into the possible 
reasons for positive and non-positive associations between FDI and growth.  
 
2.2.3. Contribution of FDI to growth 
Channels through which FDI enhances growth: Productivity improvements and 
spillover effects 
In line with the FDI-led growth hypothesis, two channels through which FDI enhances growth 
are identified. The first is via the accumulation of input factors, especially capital. Thus, FDI 
is likely to be growth-enhancing by contributing to the host economy with factor inputs to the 
production processes. For the second, it occurs through Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
growth, that is, via technical know-how and productivity improvements. Through knowledge 
transfers, that is, through skill acquisition and labour training, FDI is expected to augment the 
existing stock of knowledge in the host country. In addition, the introduction of new 
organisational arrangements and alternative management practices can lead to productivity 
improvements (De Mello, 1999). Accordingly, the peripheral benefits of FDI contribute 
considerably towards productivity improvements. 
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Policies that encourage FDI inflows to developing economies are formulated so that the 
interests of both the investing Multi-National Enterprises (MNE) and the host country can 
coexist. Apart from contributing to the expansion of domestic capital stock, FDI introduces 
organisational and management expertise to the host country, creates knowledge spillovers 
through the acquisition of technology and skills by domestic labour, introduces new 
production processes, sets up value chains through forward and backward links across sectors, 
and most importantly, establishes connections links with foreign markets by providing access 
to domestically produced goods and services. In turn, recipient economies provide the MNEs 
with natural resources, cheaper labour, tax incentives, subsidies, and hitherto untapped 
markets (Caves, 2007).  
 
FDI contributes to the economies of host countries not only by augmenting domestic 
investment but also due to its positive externalities, also known as ‘spillover effects’, in terms 
of employment creation, technology transfers, increased domestic competition, and 
productivity (Mehic et al., 2013). Spillovers of technology take many forms, including the 
physical movement of labour. For example, domestic employees who work for MNE are 
given better and more training than their counterparts in locally owned firms and labour 
movement from MNEs to other local firms or starting their businesses, capitalising on the 
training they received from MNEs. This leads to the dissemination of technical know-how 
(Blomström et al., 2001).  
 
Moreover, FDI is likely to stimulate the technological upgrading of the host country and 
diffusion of technology across borders even in the absence of significant physical capital 
accumulation. FDI reaches destinations in different operational forms such as start-ups, joint 
ventures, management contracts, and marketing, franchise, and licensing agreements. 
Consequently, FDI could help improve productivity in the host country and thereby become a 
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catalyst for domestic investment and technological progress. The improvements made 
possible by FDI due to the knowledge and technology spillovers at the firm level caused by 
interactions and integration of domestic firms with multinationals would create the expected 
positive growth impact. For example, foreign acquisition of domestic firms has led to 
increased acceptance of new technology, innovations in processes and products, and increased 
productivity in sales and labour in Spain (Guadalupe et al., 2012). Conversely, a change in the 
ownership of a firm from foreign to domestic leads to a decline in total factor productivity, 
output, and more imports at the expense of exports (Javorcik and Poelhekke, 2016). 
Moreover, productivity improvements move along the supply chains due to backward 
integration. As a result, domestic producers who supply inputs to foreign-owned multinational 
companies commit to improving their products and processes and remaining competitive 
(Bajgar and Javorcik, 2014). 
 
2.2.4. Possible shortcomings of FDI  
Crowding out effect 
Despite being growth-enhancing in many aspects, FDI is not short of shortcomings. A 
possible way that FDI may undermine growth is by crowding out domestic investment 
sources and hindering capital accumulation. This occurs when foreign investors compete for 
scarce resources such as minerals, skilled labour, bank credit, import licenses, or franchises 
with domestic investors and foreclose investment opportunities. Through such competition 
outcomes, foreign firms might impair the productivity of domestic firms. Better firm- and 
industry-specific advantages of the MNEs lead to lower marginal costs. This enables them to 
make inroads into market shares of domestic firms, which will be compelled to cut their 






Impact on Labour market dynamics 
Regarding skilled labour, MNEs could provide better workplace environments and higher 
wages to attract the best-skilled personnel from the domestic labour market using the 
comparative advantage they enjoy. However, this might trigger labour movement from 
domestic firms to the MNEs and thereby deprive local industries of better-skilled workers 
(Feenstra and Hansen, 1997; Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2004). 
Constraints on spillovers through copyrights 
For various reasons, the positive spillover effects of FDI may not transmit as predicted in the 
literature. Görg and Greenaway (2004) argue that MNEs can safeguard firm-specific 
technology and knowledge through various mechanisms such as patents and copyrights and 
thereby deliberately negate any local spillovers. The extent of spillover may also depend on 
absorptive capacity, that is, the ability of the workforce to learn new technology and skills. In 
addition, domestic firms may not have access to finance for acquiring new and expensive 
technology due to underdeveloped financial markets. The process of absorbing foreign 
technology by domestic firms may also be hampered by low-skilled labour and outdated 
production technology and techniques. Finally, the transmission of technology through MNEs 
is doubtful due to their preference to work in enclaves while maintaining the proprietary 
ownership of intellectual copyright. Dahi and Demir (2016) find that in 2010, only around 
16% of research and development (R&D) activities of US majority-owned MNEs were 
undertaken outside the United States. Approximately 80% were done in countries in the 
northern hemisphere. Outside the R&D activities of US-owned MNEs in developing 
countries, China, Brazil, South Korea, and India collectively accounted for 68%.  
Constraints on knowledge and skills transfer 
Suppose an MNE perceives that a strategy to mitigate the spillovers is more likely to 
maximise profits. In that case, they will put in place the barriers within the company to ensure 
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that the domestic labour force will not have access to firm-specific technology. The risk that 
local managers of an MNE will pass their knowledge on to rival local firms in exchange for 
better wages/salaries or working conditions would be taken into account when devising local 
expansion strategies. For example, they might bring in expatriate managers who are less 
likely to divulge firm-specific secrets than local managers or consider paying ‘efficiency 
wages’ to local staff entrusted with handling the MNE's trade secrets. In sum, the extent to 
which specific technology or know-how introduced to the host country would generate 
spillovers will depend on the strategies of foreign investors. If it is relatively expensive to 
block the spillovers of technology compared to internalising within the foreign affiliate, there 
will be more significant opportunities for spillovers and vice versa. Moreover, if the cost of 
foreign technology to a host country is relatively high compared to the underlying value of 
such technology, the adoption will be lower than expected, and spillovers of FDI will be 
somewhat limited (Blomström et al., 2001). 
Disruption to domestic entrepreneurship 
The negative effect of FDI may also be fuelled by disrupting domestic entrepreneurship. 
Danakol et al. (2016) found that the FDI inflows via M&A lead to crowding out and 
curtailing domestic entrepreneurship within the host country and its economic sectors. 
Through competition, MNEs will drive out local players who are less efficient and create 
entry barriers to the industry through superior market power. This might be even more 
adverse in host countries with weaker institutions where competition policy is poorly defined 
or implemented (Aidis et al., 2012). Conversely, higher relative wages offered by the MNEs 
may distort the occupational choices away from entrepreneurship whereby a worker would be 
better off working for an MNE rather than becoming an entrepreneur (De Backer and 






Incomplete capital transmissions 
The definition of FDI extends to both the acquisition of existing domestic firms and 
greenfield investments, that is, the establishment of entirely new enterprises. Foreign capital 
flows relating to cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) might not necessarily bring 
new capital to the host economy as they could be mere transfers of ownership between a 
domestic and a foreign investor. Unless a domestic investor uses such proceeds for further 
investments instead of consumption, there would be no impact on the domestic capital 
formation and growth (Agosin and Mayer, 2000). So the mere inflated numbers related to FDI 
due to its broad definition might not necessarily have anything to do with economic growth.  
 
2.2.5. Absorptive capacity  
It is argued that the absorptive capacity, which comprises structural and policy prerequisites 
of the recipient economy, impacts the type, volume, and growth effect of FDI inflows. 
Absorptive capacity is determined by institutional factors, such as the recipient economy’s 
legislation, trade regime, political stability, size of the domestic market, and balance of 
payments constraints. Such sometimes unobservable, country-specific effects make the 
transmission of spillover effects of FDI more conducive (De Mello, 1999). In developing 
countries, some studies suggest that any beneficial impact of FDI on economic growth is 
conditional on such characteristics of the host economy. Borensztein et al. (1998) have 
revealed that, overall, FDI generates economic growth in the recipient economy, even though 
the available stock of human capital determines the magnitude. They also assert that direct 
FDI for countries with deficient levels of human capital could be harmful. They found that 
FDI will contribute to growth only when the recipient economy demonstrates a sufficient 
ability to absorb the available advanced and new technology. They also assert that FDI does 
not crowd out domestic investment. Similarly, Blomström et al. (2001) find that FDI benefits 
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to economic growth occur when an adequate level of education is available to the workforce 
in the recipient country. 
 
A somewhat recent development in endogenous growth models developed for the FDI-related 
research is incorporating macroeconomic and institutional factors as part of the absorptive 
capacity along with traditionally employed factors such as quality of human capital, 
infrastructure, and the degree of financial and trade openness. These factors contribute to 
enhancing the economic performance of host countries and influence their capacity to benefit 
from FDI inflows. Alguacil et al. (2011) introduce a different perspective to the debate by 
incorporating the roles of the macroeconomic and institutional environment as factors that 
contribute to the growth of an economy. They argue that rather than the policies designed to 
incentivise foreign investors that are burdensome to the host, improving the FDI-related 
policy framework through stronger institutions and maintaining better macroeconomic 
stability is the key to generating economic growth. Kose et al. (2006) assert that the linkages 
between these absorptive capacities and FDI determine the growth outcomes. The absorptive 
capacities reinforce the interaction between FDI and growth by facilitating FDI directly and 
fostering economic growth indirectly. 
 
2.2.6. The causal relationship between FDI and economic growth  
One branch in the empirical literature relating to FDI and growth relationship identifies a two-
way process where they mutually reinforce each other. In other words, the same factors 
identified in the literature as those responsible for the benefits of inward FDI are also likely to 
be the main attractors of such flows, thus closing a virtuous circle. FDI accelerates Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth through technological transfers, improving production 
efficiency. In turn, higher GDP may attract more FDI of foreign investors seeking higher 
profits and returns in a larger market. Specialised investments in export sectors, scale 
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economies, productivity improvement, cost reduction, knowledge and technology transfers, 
and better management systems emanate from FDI contribute to output growth.  This, in turn, 
leads to more FDI inflows by increasing profits and returns of foreign investors through 
market expansion, creating an interactive mechanism (Hansen and Rand, 2004). This is 
attributed to foreign investors seeking higher returns on their investment capital (Moudatsou 
and Kyrkilis, 2011). Foreign investors can extract more profits from their FDI through 
economies of scale effects, arising from the expanded market size and purchasing power due 
to higher GDP in the host economy. These arguments are closely related to the location 
advantages of the eclectic model introduced by Dunning (1993). Accordingly, the would-be 
positive effects of FDI on growth and the possibility of foreign capital being attracted by 
higher growth are both plausible.  
 
2.2.7. Impact of FDI on economic growth and structural changes in Middle-Income 
countries  
Having reviewed the literature about the FDI and growth nexus, this paper now sheds light on 
the economic performance of middle-income countries in the two regions as they form the 
majority of the economies there. A pertinent question faced by policymakers of these 
countries is how to sustain the growth momentum they enjoyed over the years and remain 
competitive. A closer view of the economic progress of different countries suggests that it is 
not a journey where everybody moves at the same speed and in the same direction all the 
time. Some have become an advanced economy within a generation like the Asian Tigers, 
while others have stagnated after reaching the middle-income level. There are several 
laggards within the grouping of countries that are used in this study. The challenge of a 
middle-income country is two-fold. First, the country is to remain competitive with 
increasingly higher labour costs than the relatively less developed countries. Second, the 
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country has to compete with countries that are more developed with better and more 
sophisticated technology.  
 
Since first being coined by Gill and Kharas (2007), the ‘middle-income trap’ phenomenon has 
been widely examined in development economics-related research. Several definitions have 
been posited for the middle-income trap. Ayier et al. (2013) view it as a prolonged period of 
stagnation or recession that a middle-income economy faces after its high-growth period 
finishes and argue that such slowdowns are disproportionately concentrated on middle-
income economies. Eichengreen et al. (2012, 2013) find there are two modes of slowdowns at 
two different levels of purchasing power parity (PPP); income of US$10,000–11,000 and at 
US$15,000–16,000. According to Otsuka et al. (2017), the middle-income trap in East Asian 
countries is caused by failures to coordinate diverse interests, narrow-minded government 
interventions, and other inadequate responses to growth deceleration by the private sector. 
Several countries among the selected ones are believed to be in the middle-income trap, and 
they are in the slowing down phase, which makes it interesting to examine how FDI has 
contributed to growth in such countries.   
Aiyer et al. (2018), in their study on growth slowdowns in middle-income countries of the 
Asian region, have found that middle-income countries (MICs) differ from others in 
experiencing a higher frequency of slowdowns. The study also shows that the Asian 
economies have fared better during slowdowns than their peers in other regions such as the 
Middle East, North Africa and Latin America despite the wide disparity in countries’ 
experiences. Better macroeconomic performance in middle-income countries in Asia 
emanates from trade openness and macroeconomic stability. Asian middle-income countries 
benefit from vertical supply chains and regional integration through bilateral and multilateral 
trade arrangements on the trade front. Asia’s growth, however, has also benefited from high 
investment rates and capital inflows despite peripheral risk factors, such as vulnerability to the 
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balance of payment problems. Strong trade performance in the region may also act as a buffer 
against slowdowns in economic growth. However, institutional weaknesses such as stringent 
product market regulations in Indonesia and India hinder growth in Asian middle-income 
countries compared to others (Aiyer et al., 2018). They also need further investment in new 
infrastructure in freight and ports, public transport systems, and power utilities.   
The theoretical proposition that growth is a smooth process is debated in the recent empirical 
literature. The growth of middle-income countries lacks consistency and is characterised by 
varying phases. Berg et al. (2012), after studying different growth paths in an extended 
country sample, have identified structural breaks in economic growth paths named growth 
‘spells’. They identify foreign direct investment as one of the critical factors that predict 
sustained growth. The other factors they have noted as predictors of sustained growth are 
democratic institutions, equal income distribution, export or production structure favouring 
relatively sophisticated exports, less external debt, better macro stability, and trade openness.  
Developing countries sometimes experience more protracted downturns and growth spells 
which end relatively abruptly and quickly. Berg et al. (2012) have stated that the mean growth 
spells in emerging Asia last ten years. This is virtually the same as industrialised countries 
and is double that of Latin America and Africa. They also observe that growth spells in Asia 
have ended on average with soft landings with growth rates between -1% and 3%. They find 
that longer growth spells are associated with international financial integration, whereas 
higher levels of FDI and low external debt help growth spells persist for longer. An increase 
in FDI flows from 8-12% of the GDP extended the growth spell by 15%, and a decrease in 
external debt to GDP ratio from 44% to 39% grew it by 2%. Jayasooriya (2018) finds 
evidence that South Asian countries have experienced growth slowdowns and are in a middle-
income trap. He identifies that numerous growth slowdown episodes from 1960 to 2014 are 
caused by low trade openness, low human capital, changes in demographic realities, and 
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relatively lower levels of FDI. He asserts that official development assistance, dependency 
ratio, and inflation also cause growth slowdowns to persist.  
FDI could trigger the much-needed structural transformation in middle-income countries. 
Even in the middle-income trap-related literature, lack of structural change is cited as a major 
cause of stagnation. FDI brings about export diversification, technological spillovers, and 
industrial upgrading, leading to higher growth during the transition and driving convergence. 
Hausman et al. (2007) discover a positive and highly significant connection between export 
sophistication and ensuing economic growth across all income groups. However, when the 
relationship was tested separately for income groups, a strong positive effect was found in the 
middle-income group, whilst the relationship did not hold for low and high-income 
economies.  
Middle-income countries cannot afford to miss out on structural transformation. FDI could 
help this through the diversification and sophistication in the export sector of the recipient 
country starting at the business level. Ohno (2009) asserts there are four stages in the 
industrialisation process along which a firm advances. First, foreign guidance helps to 
develop less sophisticated manufacturing. Second, domestic companies absorb new 
technology through licensing arrangements, imports, and FDI spillovers whilst the supporting 
peripheral industries develop. In the next stage, firms have mastered the technology and 
management to produce high-quality goods, and in the final stage, firms advance to product 
design and innovation. Ohno argues there is a glass ceiling between the second and third 
stages which he defines as the middle-income trap. Accordingly, FDI is significant in the 
transformation of the middle-income economies and helps growth momentum to persist.  
 
2.2.8. FDI transmission channels  
Farole and Winkler (2014) have illustrated how various factors combine to cause FDI 
spillovers in an economy (Figure 3). Foreign firm characteristics form spillover potential via 
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factors such as FDI motive, the extent of which are linked to global value chains (GVCs) 
through global sourcing and production strategy. Domestic firm characteristics such as 
technology gap and human capital determine the absorptive capacity. Host country factors 
and its institutional framework influence the characteristics of the domestic and foreign firms 
and determine how spillover effects of FDI are transmitted to the host economy.  
 
 
Figure 2. 1: Role of mediating factors for FDI spillovers 
 
 
Source: Farole and Winkler (2014)  
 
The influence of FDI on growth is transmitted through two main channels, namely, directly 
by contributing to inputs and indirectly through productivity growth. Spillover effects in 
technology and knowledge help the recipient economies enhance their productivity levels 
(Mehic et al., 2013; De Mello, 1999). FDI contributes to growth, principally, through 
domestic capital formation through higher capital stocks (Almfraji and Almsafir, 2014). 
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Thompson (2008), using a theoretical model, shows that foreign investment flows are due to 
the difference in capital to labour ratios between the host and source country. This generates 
excess demand (host) and excess investments (source), which lead to FDI flows. To reach an 
equilibrium state (equal ratios in host and source economy), FDI flows must directly impact 
inputs accumulation, especially capital stock. An indirect link between FDI and economic 
growth via TFP growth is postulated because a host country can gain access to new 
technologies and increase economic efficiency due to better know-how, managerial skills, and 
improved human capital (Iamsirarojand & Ulubasoglu, 2015). 
FDI inflows to a recipient economy may not necessarily lead to increased labour and hence 
form an elusive relationship. FDI may contribute to growth through increased demand for 
labour, especially for the skilled labour segment. However, foreign acquisitions of domestic 
firms, such as those involved in privatisations, would lead to initial layoffs. Also, automation 
of work processes associated with new management practices would lead to lower 
employment (Azman et al., 2010). Hence, the relationship between change in labour and FDI 
may not be that straightforward. In the empirical literature, Makiela and Outtara (2018), using 
data for a grouping of developed and developing economies for the years 1970-2007, examine 
the transmission channels from FDI to growth. They find that FDI affects growth via input 
accumulation but not via the total factor productivity growth channel. Accordingly, FDI may 
not be the only contributing factor for the rise in productivity experienced by developing 
countries in recent times. 
Having reviewed the arguments for and against the growth effects of FDI and given the 
counteracting effects of FDI that were highlighted, it is evident the FDI growth nexus is 
something far more complex than how it has been projected in the literature. It is, therefore, 
essential to identify hitherto unexamined channels through which FDI generates growth. 








Source: Author’s illustration 
 
 
2.3. DATA AND METHODS 
2.3.1. Data 
Data are obtained from World Development Indicators maintained by the World Bank and 
Penn World Tables. Institutional factors in the model employ Freedom House Indexes. Data 
are collected from 1993 to 2017 for several reasons. The first is availability. Second, the 
period represents an era where most of the countries in the selected grouping went through 
structural changes. Third, by the mid-1990s, almost all these countries had started 
competitively introducing economic reforms. Twelve countries were selected out of the 14 
middle-income level nations in the two regions based on the data availability. Those countries 
are outlined in Table 1. Following the existing literature, sample data are used as three-year 






Table 2. 1: Countries that are studied 
 
SAARC ASEAN  
Bangladesh Malaysia 
Bhutan Indonesia 
India Lao PDR 
Pakistan Vietnam 
Sri Lanka  Thailand 
 Cambodia 
 The Philippines  
 
2.3.2. Econometric Model  
This paper adopts a two-step approach to examine the transmission channels in the FDI-
growth nexus. In the first step, economic growth will be decomposed into factor components, 
and in the second step, it is determined through which component, FDI, causes economic 
growth. In terms of the conceptual model employed for this study, FDI affects the growth of 
an economy both directly and indirectly; direct impact occurs through factor accumulation 
and indirect one via the growth in Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Both factor accumulation 
and the growth in TFP contribute to output growth. Accordingly, each growth component is 
considered as a transmission channel through which FDI inflows translate into growth. 
 
As a first step, economic growth will be decomposed into its factor components, broadly 
speaking, capital, labour, and TFP. First, the production technology for an economy is defined 
in the form of a production function. Then estimates of TFP are obtained from the method of 
decomposition employed. As a next step, growth rates of output, input factors, and TFP will 
be derived. Since output growth is a result of the contribution of each factor, the growth rates 
of each input are calculated as a ratio of output growth. Accordingly, the growth components 
of output will be the growth rates of the contributing factors. Growth decomposition starts 
with specifying a simple aggregate production function in the form of Y= F(A, K, L) where Y 
is total output, K is stock of capital, L is labour, and A represents the Total Factor 
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Productivity (TFP). The growth components are separated using a growth accounting 
equation as follows:  
     Y =     K +   L +   TFP -------------------- (1) 
 
The second step involves investigating the transmission channels, as identified in the first step 
as growth components, through which FDI transmits into growth. Each growth component is 
regressed with FDI. This is done to examine how FDI affects each growth component. ν is an 
independently distributed error term. yit represents each growth component.  
 
Δyit = Δyit-1+ β1ΔFDIit+ β2 Δxit + νit  --------------(2) 
 
Coefficient β1, which is estimated for all three growth components, explains through which 
component growth effects of FDI will be transmitted. This involves regression analysis where 
each growth component is regressed against independent variables, including the FDI, in 
terms of equation 2. The effect of FDI on all growth components - capital, labour, and TFP - 
is explored in this manner. We also use other control variables, denoted as ‘x’ in equation (2). 
The terms of trade (TOT) represents the impact of trade, and Real Gross Domestic Product 
(RGDP) is an indicator of economic performance. Inflation (INF) is a proxy for 
macroeconomic stability as higher inflation leads to economic uncertainty. The infrastructure 
level is represented by the availability of electricity (ELC), while the institutional factors 
constitute the democratic index devised by Freedom House (INST). 
 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) methodology for dynamic panel data proposed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998) is employed as the estimation method. Such a dynamic panel 
approach captures the presence of country-specific effects which may be left unobserved. It 
also addresses the issues relating to simultaneity or reverse causality.  
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2.3.3. Growth Decomposition techniques 
There are mainly three methods that have been employed in the empirical literature to 
decompose economic growth into factors: the traditional growth accounting (GA) approach, 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). More recent 
literature employs the latter two.  
 
2.3.3.1. Growth accounting approach  
The Growth Accounting approach, also known as the sources of economic growth approach, 
was pioneered by Solow (1957). Growth accounting provides a breakdown of economic 
growth into its main components by determining changes attributable to growth in each of the 
factor inputs, mainly capital and labour, and an unexplained component, known as Solow’s 
residual. The change in growth due to Solow’s residual is attributed to technical progress or 
technical change. It has since become known as total factor productivity (TFP) because it 
captures all sources of economic growth apart from those attributable to capital and labour. 
However, Abramovitz (1956) concedes that TFP is not necessarily a measure of technology 
since it could be a function of other factors such as monetary shocks, institutional factors, or 
even the political party in power or military spending. Hence, he referred to TFP as a measure 
covering many components: innovation-based technological progress, imitation–based 
technological progress, institutional change, efficiency change, omitted variables, and 
measurement errors. Therefore, it is now common to examine the fundamental determinants 
of performance in any economy using the growth accounting exercise. The growth accounting 
exercise helps determine whether economic growth has been driven by factor input growth or 
productivity increases. Another advantage of this distinction is to determine whether the 
observed economic growth is sustainable or not. If the rapid increase in capital stock drives 
economic growth, such growth may not be sustainable in the long run. Still, if increases in 
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total factor productivity drive growth, such growth may be sustainable in the long run (Iyoha, 
2002). 
The total output of an economy is modelled as being produced by factors of production, 
which are usually captured by an aggregate production function, written as follows: 
 
Y=F(A,K,L) ------------------(3)  
 
where Y, A, K and L represent the total output, Solow’s residual, capital and labour, 
respectively.  
 
Differentiating equation (3) with time, dividing both sides by Y and rearrangement of the 
term yields: 
 
(Equations to derive growth components) 
 
 
However, the Growth Accounting approach is not short of limitations. The first and most 
prominent caveat is that, as the total factor productivity is calculated from the residual, 
measurement errors in the variables measuring labour and capital are mechanically imputed 
into the TFP. Accordingly, interpreting the residual as the change in TFP growth could be 
disputed. Second, growth accounting is a descriptive tool that does not provide insights into 
the nature of TFP growth, whether it is due to technological, structural, or institutional 
changes. It also depends on the assumption of independence between employment growth, 
capital accumulation, and productivity growth.  
 
 
2.3.3.2. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Approach  
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a nonparametric, mathematical programming method 
employed in economics and operational research to estimate production frontiers (Charnes et 
al., 1978). It is used to empirically measure the productivity and efficiency of the decision-
making units (DMUs) using linear programming that envelops input-output vectors 
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(Boussofiane et al., 1991). When DEA is employed to analyse macroeconomic data in a 
cross-country setup, each country is considered as a DMU. DEA is based on linear 
programming techniques where efficiency is measured as the relative distance to the frontier. 
Thus, technically inefficient firms operate at points within the frontier, while technically 
efficient firms operate somewhere along the technology defined by the frontier. 
Depending on what the analysis is trying to achieve, the DEA approach has more tools to 
investigate the differences in efficiency and productivity among the DMUs. DEA can be 
subdivided into an output-oriented model that maximises outputs or an input-oriented model 
that minimises inputs while satisfying at least the given output levels. Further, DEA can be 
subdivided in terms of returns to scale by adding weight constraints. Charnes, Cooper, and 
Rhodes (1978) originally proposed the efficiency measurement of the DMUs for constant 
returns to scale (CRS), where all DMUs are operating at their best possible level. Later, 
Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984) introduced the variable returns to scale (VRS) efficiency 
measurement model, allowing efficiency breakdown into technical and scale efficiencies in 
DEA. 
Whilst DEA makes possible further decomposition of the TFP into technical and scale 
efficiencies, and there are some limitations. One issue with the DEA is that it is deterministic, 
and consequently, it is based on the strong assumption there is no measurement error in the 
data. However, when dealing with macroeconomic data, one is more likely to encounter 
measurement error issues. Another shortcoming is that, rather than assuming the CRS or VRS 
nature of production, it is impossible to specify a particular production technology in the form 
of a production function. 
 
2.3.3.3. Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) Approach 
SFA is the other primary contemporary approach to analyse productivity independently, and it 
is a method that originally was devised by Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) and Aigner et 
38 
 
al. (1977). Unlike GA or DEA approaches, SFA is an econometric approach. However, just 
like the DEA, it employs a frontier method to determine the efficiency of a firm or a country. 
Under the classical SFA approach, Maximum Likelihood Estimators (MLE) are utilised for 
estimation purposes. However, in a more recent development, Bayesian methods have been 
integrated into the SFA approach. This Bayesian Stochastic Frontier Analysis (BSFA) 
approach makes inferences about economic growth and its components in BSFA depend on 
two aspects: (i) the choice of production function parameterisation; and (ii) the BSFA model 
type, that is, the choice of prior in-efficiency distribution. 
 BSFA comprises important features that make the growth decomposition stage more 
interesting. First, economic regularity conditions (non-negative elasticities of production 
factors) about the production function can be easily imposed, ensuring that the features of the 
production technology, such as non-negative factor elasticities, can be specified against which 
objectives of the study are benchmarked. Second, BSFA makes it possible to acquire the exact 
small sample results and derive the full posterior distribution of any quantity of interest that 
leads to a relatively more straightforward assessment of measurement uncertainty of the 
growth components (and these are complex functions of the data, model parameters, and 
latent variables). And third, it is possible to formally compare competing stochastic frontier 
specifications and thereby formally mitigate the problem of choosing an appropriate 
approximation of the unknown production function (Makiela and Ouattara, 2018). This leads 
to selecting the best frontier model given the data for output growth decomposition. 
2.3.4. Choice of decomposition technique  
For this study, the choice between the three techniques discussed will be based on several 
criteria. Recent literature appears to prefer econometric methods. However, the BSFA 
approach requires stating explicitly the prior distributions of all unknown quantities of the 
model, such as the latent variables and production parameters. In practice, this makes the 
BSFA approach more difficult to pin down and less of an automatic choice. On the other 
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hand, DEA does not have the freedom to specify a production function with specific 
coefficients for labour and capital since it considers only a CRS versus VRS specification, 
which is broader. Accordingly, this study intends to employ a modified approach to growth 
accounting. As a first step, the production function will be chosen based on model selection 
criteria. For this, each production function will be regressed to obtain the maximum 
likelihood estimates (MLE), and the best production function will be chosen based on the 
information criteria. The second step will involve using the traditional GA approach to 
decompose growth to obtain the growth components.   
 
 
2.3.5. Growth component regressions  
 
2.3.5.1. Estimation Technique 
In the second stage of the analysis, equation (1) is estimated by using the difference 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) methodology for dynamic panel data proposed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The GMM estimation enables 
controlling for potential endogeneity of all the explanatory variables. As this is a maximum 
likelihood type dynamic panel technique, it improves the existing technique in terms of finite-
sample performance, removing the biases caused by weak instruments. It also considers the 
presence of unobserved country-specific effects and deals with the problem of reverse 
causality or simultaneity. Moreover, this methodology appears to be more appropriate for 
estimating the growth models than the standard GMM estimator developed for dynamic panel 
data (Arellano & Bond, 1991). As Blundell and Bond (1998) demonstrated, the instruments 
used in the standard GMM estimation can behave poorly when explanatory variables present 
a strong autoregressive component (such as income or capital level). 
Several assumptions are embodied in the data generating process in the GMM estimations. 
Some regressors are endogenous, the process is dynamic as the past realisations of the 
dependent variable influence current ones, and the fixed individual effects are arbitrarily 
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distributed. The idiosyncratic disturbances are uncorrelated across individuals and may have 
individual-specific patterns of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. Endogenous and 
exogenous variables were used as instruments along with the regressors. The first lag of the 
dependent variable was used as an endogenous variable in all the regressions. This is because 
some regressors are independent of current disturbances, or not strictly exogenous, and some 
regressors can be influenced by past ones (Roodman, 2009). 
Several test statistics were used to validate the regressions’ outcomes. The reliability of the 
econometric approach based on the dynamic panel approach depends on the validity of the 
instruments. To test the presence of serial correlation, p-values of AR(1) and AR(2) statistics 
are used. A significant AR(1) implies the presence of first-order serial correlation and this 
justifies the use of lags. Once the lag of the dependent variable is used as a regressor, AR(2) 
needs to be insignificant, strongly suggesting that the model no longer suffers from second-
order serial correlation. Sargan and Hansen tests generate the p-values for the null hypothesis 
of the invalid specification. Both p-values need to be insignificant to ensure the correct 
specification. The reliability of the econometric approach based on the dynamic panel 
approach relies heavily on the validity of the instruments, which can be evaluated with the 
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. 
This study employs difference GMM estimation. This is because the coefficient generated for 
the lagged independent variable by the difference GMM estimation is higher than that of fixed 
effects estimation. Further, one of the prerequisites of GMM estimation is that the number of 
groups has to be larger than the periods in the panel. Accordingly, this is met by having 12 
countries and 8 time periods in the study, as explained in the Data section. Since the sample 
size was restricted to 12, the ‘collapse’ option was employed in the regressions to control the 
number of instruments, as suggested by Roodman (2009, p 87). The ‘robust’ option served to 
ensure that the standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity whilst the ‘small’ option was 
employed to cater for the small sample size. Also, regressions are run for seven different 
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models, a baseline model which shows the relationship between the growth component and 
the FDI, a model that employs all the regressors, and 5 further models. All this depends on the 
regressors that represent different areas of concern.  
 
2.3.5.2. Choice of independent variables  
Regressions of the growth components involve choosing regressors to be used along with the 
FDI as independent variables. The existing literature uses an extensive range of variables as 
determinants of growth and the same is used in this study as determinants of the growth 
components as well. These variables are grouped into different categories. To avoid the use of 
similar types of variables and the use of variables that are highly correlated, a correlation 
analysis was employed to select the independent variables from each category in the 
regressions. 
Real GDP and Inflation (INF) are used as Macroeconomic variables. Real GDP (measured by 
the GDP in constant 2010 US$ of the World Development Indicators) represents the size of 
the economy. Inflation is used as a proxy for the macroeconomic stability of the economy. 
For this, inflation (measured by the GDP deflator) provided by the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) is employed in the regressions. Trade is represented by the share of 
merchandise exports (at current purchasing power parity) in the GDP provided by the Penn 
World Tables (PWT) was used. Institutions are proxied by a combined index formed by 
averaging the Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL) indexes of the Freedom House 
Institute. PR and CL are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest 
degree of freedom and seven the lowest. Freedom in the World analyses the electoral process, 
political pluralism and participation, the functioning of the government, freedom of 
expression and belief, associational and organisational rights, the rule of law, and personal 
autonomy and individual rights for each country and territory (Freedom House 2018). 
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Human capital is proxied by the Human Capital Index compiled in the PWT9 which is based 
on years of schooling and returns to education. Infrastructure is proxied by the availability of 
electricity. Access to electricity as a percentage of the population provided by the WDI is 
used for this reason. Variables such as the geographical area cannot be used in a dynamic 
panel setup since taking the first difference will automatically remove the time-invariant 
terms.  
Four types of production functions below were selected based on their wider use in the 
existing literature: 
Let h(xit; βt) be the log form of a production function 
i. Cobb-Douglas production function 
h(xit ; βt) = β0 + β1kit + β2lit 
ii. Cobb-Douglas production function with a time trend 
h(xit ; βt) = β0 + β1kit + β2lit + β3t 
iii. Translog production function 
h(xit ; βt) = β0 + β1kit + β2lit + β3k2 + β4l2 + β5kit lit 
iv. Translog production function with a time trend 
h(xit ; βt) = β0 + β1kit + β2lit + β3k2 + β4l2 + β5kit lit + β3t 
 
2.3.6. Estimation process 
First, the maximum likelihood estimates were obtained for the four production functions. Real 
Gross Domestic Production, Gross fixed capital formation, and Labour Force were used as 
proxies for output, capital, and labour, respectively. An appropriate production function that 
fits the data was chosen by using the information criteria. For this study, Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) are used for selecting the 
production function. Accordingly, the Cobb-Douglas production function with a time trend 
that has the lowest AIC value was chosen. 
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Table 2. 2: Selection of the production function 
 
Production Function  AIC  BIC 
Cobb-Douglas production function -2.963575 9.752899 
Cobb-Douglas production function with a time trend -43.98754 -31.27106 
Translog production function -2.813923     14.98914 
Translog production function with a time trend -28.14038 -12.88061 
Then, using the coefficients for capital and labour resulted in by the maximum likelihood 
estimation, the growth components of capital (GCGFC), Labour (GCLF), and TFP (GCTFP) 
were derived using the growth accounting method. Next, each growth component was 
regressed against the FDI and other independent variables using the difference GMM 
technique. 
 
2.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
The estimation results are summarised in Tables 3, 4, and 5 which represent regressions with 
growth components of labour, capital, and TFP, respectively. Starting with Table 3, it appears 
that the coefficients of FDI are significant only in the growth component of labour force 
(GCLF). This observation is true for all seven models that use GCLF and they also have 
positive values. The robustness of the findings is visible in all the models that are estimated 
under each of growth component. For the other two components, that is, growth components 
of capital (GCGFC) and the TFP (GCTFP), FDI does not show any significance in any of the 
models. Nevertheless, the estimated coefficients of FDI for both GCGFC and GCTFP have 
negative signs in all the models. It is clear from the diagnostics presented in Tables 3-5 that 
the instruments are appropriate. Test statistics are also presented for Arellano and Bond’s 
(1991) first-order AR(1) and second-order AR(2) serial correlation in the error process. In one 
model of GCTFP and some models under GCGFC, first-order serial correlation is visible. 
44 
 
Nevertheless, such models do not produce valid results. However, the AR(2) tests indicate 
that no second order-serial correlation is present in all the models.  
This implies that the FDI has been instrumental in expanding the labour markets in the sample 
of countries. As these economies were structurally reforming, labour movement from primary 
sectors such as agriculture to manufacturing is evident. FDI generally flows into the 
manufacturing sectors of the countries, expansion of which can absorb more labour from the 
hitherto untapped resources such as the unemployed women and youth. As highlighted by 
Feenstra and Hansen (1997) and Lipsey and Sjoholm (2004), MNEs pay higher wages which 
triggers labour movement from domestic firms to the MNEs. This might leave a vacuum of 
labour in the domestically owned firms and compel them to hire more personnel. As more 
labour is employed, the contribution from labour to the growth would be more prominent. 
Also, Driffield and Taylo (2000) assert that FDI increases the demand for skilled labour while 
contributing to skill upgrading. This will encourage the unemployed to gain new skills to be 
employed in new firms and those in informal sector to move to the formal sector as a skilled 
employee In sum, FDI has contributed to the labour growth in economies that leads into   
overall growth in the economy. 
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Table 2. 3: Growth Component of Labour Force as Dependent variable 
Variables  Baseline  Macro.  Trade Infrastructure Institutions  Human 
Capital 
All 
L1.GCLF 0.021 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.008 -0.007 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.038) 0.037 (0.107) 
FDI 0.080* 0.089* 0.093* 0.096** 0.087* 0.096** 0.152** 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) 0.048 (0.062) 
RGDP  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
INF  -0.002     -0.009 
  (0.010)     (0.012) 
TRD   -0.119    0.235 
   (0.237)    (0.714) 
ELC    -0.018   -0.086 
    (0.012)   (0.079) 
INST     0.010  -0.121 
     (0.147)  (1.407) 
HC      -1.215 -2.147 
      1.143 (2.010) 
Observations 71 71 71 71 71 65 65 
Number of countries 12 12 12 12 12 11 11 
Number of Instruments 5 7 9 9 9 10 10 
AR1 test (p-value) 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.035 
AR2 test (p-value) 0.856 0.803 0.824 0.864 0.793 0.893 0.77 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.448 0.498 0.518 0.563 0.488 0.535 0.537 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.235 0.453 0.327 0.345 0.436 0.234 0.334 
Notes:         
(1) Robust Standard errors are indicated in the parentheses. 


























Macro.  Trade Infrastructure Institutions  Human 
Capital 
All 
L1.GCGFC 0.026 0.008 0.014 0.013 0.022 0.005 -0.139 
 (0.074) (0.080) (0.091) (0.095) (0.107) 0.097 (0.127) 
FDI -0.106 -0.129 -0.107 -0.107 -0.105 -0.111 -0.128 
 (0.118) (0.124) (0.116) (0.117) (0.116) 0.112 (0.094) 
RGDP  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
INF  0.033     0.059 
  (0.042)     (0.061) 
TRD   -0.187    1.774 
   (0.233)    (1.809) 
ELC    0.011   0.036 
    (0.015)   (0.028) 
INST     -0.021  0.719** 
     (0.128)  (0.360) 
HC      0.868 -2.017 
      0.756 (2.957) 
        
        
Observations 68 68 68 68 68 62 62 
Number of countries 12 12 12 12 12 11 11 
Number of Instruments 5 7 9 9 9 10 10 
AR1 test (p-value) 0.128 0.114 0.147 0.137 0.142 0.144 0.095 
AR2 test (p-value) 0.296 0.301 0.241 0.302 0.23 0.456 0.349 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.919 0.885 0.903 0.883 0.883 0.933 0.791 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.145 0.323 0.236 0.273 0.329 0.146 0.335 
Notes: (1) Robust Standard errors are indicated in the parentheses. 
            (2) *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 























Table 2. 5:Growth component of Total Factor Productivity as Dependent Variable 
Variables  Baseli
ne  
Macro.  Trade Infrastructure Institutions  Human 
Capital 
All 
L1.GCTFP 0.060 0.056 0.076 0.014 0.074 0.096 0.024 
 (0.082) (0.112) (0.121) (0.108) (0.116) (0.125) (0.115) 
FDI -0.122 -0.112 -0.203 -0.125 -0.207 -0.127 -0.114 
 (0.117) (0.105) (0.176) (0.115) (0.176) (0.121) (0.104) 
RGDP  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INF  -0.014     -0.010 
  (0.017)     (0.016) 
TRD   0.232*    0.173* 
   (0.138)    (0.102) 
ELC    0.018   0.014 
    (0.013)   (0.011) 
INST     -0.003  0.008 
     (0.064)  (0.069) 
HC      0.935*  
      (0.522)  
        
        
Observations 68 68 68 68 68 62 68 
Number of countries 12 12 12 12 12 11 12 
Number of Instruments 5 7 9 9 9 10 10 
AR1 test (p-value) 0.115 0.098 0.063 0.070 0.069 0.099 0.088 
AR2 test (p-value) 0.753 0.612 0.776 0.367 0.682 0.863 0.417 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.968 0.956 0.949 0.778 0.959 0.936 0.803 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.355 0.406 0.301 0.202 0.494 0.737 0.176 
Notes:  
(1) Robust Standard errors are indicated in the parentheses. 
(2) *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The core finding that the FDI contributes to growth but not through GCTFP agrees with the 
existing empirical literature. Makiela and Ouattara (2018) conclude that FDI affects growth 
via inputs accumulation but not through the TFP growth. This study’s findings are consistent 
with the above, as it further proves that the TFP is not significant for economic growth in the 
selected countries. This study goes a step further to highlight that out of the two inputs, it is 
the labour growth that contributes to overall economic growth. The growth impact of FDI 
through capital is not statistically significant. Accordingly, there is no strong evidence to 
conclude that the direct impact of FDI on the growth through contribution to domestic capital 
accumulation is growth-enhancing. Agosin and Mayer (2000) highlight the possible crowding 
out of domestic investment by the FDI, in which case the overall impact of capital 
accumulation would be insignificant. None of the other explanatory variables show any 
significant impact on growth through the component of capital except for the institutional 
factors. Accordingly, stronger institutions have helped the economy to grow through capital 
accumulation. This is because, stronger institutions, especially economic ones, can trigger 
growth in capital through a well-functioning financial system.  
Nevertheless, the results do not contradict the role of productivity growth in economic 
development. Rather, it suggests that factors other than FDI, that is, trade and human capital, 
seem to affect the productivity growth more. This also is in line with the existing literature 
(Rath and Farida, 2014; Danquah et al., 2014). In other words, the share of manufacturing 
exports to the GDP and growth in human capital have contributed to rising productivity which 
might have been helped by the peripheral benefits of FDI flows, such as skills and technology 
transmission. However, stronger institutions have not been able to contribute to productivity 
growth. Although FDI makes no direct impact on productivity, results do accord with the 
proposition that the spillover effects of FDI help to improve productivity growth (Mehic et al., 
2013). This might also explain why some studies on the FDI-growth nexus concerning the 
developing countries results in neutral or negative outcomes, when such countries rely a lot 
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on productivity growth. This study suggests that, other than a direct positive impact on labour 
growth, FDI might help productivity growth indirectly through spillover effects. However, 
this might not be reported most studies.  
2.5. CONCLUSIONS 
The macroeconomic issues relating to output growth have been a major preoccupation of 
modern economics since its dawn and have never failed to generate debates in academic 
circles. The dominance of Asia as the top receiver of FDI inflows has been linked to the 
impressive growth rates in those economies in the last few decades. It is argued that positive 
spillovers of technology and knowledge, incentives for innovation, and productivity 
enhancement have contributed to the host economies’ progress. However, the transmission 
channels through which the FDI translates into growth remain an unknown in the literature. 
Moreover, despite numerous avenues in which the literature on economic growth has 
expanded there is a deficiency in the studies conducted in the context of middle-income 
countries in the SAARC and ASEAN countries. Middle-income countries are special as they 
experience growth slowdowns more frequently than other economies. To address the research 
gaps in this area, this study aimed to identify and explain the transmission channels of FDI. 
The role of FDI in economic growth has been a highly debated topic in academic circles. The 
empirical findings are quite diverse irrespective of the period or geographical area(s) being 
investigated. This study marked an attempt to explain such varied conclusions. It dug deep by 
focusing on the transmission channels through which FDI flows translated into growth. The 
relationship between FDI and three main growth components is investigated using a sample 
comprising of 12 middle-income countries in the SAARC and ASEAN regions using data 
from 1994 to 2017. The results show that FDI exerts a positive and statistically significant 
effect on the growth component of labour and then overall economic growth. However, FDI 
shows no statistically significant effect on the growth components of productivity and capital.  
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Since FDI has not contributed to the component of capital accumulation, it would be 
important to investigate what type of FDI inflows dominates the portfolio and the strategies 
that MNEs adopt when attempting to enter the domestic market. A possible way that FDI 
might not contribute to the overall capital may be crowding out domestic investment sources 
which leads to minimal net capital growth. Moreover, if FDI inflows were dominated by 
foreign acquisitions of the existing businesses, there may not have been further fresh new 
capital infusions to improve the scales of operation. Another possibility is the lower initial 
investments of new investments that flow in which rely on the domestic financial system to 
fund the initial phases.  
Moreover, FDI makes no direct contribution to growing productivity in an economy which is 
consistent with the existing literature. What the results suggest is that FDI has not been able to 
directly contribute to the productivity growth in the SAARC and ASEAN economies. The 
manufacturing trade sector and human capital development have contributed more to this 
aspect of the economy. However, FDI might have contributed to these two factors indirectly, 
for example, a significant section of FDI that flows into these countries ends up in the 
manufacturing exports sector. As highlighted by Kumar and Pradhan (2002), FDI usually 
flows as a bundle of resources, mainly capital to technology, but also the marketing know-
how managerial and organisational skills, and market access through the marketing networks 
of MNEs. FDI has not played a significant role in the increased productivity growth observed 
in developing countries in recent decades. Instead, trade policies and investment in human 
capital development have contributed more to productivity growth. This is alarming as 
productivity growth forms a major share of economic growth in developing economies. This, 
to some extent, explains why some studies conclude there is no significant impact of FDI on 
economic growth.  
From the point of view of policymakers, this study has several important implications. Since 
FDI has contributed to labour growth in the recipient countries, it will be advantageous to 
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further encourage FDI inflows. Some SAARC and ASEAN countries have inherent issues in 
their labour systems such as poor participation rates, especially that of the women, and 
bloated public sectors that hinder dynamism in the labour market. Another possibility is the 
expansion of the formal sector at the expense of informal sector causing the improvements in 
labour data. Since the results suggest that human capital contributed to productivity growth, 
the labour policies would have to be shaped in a way that more investments can made in 
education and encourage more people to find employment. Since the FDI has not contributed 
to growth through capital, it is necessary to encourage the type of investment which brings in 
significant initial investment and discourages resorting to domestic financial sources. 
Nevertheless, this outcome will encourage policy planners to exploit FDI as a tool to reduce 
the structural unemployment.  
We also find evidence as to why the convergence is weak in the selected countries. FDI is one 
of the main mechanisms which links countries economically. Accordingly, stronger the 
countries are inter-connected, more evident should be the convergence. However, our results 
suggests that FDI is not as effective as expected in transmitting the growth in recipient 
economies. This is because two out of the three growth transmission channels are ineffective. 
This further explains why FDI does not help middle-income level countries to avoid the cycle 
of stagnation and break the ‘ice ceiling’ to reach the next level of economic development.  
The SAARC and ASEAN economies are generally demonstrating labour growth-driven input 
growth. It would have been a fairer assessment if there had been a more balanced panel of 
countries, with more capital accumulation-driven input growth. Another problem that 
emerged in this study was the poor availability of data which limited the number of countries 
in the data set. Even considering the econometric approach, had the sample been larger, more 
instruments would have been employed in the estimation process. A possible future extension 
of this study would be to decompose the TFP growth further into its main components, that is, 
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efficiency change and technological progress and determine whether FDI contributes to 























CHAPTER 3: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS AND 




Financial globalisation has played a key role in the phenomenal growth of the world economy 
in the last few decades. A main carrier of finance worldwide was Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDI). However, a highly debated topic concerning FDI is its distributional effects. FDI has 
always been promoted by policy-makers of the developing world as a way of providing 
impetus to growth. FDI is widely believed to trigger economic growth in the host country not 
only by contributing to the domestic capital but also through the spill-over effects, such as by 
way of transferring technology and know-how (OECD, 2002). Although the empirical 
literature is divided on the opinion on how effective FDI is as a growth factor, even 
globalisation critics such as Stiglitz (2000), find the case for FDI compelling. Conversely, one 
of the most debated subjects is the impact of income inequality on growth. Income inequality 
is defined as the extent to which income is distributed unevenly in a given country or region 
(Atkinson, 1997). Also, Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) are an important source of FDI in 
host economies, activities of which are believed to have caused inequality. Accordingly, not 
only the roles of FDI in enhancing the growth but also whether it increases the income 
inequality in the host country are important research questions worth investigating. 
There is a growing body of empirical literature investigating the link between FDI and 
inequality. However, they differ in their findings and conclusions. In particular, the empirical 
studies regarding the middle-income host countries are sparse and the cross-country evidence 
remains inconclusive. Another reason for examining the inequality-FDI nexus is that it is one 
of the least researched areas in the empirical literature relating to the FDI. This is because the 
bulk of studies that examined the growth impact of FDI inflows assumes that FDI leads to 
evenly distributed income in the host countries. Ambiguity exists about the theoretical 
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predictions of how FDI may influence income inequality; the relationship can be positive, 
negative or both depending on the period examined and the transitional nature of this 
relationship. This calls for empirical research on the distributional effects of FDI. 
Accordingly, this paper aims to investigate the relationship between FDI and income 
inequality. The specific focus is on the middle-income countries in the SAARC and ASEAN 
regions.  
Increasing income inequality induced by economic growth in both developed and developing 
countries has been very evident in the last few decades. Decades ago, it was believed that 
inequality would eventually decline as predicted by the Kuznets hypothesis (1955). This same 
period overlapped with growth in international trade and more recently, global financial 
integration at unprecedented levels. Much of the debate on rising inequality has focused on 
the role that globalisation has played in explaining inequality patterns. As well, there is 
growing scholarly interest on the role of FDI and MNEs in the rising level of inequality in 
host countries.  
Promotion of FDI is perceived as an attractive policy for developing countries to pursue 
because it provides a channel for international convergence in standards of living. Such 
convergence, if realised, would be an effective source to level off the income inequality 
among nations. Even though FDI may trigger international convergence, one school of 
thought argues that it may worsen income inequality within an economy (Feenstra & Hanson, 
1997). Concerns have been raised as to whether FDI contributes to widening the income 
inequality in recipient countries despite having been identified as an effective tool to promote 
economic development (Feenstra & Hanson, 1997; Cornia, 1999; Herzer & Nunnenkamp, 
2011). Smolensky, Plotnick, Evenhouse, and Reilly (1994) asserted that ‘the effectiveness of 
growth in reducing poverty depends a great deal on how growth is distributed. The rise in 
income inequality offsets the poverty-reducing effects of more than a decade’s worth of 
growth’ (p. 222). Accordingly, the benefits of rising aggregate GDP growth rates and per 
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capita income levels associated with globalisation, liberal-market oriented reforms, 
technological innovation and integrating economically laggard countries into the global 
economy, may not be shared equally. 
In terms of theoretical propositions, there are mainly two schools of thought that apply for 
FDI-induced inequality in host economies, namely, modernisation theory and dependency 
theory. Modernisation theory identifies income inequality as a necessary precondition for 
eventual improvement in income levels and asserts that sufficient output must be produced 
initially before it can be redistributed. It predicts that income inequality would level off over 
time, suggesting a Kuznets-type relationship
1
 between FDI and income inequality (Fei & 
Ranis, 1964; Lenski, 1966). In contrast, dependency theory postulates that inequality would 
continuously widen the income gap. It maintains that social control through investment, aid 
and trade, is what affects income equality not economic output and wealth (Girling, 1973; 
Evans 1979). This paper seeks to identify which of either theory applies to the middle-income 
countries in the SAARC and ASEAN regions.  
One concerning trend emerging in Asia has been the rise in income inequality in recent years. 
Outside the SAARC and ASEAN regions, some parts of the world such as the Latin American 
countries have been experiencing higher levels of income inequality despite recent policy 
measures. As depicted in Figure 2, developing Asian countries have been experiencing higher 
and increasing levels of income inequality compared to other parts of the world (Zsolt, 2019).  
Ten out of the 17 countries included by Zsotls (2019) in his study as Emerging and 
Developing Asia & ASEAN-5 are examined in this study. Consequently, we focus on these 
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Source: Zsolt (2019)  
The main criterion used for selecting countries is whether they are middle-income level ones 
which are defined as those with per capita Gross National Income of more than $1,006 but 
less than $12,235 in 2017, as calculated using the Atlas method (World Bank, 2017). We 
focus on middle-income countries for a number of reasons. First, they were recipients of high 
levels of FDI during the period examined; they recorded better growth rates compared to 
other developing country groupings. Second, the selected countries have been implementing 
market-based economic policies for a few decades. Third, they have achieved moderate or 
relatively low success compared to the ‘Asian Tiger’ economies, which therefore makes them 
interesting case studies to analyse. Countries such as Malaysia and Thailand are deemed to be 
caught in the so-called ‘middle-income trap’ with minimum signs of economic take off as was 
evident in the Tiger’ economies. Also, past studies selected countries that are relatively 
homogenous in terms of per capita income and thus avoided a grouping of poor and wealthy 
economies. Blonigen and Wang (2004) assert that this is inappropriate for empirical studies 
relating to FDI. At the same time, these countries have different policies that were 
implemented at different times, which provide the necessary variations in the sources of 
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growth and effects of FDI. Figure 3 illustrates the income inequality and FDI flows for the 
countries that are examined in this study in separate country charts. It depicts all countries as 
having a unique relationship offering heterogeneity in the analysis.   
Figure 3. 2: FDI and income inequality in the examined countries  
 
Source: SWIID (2014) and World Development  
This paper employs Genralised Methods of Moments to examine the relationship between the 
FDI inflows and the income inequality. It also adds a robustness test using the fixed and 
random effects analysis. We find robust evidence that inequality and FDI relationship in 
selected countries follows modernisation theory, that is, FDI flows tend to increase the 
inequality at lower shares of FDI in GDP but it turns into a negative relationship at higher 
shares of FDI in GDP. We find that FDI flows trigger a rise in inequality until it reaches a 
tipping point of 8.1% as a share of GDP, and start to improve income distribution at higher 
share of GDP. Furthermore, infrastructure expansion, human capital development and trade 
serve as conduits to promote equitable income distribution. However, stronger institutions 
increase income inequality. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature 
relating to the FDI-income inequality debate, and illustrates the two contending theoretical 
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perspectives on the distributional effect of FDI, namely, modernisation theory and 
dependency theory. Section 3 reports the data, its sources, and the variables of interest in the 
model specification. Section 4 sets up the regression models for the empirical study based on 
the theoretical propositions and relevant literature. Section 5 reports the empirical results 
along with a discussion. The last section concludes the paper. 
 
3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.2.1. Income inequality, growth, financial globalisation and FDI  
Economic circles are currently debating whether inequality is the sacrifice to be made in order 
to achieve economic efficiency (Okun 1975). Some empirical studies have found that higher 
income inequality tends to retard growth in developing countries, even though the evidence is 
far from conclusive. Barrow (2005) concedes that higher income inequality deters growth in 
developing countries. Some of the empirical literature suggests that an increase in income 
inequality in some countries would become a barrier to growth yet trigger growth in others. 
However, the income inequality that occurs in the early stages of industrialisation can 
encourage growth later on (Rodrik, 2014). It appears that the empirical findings are 
contextual, depending on the country, region and stage of development.  
 
There is a large volume of literature examining the relationship between growth and income 
inequality. Studies have investigated a plethora of relationships, both linear and non-linear. 
Beginning with Kuznets (1955), most analyses find a negative nexus between growth and 
income inequality, but with many contextual exceptions and modifications. The most 
hypothesised proposition for the relationship between growth and income inequality is what 
was suggested by Kuznets (1955) who argued that income inequality would rise in the initial 
stages of development, then level off in the middle stages with increasing levels of income. 
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Then, income inequality will fall as countries reach higher levels of income. Kuznets’ 
hypothesis has a multi-faceted explanation which includes political environment and 
economic transformation. Economies start with a prominent primary or agriculture sector but 
through industrialisation they change into much technology-based production. The higher 
income levels overlap with the rise of the welfare state and democratisation leading to the 
benefits of growth being more widely distributed and extending to lower income groups. This 
process, however, depends on the political commitment to democracy, strength of institutions 
and the effectiveness of government policy in addressing issues relating to income inequality 
 
Financial globalisation is a broader topic which encompasses a plethora of cross-border 
financial flows in the form of FDI, capital flows, aid and lending. Increasingly, literature has 
been published on globalisation and its effect on the developing economies with special 
interest on inter and intra economy income inequality. Joseph Stiglitz, the 2001 Nobel 
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, has questioned the merits of globalisation by raising 
concerns around MNEs focus on profits at the expense of social and community benefits 
(Stiglitz, 2006). He also referred to the harmful impacts of foreign investors on host 
developing countries (Stiglitz, 2002). Dani Rodrik, another prominent economist who 
critiqued globalisation, warned against the risk of distributive injustice caused by hyper-
globalisation (Rodrik, 2017). Piketty (2014) asserts that wealth accumulation by the rich such 
as unwarranted appropriation of natural resources in developing countries simply makes the 
poor worse off and categorises such practices as ‘outright theft’.  All too often these and other 
economists are worried about the risk that globalization could make the poorest and marginal 
people worse off.  
 
Indeed, income inequality has risen in most countries and regions in recent decades, including 
developed countries which were thought to have reached levels of prosperity where income 
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inequality would level off in line with the predictions of the Kuznets hypothesis. Since this 
period has also been associated with unprecedented levels of trade and financial integration, 
much of the debate over rising income inequality has focused invariably on the role of 
globalisation in explaining income inequality patterns. In financial globalisation the most 
prominent method of making it possible are the FDI flows between countries. Accordingly, 
this study focuses on the income inequality in recipient economies caused by FDI inflows.  
 
3.2.2. How FDI causes income inequality 
The policy-makers in developing countries have for the last few decades implemented 
policies that promote FDI inflows given both the direct and indirect benefits arising from 
them. They also promote redistribution policies through improvements in welfare systems, the 
gains of which have been visible in various human development indexes. Nevertheless, if FDI 
has resulted in a skewed distribution of income, policy-makers face a policy dilemma. The 
relationship between FDI and income inequality is better explained when the relationship 
between growth and income inequality is examined. If FDI causes growth then by the same 
reasoning it will lead to income inequality. In the forthcoming paragraphs, different avenues 
through which FDI causes income inequality in host countries are discussed.  
i. Skill premium on offer for skilled labour 
Most studies highlight that the skill premium demanded by foreign-owned companies is the 
main problem that causes FDI-induced income inequality in developing countries. Since the 
Multinational Enterprises
2
 (MNEs) recruit more skilled workers, the relative demand for 
skilled labour increases, which is reflected in their wages/salaries. An economy that is going 
through a structural change, which is typical of developing countries, might experience 
relative changes in wages caused by an increase in the demand for skilled labour. For 




Skill premium that is demanded by MNEs would lead to income inequality in several ways. 
First, from the perspective of a developed country, due to increased competition from low-
wage countries, there is a resource shift towards the sectors that are biased and in favour of 
skilled labour (Wood, 1994; Borjas & Ramey, 1995). Accordingly, it is more cost-effective 
for them to transfer some operations in the value chain that demand skilled labour to the 
developing countries so that they remain competitive. Second, MNEs are expected to pay 
higher wages to reflect higher productivity which is customary with technology-based 
production. Thus, invariably, they will pay higher wages compared to local firms to attract the 
best skilled labour from the domestic labour market and enjoy a comparative advantage 
(Aitken et al., 1996). Third, better working environments provided by MNEs might trigger 
labour movement from domestic firms to the MNEs and thereby deprive local industries of 
better skilled labour (Feenstra & Hansen, 1997; Lipsey & Sjoholm, 2004). This might include 
all peripheral advantages, ranging from better social acceptance and flexible rewards schemes 
to employee retention schemes that allow share ownership in the parent companies. However, 
evidence suggests that foreign ownership and FDI are associated with higher wages for all 
types of workers, both skilled and unskilled (Overseas Development Institute, 2002). 
Another consideration to determine income inequality caused by MNEs’ absorption of skilled 
labour is the ranking of skill intensity of the absorbed labour. This is because headquarter 
(HQ) services are more skill intensive than plant operations (Markusen & Venables, 1997). 
Nations like Sri Lanka have given special incentives to MNEs to establish their regional 
headquarters in the host country. Accordingly, the inward FDI is likely to increase the average 
skill intensity of production in developing countries. This is more visible in North-South 
models along the lines of Feenstra and Hanson (1997), which explains the vertical economic 
integration through FDI between the less advanced host countries in the South and more 
advanced source countries in the North. 
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The increase in wages due to the presence of MNEs may be evident in both foreign-owned 
and locally owned companies. Lipsey and Sjoholm (2001) examined the MNEs in Indonesian 
manufacturing firms and concluded that an increase in foreign presence in firm ownership 
leads to higher wages in locally owned companies, principally because the latter need to 
compete with the former over employing skilled labour. However, since the foreign-owned 
companies are able to pay higher wages they have the upper hand of winning this 
competition. Nevertheless, this might lead to an economy-wide increase in general wage 
levels irrespective of the industry or the province. Furthermore, MNEs scout for skills in 
specific industries and sectors which contribute to growing income inequality. The 
technological changes that are brought about by the MNEs will be skill-specific. Moreover, 
they will engage in skill-specific wage bargaining that will lead to a wage premium in the 
skill-intensive sectors. MNEs may also affect the level of education through general training 
sessions, and sector-specific skills upgrades. Moreover, Tatoglu et al. (2016) who examined 
data from 201 firms in Turkey, find significant differences between the talent management 
motives of MNEs and local firms. The former have more tactical motives for their talent 
management systems that leads to better labour productivity but also biased reward schemes.  
 
ii. Competition with domestic firms  
Another way that FDI may trigger income inequality is by crowding out domestic investment 
sources. This occurs when foreign investors compete for scarce resources such as minerals, 
skilled labour, bank credit, import licenses or franchises with domestic investors and foreclose 
investment opportunities. Through such competition, foreign firms might impede the 
productivity and business outlook of domestic firms. Better firm- and industry-specific 
advantages of the MNEs lead to lower marginal costs. This in turn enables them to make 
inroads into market shares of domestic firms which will be compelled to cut down their 
production processes and/or costs and move further up along the firms’ average cost curve 
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(Aitken & Harrison, 1999). For this reason, those who are employed in the domestic firms, 
with less ability to adjust to the demand of the modern sector, may be disadvantaged.  
Also, in the presence of foreign competition, local firms would be compelled to learn and 
upgrade their technology, and to emulate the business models so that they can be more 
competitive. According to the firm capabilities argument, it is expected that domestic firms 
are better positioned to fend off foreign competition given their existing technological 
capabilities and knowledge of the local market that enable them to learn from foreign entrants. 
However, subsequent to foreign entry, it has been observed that local technological leaders 
apply for fewer patents compared to local technological laggards (Jin et al., 2019). 
Accordingly, the possession of superior technological capabilities of local firms does not 
buffer them from harmful outcomes of competition due to foreign entry into the domestic 
market.  
iii. Locational factors  
The locational aspect of FDI-induced income inequality is a consequence of the formation of 
special economic zones (SEZ) by host governments with a view to creating a more attractive 
and conducive business environment for MNEs. Generally, most of the populations in 
SAARC countries work in agriculture as their main livelihood, which does not require 
advanced skills (Chand, 2010). These zones are usually established closer to harbours, 
financial centres and cities with better infrastructure facilities. These zones work as ‘patches 
of modernity’ and trigger acquisition of skills by those who are employed in the traditional 
sectors so as to improve their employability as well as the movement of rural labour. Ideally, 
labour migration to economic zones may spur the distribution of benefits in the form of wage 
increases and FDI-induced spill-overs. However, a more equal distribution of FDI-related 
benefits depends on two things: firstly, whether migrant workers are sufficiently qualified; 
and secondly, whether the growth effects are strong enough to induce worker mobility 
(Herzer et al., 2014).  
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Also, foreign owned firms characteristically cluster in the economic hotspots of host countries 
where mobile and skilled workers are usually employed in technologically advanced, export-
oriented and dynamic industries. This is encouraged by the host countries through their FDI 
hosting strategies and their placement of exports promotion zones, which in turn decides the 
areas in the country that will host the industrial production undertaken by MNEs. FDI induces 
growth mainly in these urban centres. As the pool of sufficiently skilled labour is fixed in the 
short-term, the income gaps are likely to widen initially. Later, wage income inequality 
declines, firstly, as the firms gradually acquire much more modern technology, and secondly, 
the supply of the required skills improves (Herzer et al., 2014).  
 
iv. Lower demand for the less skilled  
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003, 2005) argue that even when countries introduce conducive 
reforms to attract favourable FDI, they may not always be successful in attracting FDI that 
demand skills at middle to high levels. This might result in poor wage growth at the lower 
level of the pay scale, thus aggravating income inequality. Rodrik (2014) highlights that in 
spite of the dramatic increase in foreign direct investment inflows and aggressive 
liberalisation measures introduced in Mexico, employment growth in the formal sector has 
barely changed. Yet employment growth in the informal sector has exploded, further 
reinforcing the polarised nature of a developing economy that is characterised by two 
differentiable sectors. 
 
v. Skewed incentive schemes 
The income inequality induced by foreign ownership in firms might also occur due to the 
skewed incentive schemes within firms. Giuliani (2018) argues that MNEs may end up 
generously rewarding a few individuals, such as shareholders, board members and Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs), who might experience abnormal accumulation of income and 
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wealth, aggravating income inequality even further. Girma et al. (2019), in their study using 
firm-level data in 146,199 Chinese firms find that the direct wage effect of foreign ownership 
in the targeted firm is positive and it increases with the share of foreign ownership in the 
firms.   
 
vi. Lagged transmission of technology to the domestic sector 
The advent of new technology plays a key role in explaining wage differences between skilled 
and unskilled labour. Aghion and Howitt (1998), explaining the U-shaped relationship 
between FDI and income inequality, argue that there are two stages in the technological 
diffusion through the MNEs which determine the evolution of demand for skilled labour. In 
an economy with both MNEs and indigenous businesses, in the first stage, the latter group 
starts to experiment with the production technology to compete with the former. MNEs are 
the role models for them and they try to imitate technological templates of the MNEs who 
employ advanced technology. However, until the transmission is complete, indigenous firms 
are using the old technology which requires only unskilled labour. The skilled labour is 
required only for Research and Development (R&D) activities in order to keep up with the 
MNEs. In the second stage, at the end of the transmission of the technology and adjustment 
processes, all firms are using the new technology. However, they require only the skilled 
workers who can handle the new technology. This prolonged process of technological 
diffusion and transformation of the skill requirement have implications for the wage structure. 
Aghion and Howitt (1998) explain that at the beginning of the first stage, the demand for 
skilled labour is very low and the wage differential is negligible. However, later on, demand 
for skilled labour increases rapidly, creating labour-market segmentation where the skilled 
worker is paid a higher wage. This segmentation leads to income inequality in the wages paid 
to skilled and unskilled employees.  
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The empirical literature provides evidence for the transitional nature of the FDI-income 
inequality nexus. Aghion and Howitt (1998) find that, by considering the transition to a new 
technological paradigm due to learning and skill upgrading which is brought about by FDI 
inflows, the relationship between inward FDI and income inequality is nonlinear and varies 
over time. They argue for an inverted Kuznets curve hypothesis where the FDI-induced spill-
overs and the absorption of new technologies may increase income inequality in the short-
term, and reduce income inequality in the long-term. This is because FDI enhances the 
development of the entire economy though it’s widespread spill-over gains and moderates 
income inequality in host economies. As long as the skills demanded by MNEs are in short 
supply, the skill premium tends to increase.  
vii. Income inequality due to unfavourable characteristics of the host country  
Another way in which MNEs trigger income inequality would be through the exploitation of 
weaker labour laws in the host countries. This can range from exploiting the gender-based 
wage differential to deprivation of certain human rights previously enjoyed by marginalised 
workers such as children, indigenous people and women. MNEs might be involved in 
infringements of human rights either directly through the actions of its management staff or 
indirectly through third party actors who perpetrate such abuses, such as government agencies 
or suppliers. Giuliani (2018) argues that these damaging aspects of MNE operations are often 
neglected, overlooked or misinterpreted in the guise of improved well-being due to the 
presence of MNEs. Also, the use of technology that is inappropriate for local circumstances, 
actively constrains potential technology spill-overs and reduces (rather than complements) the 
domestic capital stock and tax bases through transfer price manipulation and excessive profit 
repatriation (Doh, 2018). Accordingly, MNEs might be effectively crowding out domestic 
firms and operate in such a way as to exacerbate income distribution in the host country. 
Also, the distributional impact of FDI depends on the contextual contingencies of the host 
country such as gender equality, property rights and labour regulations. In a broad-based 
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study using unique micro-level data from over 40,000 employees in 13 countries, Straaten et 
al. (2019) examine distributional effects of MNEs’ on host country labour regulations and 
property rights protection, interactions with industry and region effects and employees’ 
gender, immigrant status and experience. They find that gender wage gap is smaller in MNEs 
in developed countries than in domestic firms but it is the opposite in developing countries.  
They also reveal that the MNE wage premium is lower when the level of property rights 
protection legislation in the host country is higher. These findings demonstrate that the wage 
premium is negative for females working in developing countries and, in contrast, positive for 
experienced and foreign-born employees in developed countries. Straaten et al. (2019) assert 
that distributional effects of the MNEs show noticeable differences, which depend invariably 
on the host country context. 
 
3.2.3. Arguments against the skill premium proposition  
A prominent argument against the FDI-induced income inequality stems from the proposition 
that the level of skills that MNEs scout for in the host country depend on the level of 
sophistication of the operations they plan which, however, may be simpler than anticipated.  
This involves ranking of skill intensities in different sectors of the host economy and 
identifying the level of skill that is demanded by the foreign-owned sector. Markusen and 
Venables (1997) find that if the MNEs confine the more skill intensive headquarter services to 
the parent companies and try to exploit the benefit of low cost labour in host economies with 
less skill-intensive plant operations, any impact on wages in the host economy will be 
minimal. This might even dampen the demand for skilled labour as the foreign-owned 
companies reduce their demand for such labour by recruiting more unskilled workers. 
Blonigen and Slaughter (2001) show that the Japanese Greenfield FDI has reduced the 
demand for skilled labour in the United States. Nevertheless, this effect is more likely to 
happen when both the source and destination countries are advanced economies.  
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The different business models that evolved due to foreign-owned businesses were able to 
enhance the spill-over benefits of the FDI and reduced the inter-sectoral income inequality in 
the process. The cost-effective strategies such as outsourcing and subcontracting could 
possibly bridge the wage differential between the formal organised sector and the informal 
unorganised sector. MNEs operate in the formal sector where many local firms may have to 
resort to doing business in the latter category.  Ramaswamy (1999) finds that by the late 
twentieth century, the increased practice of subcontracting by formal manufacturing 
enterprises to the informal units in India was a dominant strategy. Beladi et al. (2016) show an 
increase in the scale of production in the unorganised sector in India and argues that it was 
triggered by the trend for outsourcing production needs. They also assert that the level of 
outsourcing may even increase if the formal sector units receive capital from foreign sources. 
This is because the firms in the formal sector would try to expand their production when they 
can address their capital constraints through foreign capital and access to informal production 
units which allow formal firms to reduce their costs, especially wage/salary bills. 
Accordingly, the wage premia paid by foreign-owned firms may not be as high as expected.  
 
3.2.4. Other possible causes of income inequality  
The two main causes identified as explaining income inequality are the poor development of 
human capital in backward economies and weaker institutions where redistribution policies 
do not work. Straaten et al. (2019) assert that the higher the level of property rights protection 
in a host country, the lower will be the MNE wage premium. Accordingly, better property 
rights and enforcement of such rights will be beneficial for income distribution. Governments 
will have to uphold the rule of law, introduce labour laws that promote wage equality, and 
introduce stronger property rights for all people. Mah (2013) finds that income inequality in 
China is mainly driven by institutional issues of land use and ownership in rural areas, skewed 
government spending, the huge rural-urban divide and internal migration restrictions.  In 
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addition, corruption is a major problem that creates poor governance and compounds income 
inequality. It can bedevil governments and distort the composition of public expenditure in 
such a way that those at the top of the distribution are rewarded at the expense of the bottom 
(Andres & Ramlogan-Dobson, 2011). Accordingly, poor institutions can cause higher income 
inequality in the developing economies.  
 
3.2.5. Empirical evidence 
Empirical findings on this topic are inconclusive. They can be broadly divided into four 
categories depending on the nature of the relationship between FDI and income inequality, 
namely, positive, negative, and inconclusive. First, we focus on investigations that yield 
positive outcomes. Herzer et al. (2014), in their study on the impact of FDI stocks on income 
inequality among households in Latin American host countries using the panel cointegration 
analysis, conclude there is a significant and positive effect on income inequality. However, 
they find no evidence for any reverse causality. Jaumotte et al. (2018) state that financial 
globalisation and foreign direct investment, in particular, are linked to an increase in income 
inequality. The main cause of this is wage differentials introduced by foreign-owned firms 
rather than limiting opportunities for economic advancement.  
The cross-country study by Choi (2006) finds more pronounced income inequality where the 
ratio of FDI stocks to GDP is higher. Tsai (1995) examines a group of 39 middle-income 
countries over 1981-2006. He finds that inward FDI affects income distribution adversely in 
transition economies and Latin American countries but marginally improves income 
distribution in the Asian group. His study concludes there is a statistically significant 
correlation between FDI and income inequality. However, he concedes that this reflects the 
structural differences in income inequality between geographical regions rather than 
attributing it to the harmful influence of FDI. Basu and Guariglia (2007), in their analysis of a 
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large sample of developing countries, point to a trade-off between rising income inequality in 
terms of schooling and FDI-related growth promotion.  
Te Velde and Morrissey (2002) find that FDI has raised wage inequality in Thailand by 
examining foreign ownership and wages at the micro-level. They find that foreign-owned 
firms pay more to their workers than local firms and that these wage differentials are as much 
as 60%. Lipsey and Sjöholm (2001), Matsuoka (2001), and Zhao (2001) find foreign firms 
pay higher wages to their workers, especially to skilled workers. Te Velde and Morrissey 
(2001) note that FDI in Africa benefitted primarily middle and upper skilled workers, and Te 
Velde (2003) documents similar results in Latin America. Feenstra and Hanson (1997), in 
their study on the Mexican manufacturing sector for the period 1975-1998, find that FDI 
inflows contributed to growing income inequality through increased relative demand for 
skilled labour. Examining the regional data, they conclude that growth in FDI can account for 
over 50% of the increase in the wage share of skilled labour that occurred in the late 1980s in 
the regions where FDI had concentrated. 
The second stream of literature finds evidence supporting the view that FDI has helped to 
reduce income inequality. Studies by Chintrakarn, Herzer, and Nunnenkamp (2012) and Te 
Velde (2003) have demonstrated that this was the case in the United States, Mexico and Latin 
America. The third stream of literature detects no significant relationship between FDI and 
income inequality. For instance, Sylwester (2005) did not find any robust links between FDI 
and income distribution within a cross-section of less developed countries between 1970 and 
1989. Te Velde and Morrissey (2004) did not discover any supporting evidence that FDI 
wields a strong influence on wage inequality in the five Asian countries they examined. 
The last stream of empirical findings concludes that the effects of FDI on income inequality 
vary according to the level of economic development. Figini and Gorg (2011) have found 
evidence for a non-linear hypothesis in developing countries where FDI has been shown to 
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have increased wage inequality in developing countries; however, this effect diminishes with 
higher levels of FDI. They also report that the FDI has improved income distribution in 
developed countries, but a non-linear effect does not hold. Kaulihowa and Adjasi (2018) 
findings on the FDI induced income inequality in African countries also reveal evidence for a 
non-linear relationship. However, they find that FDI decreases inequality of income 
distribution in the countries they examine, but it eventually increases as FDI also increases. 
Figini and Gorg (1999) have analysed the manufacturing sector data for Ireland from 1979 to 
1995. They test an econometric model to examine whether introducing new technology by 
MNEs causes wage inequality to rise due to the rising demand for skilled labour. They 
conclude that the increased presence of MNEs and wage inequality has an inverted-U 
relationship. 
3.2.6. Theoretical Literature  
To provide a deeper insight into the evolution of FDI- income inequality nexus, it is essential 
to review different theoretical views. Two theories are generally employed to explain the FDI-
induced income inequality in the host countries. These are modernisation theory and 
dependency theory, and they are described in more detail below.  
i. Modernisation theory  
Modernisation theory grew out of neoclassical economics (Kuznets, 1955; Rostow, 1960) and 
can be traced back to the early 1950s. Modernisation theory identifies income inequality as a 
necessary precondition for eventual improvement in income levels and stresses that sufficient 
output must be produced initially before it can be redistributed. It suggests that an economy’s 
development involves different stages and that each stage will have different implications for 
income inequality. This proposition has been developed according to the Kuznets hypothesis, 
which states that an inverted-U curve relationship exists, according to which income 
inequality increases during the early stages of economic growth but declines later on. 
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Therefore, economic development arising from FDI inflows and activities of MNEs may be 
linked with the Kuznets (1955) hypothesis so that the relationship between FDI and income 
inequality may follow an inverted U-curve. 
During the early stages of development, different sectors of the economy respond differently 
to the new source of capital. There are at least two noticeable sectors in a developing 
economy: a modern high-income sector such as the services and industrial sectors and 
traditional low-income sectors, such as agriculture.  Initially, the overall income inequality in 
the economy increases due to several factors: an increase in the income gap between the two 
sectors due to wage premiums enjoyed by the modern sector, an increase in the share of the 
population in the new sector due to movement of labour from traditional to the new sector and 
an increase in income inequality in each sector (Adelman & Robinson, 1989). However, the 
economy goes through drastic changes as it develops and transforms. As output grows further, 
labour in the traditional agriculture sector moves to the modern sector, gaining skills required 
to qualify for the new sector employment. This leads to a gradual disappearance of the surplus 
labour in the agriculture sector, in which the marginal product of labour will increase up to a 
level equivalent to that of the industrial sector. Due to high economic growth, higher labour 
income and the likely transition of countries to democratic governance, the income would be 
more equally distributed (Fei & Ranis, 1964; Lenski, 1966). 
 
However, the early modernisation theorists have been silent on the relationship between 
income inequality and FDI. They treat capital as homogenous, irrespective of its origin, 
domestically sourced or received from abroad. Adehnan and Morris (1973) provide the first 
study examining the FDI-induced income inequality proposition concerning the Kuznets 
hypothesis, albeit subject to some criticism due to data limitations. They find that a Kuznets-
type relationship exists regarding FDI and income inequality. Furthermore, they note that 
improvement in human capital, in general, helps curtail income inequality. Still, direct 
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government activities and short-term growth rate of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
are not significantly related to income distribution. As highlighted in this review, a majority 
of recent studies has reported similar findings. In adopting modernisation theory to this study, 
it could be argued that the wage premia that MNEs offer are responsible for the initial 
increase in income inequality. However, at a later stage, the modern sector grows due to the 
intra-economy labour movement, a better-skilled labour force demanded by the labour 
market, outsourcing and subcontracting. 
ii. Dependency theory 
In contrast to modernisation theory, where income inequality would level off over time, 
dependency theory postulates that income inequality will grow continuously, widening the 
income gap. It maintains that social control through investment, aid, and trade, rather than 
economic output and wealth, affects income inequality. This theory has been built along the 
lines of core-periphery structure in an economy where the core represents the highly 
industrialised countries with abundant skilled labour. In contrast, the periphery is made up of 
developing economies with much-unskilled labour. The periphery depends on the core as a 
source of capital and technology, and the ensuing economic integration between them leads to 
rising income inequality. The FDI receipts create an elite labour class in the host country, 
which enjoys four to ten times the salaries and other benefits compared to similar sectors in 
the traditional economy. Unsurprisingly, this leads to an inevitable increase in wages in the 
traditional sector. However, the elite sector will enjoy more capital intensive production, 
resulting in more unemployment in the traditional sector and disrupting the labour movement 
to the modern sector (Rubinson, 1976; Girling, 1973; Bomschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985).  
 
It is argued that the elite labour group in the modern sector will work closely with foreign 
investors to form an economic-cum-political triple alliance to maintain its status. This alliance 
seeks to eliminate any policy that may reduce the income gaps in an economy and thereby 
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causing persistent income inequality (Evans, 1979). Moreover, the modern sector receives 
technology-embedded FDI, which is usually skill-intensive and would produce further income 
inequality (Findlay, 1978; Lee & Vivarelli, 2006; Wang & Blomstrom, 1992). FDI received 
by developing economies from developed economies seeking unskilled labour could 
aggravate income inequality in the recipient country because what is classified as unskilled 
labour in advanced economies could be categorised as skill-intensive in developing countries 
(Feenstra & Hanson, 1996, 1997). Hein (1992) argues that economic relationships between 
the periphery and core are structurally harmful to the former because of the inherent dynamics 
of international capitalism, such as the division of labour. This causes increased income 
inequality, distortion of domestic economies and declining growth in developing countries. 
Basu and Guariglia (2007) assert that FDI-induced income inequality may persist unless 
lower-income segments can acquire human capital with the ability to use new technologies. 
Accordingly, the integration between economies, which is mutually beneficial, might worsen 
income distribution, especially if the recipient economy depends on the source economy for 
skills-intensive and technology-based investments.  
 
3.3. DATA 
3.3.1. Data on income inequality  
The biggest challenge in empirical studies on income inequality across a group of countries is 
selecting a suitable proxy for income inequality that makes it possible to compare economies. 
The standard national level Gini coefficients do not provide this comparability. In this regard, 
as a proxy for income inequality, this study employs the Gini coefficient (based on net 
income) from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) developed by 
Solt (2014). It maintains the widest possible coverage across countries and over time while 
maximising income inequality data comparability. The SWIID combines information from 
several sources: the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database, which offers harmonised 
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micro-data collected from multiple countries, World Income Inequality Database (WIID) 
provided by the World Bank and data from UNU-WIDER. This provides SWIID with greater 
comparability than the WIID and more excellent coverage than the LIS data. The data 
provided by Solt (2009) are estimated like the EHII data. Furthermore, SWIID allows the 
extension of the time dimension as well as a cross-section of the analysis. It also incorporates 
data from national statistical offices around the world: Eurostat, the OECD Income 
Distribution Database, the World Bank’s PovcalNet, the UN Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the 
Caribbean generated by CEDLAS and the World Bank and academic studies. In this way, any 
reliance on problematic assumptions by using as much information as possible from 
proximate years within the same country is minimised. The data collected by the Luxembourg 
Income Study serves as the standard. Three missing values were replaced by extrapolated data 
points
3
 to obtain more excellent coverage. 
 
3.3.2. Choice of independent variables  
Data are collected for the period 1993 to 2017 for several reasons. The first concerns data 
availability, and for the second, this period represents an era where most countries in the 
selected grouping underwent structural changes. Third, by the mid-1990s, almost all of these 
countries started competitively introducing economic reforms. Accordingly, 12 countries 
were selected out of the 14 middle-income level countries in the two regions based on data 
availability. These countries are listed in Table 1.  Following the existing literature, sample 
data for all variables are used as three-year averages. Accordingly, the data set comprises 8 






Table 3. 1: Countries that are studied 
SAARC ASEAN  
Bangladesh Malaysia 
Bhutan Indonesia 
India Lao PDR (Laos) 
Pakistan Vietnam 
Sri Lanka  Thailand 
 Cambodia 
 The Philippines  
 
Data for the independent variables are obtained from Penn World Tables and World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank. Regressions of the growth components involve 
choosing regressors to be used along with the FDI as independent variables. The existing 
literature employs an extensive range of variables as determinants of growth which we follow. 
These variables represent different areas of concern that are raised in theory and empirics, 
such as the macroeconomy, trade, human capital, infrastructure, and institutions. To avoid 
using similar types of variables and highly correlated variables, a correlation analysis is 
employed to select the independent variables from each category in the regressions. Summary 
statistics at the aggregate level and regional levels are provided in Table 2. Country-level 









Table 3. 2: Summary Statistics  
Panel A: Aggregate  
    Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gini 96 41.925 3.839 35.5 49.033 
FDI 96 2.774 2.708 -1.982 12.979 
FDISQ 96 14.954 28.734 1.58E-11 168.463 
ELC 96 70.439 25.443 4.566 99.995 
RGDP 96 2.39E+11 3.73E+11 4.55E+08 2.13E+12 
HC 88 2.134 0.449 1.412 2.99 
INST 96 4.571 1.538 2.5 7 
EXP 96 0.172 0.149 0.026 0.641 
Panel B: ASEAN  
    Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gini 56 42.066 3.564 36.767 47.9 
FDI 56 3.984 2.95 -1.982 12.979 
FDISQ 56 24.42 34.706 0.035 168.463 
ELC 56 75.517 25.947 4.955 99.995 
RGDP 56 1.97E+11 2.18E+11 2.66E+09 9.89E+11 
HC 56 2.201 0.401 1.485 2.99 
EXP 56 0.243 0.158 0.038 0.641 
INST 56 4.795 1.757 2.5 7 
Panel C: SAARC 
    Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gini  40 41.727 4.232 35.5 49.033 
FDI 40 1.08 0.741 0 2.782 
FDISQ 40 1.701 2.13 0 7.739 
ELC 40 63.329 23.205 4.566 95.914 
RGDP 40 2.97E+11 5.16E+11 4.55E+08 2.13E+12 
HC 32 2.017 0.508 1.412 2.894 
INST 40 4.258 1.113 2.5 7 
EXP 40 0.072 0.036 0.026 0.23 
 
FDI is measured by FDI net inflows as a percentage of GDP. Real GDP (RGDP) is measured 
by the GDP in constant 2010 US$ of the World Development Indicators. This is the 
macroeconomic variable that represents the size of the economy. Trade (TRD) is represented 
by the share of merchandise exports (at current purchasing power parity) in the GDP provided 
by the Penn World Tables (PWT). Instead of including a variable that combines imports and 
exports, an exports-related variable was chosen for two reasons: firstly, as all the economies 
aggressively expanded their export sectors during the period under study through export 
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promotion zones; and secondly, the FDI-related investments were mainly in the export-related 
industries. Institutions (INST) are proxied by a combined index formed by averaging the 
Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL) indexes of the Freedom House Institute. PR and 
CL are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom 
and seven the lowest. Freedom in the World, which is an annual report published by Freedom 
House, analyses the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, the functioning of 
government, freedom of expression and belief, associational and organisational rights, the rule 
of law, and personal autonomy and individual right for each country and territory (Freedom 
House, 2018). The human capital (HC) variable is the index compiled based on years of 
schooling and returns to education as in PWT9. Infrastructure (ELC) is proxied by the 
availability of electricity, access to electricity as a percentage of the population provided by 
the WDI.  
 
3.4. METHOD  
3.4.1. Empirical model and prior expectations 
Based on the empirical and the theoretical literature reviewed in the previous sections, the 
following empirical model is estimated and written as an equation:  
Giniit = β0 + β1FDIit + β2FDI
2
it + β3X’it + εit  ------------------(1)  
A higher Gini index value indicates greater income inequality characterised a larger 
percentage of the population's total income been enjoyed by high-income individuals. FDI 
denotes the FDI inflows as a share of GDP, and the values are at level. The inclusion of the 
quadratic term of FDI, FDISQ (FDI
2
), is intended to capture a possible non-linear relationship 
between FDI and income inequality. X is a vector of other control variables used in this study. 
To enhance the robustness of the estimates, the control variables are chosen to explain 
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macroeconomic variables (RGDP), infrastructure (ELC), trade (TRD), human capital (HC) 
and institutions (INST).     
The relationship between income inequality and FDI, the primary interest of this study, is to 
be determined by the coefficients β1 and β2. If β2 is not statistically significant, it could be 
concluded that there is no U-shaped relationship between FDI and income inequality. In other 
words, the relationship is linear and the evidence will support dependency theory. If β2 is 
statistically significant, there are two possibilities of research interest. If β1it <0 and β2it >0, it 
denotes a U-curve relationship between FDI and income inequality, where an increase in FDI 
will reduce income inequality until a point where further increases in FDI starts to increase 
income inequality. If β1it > 0 and β2it < 0 the relationship is an inverted U-shape where FDI 
will first worsen income inequality, with such an effect diminishing after a maximum turning 
point. This would provide the evidence that supports the modernisation theory.  
As the literature suggests, RGDP is expected to have a positive sign as economic growth is 
expected to increase income inequality in developing countries. TRD is expected to have a 
negative sign since all these countries are transitioning into more open economies during the 
period under the study with shrinking primary sectors. On the other hand, with the growing 
export sectors, trade is expected to increase the incomes of lower-income groups. ELC, which 
represents infrastructure, is supposed to have a negative sign as the infrastructure helps 
underprivileged communities to connect with commercial economic activities. HC is expected 
to have a negative sign because improvements in human capital are believed to be the single 
most crucial factor that can narrow income gaps in the long term. INST is supposed to have a 
positive sign as better institutions would lead to shared prosperity.   
This model makes it possible to determine the turning point beyond which the income 
inequality will increase or decrease. The turning point of the quadratic equation can be 
calculated by taking the partial derivatives:  
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dGini/dFDI = β1+ 2 β2 (FDI it) -------------------(2) 
 
where dGini/dFDI is the slope of the function. At the turning point, the slope becomes zero. 
Accordingly, by substituting zero for the slope, and solving for FDI yields the following 
turning point is written as follows: 
  
 ------------------- (3) 
Thus if the results suggest a non-linear relationship, it is possible to find the turning point of 
the level of FDI flows, following which income inequality would diminish.  
 
3.4.2. Estimation Technique 
The model is empirically estimated using the difference Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) methodology for dynamic panel data proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and 
Arellano and Bover (1995). The GMM estimation enables controlling for potential 
endogeneity of all the explanatory variables. As this is a maximum likelihood type dynamic 
panel technique, it improves the existing technique in terms of finite-sample performances, 
alleviating the biases caused by weak instruments. It also considers the presence of 
unobserved country-specific effects and deals with the problem of reverse causality or 
simultaneity. Moreover, this methodology is more appropriate for estimating growth models 
than the standard GMM estimator developed for dynamic panel data (Arellano & Bond, 
1991). As Blundell and Bond (1998) demonstrated, the instruments used in the standard 
GMM estimation can behave poorly when explanatory variables present a strong 
autoregressive component (such as income or capital level). 
 
Several assumptions are embodied in the data-generating process in the GMM estimations. 
Some regressors are endogenous, and the data-generating process is dynamic as past 
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realisations of the dependent variable influence current ones, and the fixed individual effects 
are arbitrarily distributed. The idiosyncratic disturbances are uncorrelated across individuals 
and may have individual-specific patterns of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
Endogenous and exogenous variables served as instruments along with the regressors. The lag 
of the dependent variable was used as an endogenous variable in all the regressions. This is 
because some regressors are independent of current disturbances or are not strictly exogenous; 
that is, some regressors can be influenced by past ones (Roodman, 2009). 
Several test statistics were used to validate the outcome of the regressions. The reliability of 
the econometric approach based on the dynamic panel approach depends on the validity of the 
instruments. To test the presence of serial correlation, p-values of AR (1) and AR (2) statistics 
are used. A significant AR (1) implies the presence of first-order serial correlation, which 
justifies the use of lags. Once the lag of the dependent variable is used as a regressor, AR (2) 
needs to be insignificant, which suggests the model no longer suffers from second-order serial 
correlation. The Hansen test generates the p-values for the null hypothesis of invalid 
specification, which should be rejected to ensure the model has the correct specification. The 
reliability of the econometric approach based on the dynamic panel approach depends heavily 
on the instruments’ validity, which can be evaluated with the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions. 
This study employs difference GMM estimation. This is because the coefficient generated for 
the lagged independent variable by the difference GMM estimation is higher than that of fixed 
effects estimation. Further, one of the prerequisites of GMM estimation is that the number of 
groups has to be larger than the time periods in the panel. As explained in the data section, 
this scenario is met by having 12 countries and 8 time periods in the study. Since the sample 
size was restricted to 12, the ‘collapse’ option in STATA 12 was employed in the regressions 
in order to control the number of instruments. The ‘robust’ option was used to ensure that the 
standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity, while the ‘small’ option was employed to 
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cater for the small sample size. In addition, regressions are run for seven different models. 
First, a baseline model indicates the relationship between income inequality and FDI and the 
regressors; secondly, 6 other models that depend on the regressors represent different 
specifications of interest. Apart from the GMM estimation, we estimated the model using 
fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) estimation methods for each model as a robustness 
test. To select a model between the FE and RE, each estimation was followed by a Hausmann 
test. Results of the GMM estimation and the robustness tests are presented in Tables 3 and 4, 
respectively. 
 
3.5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Seven models are estimated to examine the relationship between income inequality and FDI 
with different combinations of regressors (see Table 3). Each model is tested for serial 
correlation using the AR (1) and AR (2) statistics and the correct specification using the 
Hansen statistics. If there is no presence of serial correlation, then AR (1) needs to be 
statistically significant, and AR (2) must be statistically insignificant. A correct specification 
will result in a Hansen statistic which is not statistically significant. According to the test 
statistics, models 2, 4 and 5 have all met the conditions and are selected for the discussion.   
First, we look at our main regressor of interest, FDI. It has the expected sign in all the models, 
and of all the selected models, model 4 results in a significant and positive sign for FDI. If we 
look at the economic magnitude, a one-standard-deviation increase in the FDI flows from its 
mean is associated with a 0.09% increase in income inequality measured by the Gini 
coefficient. Accordingly, the proposition that FDI increases income inequality holds for this 
study. The coefficient of FDISQ has a negative sign in all the models, which signifies a non-
linear relationship and provides evidence for modernisation theory. Income inequality falls at 
higher levels of FDI inflows, but FDISQ is not significant in any models.  
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Table 3.3: Results of Two-Step System GMM estimation  
 
Variables  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6)  Model (7)  
L1.GINI 0.482 1.212*** 0.984*** 1.018*** 1.244*** 0.961*** 0.961*** 
 (0.335) (0.154) (0.049) (0.035) (0.141) (0.091) (0.033) 
FDI 0.187 0.002 0.061* 0.034*** 0.043 0.055 0.077 
 (0.201) (0.127) (0.033) (0.012) (0.036) (0.094) (0.061) 
FDISQ -0.0301 -0.001 -0.004   -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.031) (0.013) (0.003)   (0.006) (0.005) 
RGDP   4.20e-13** 3.00e-13** 4.63e-13  3.66e-13* 
   (1.64e-13) (1.45e-13) (1.34e-12)  (1.63e-13) 
HC  -1.877**   -1.456 0.464 -0.487 
  (0.777)   (0.946) (7.214) (0.308) 
TRD   -1.365** -1.664*** -2.148**   
   (0.603) (0.599) (0.897)   
ELC     -0.019 -1.215  
     (0.121) 1.143  
INST      -0.104 -0.123 
      (0.137) (0.077) 
Constant 20.85 -4.619 0.723 -0.572 -6.665 2.363 3.000 
 (13.64) (4.681) (1.934) (1.351) (3.951) (3.633) (1.855) 
Observations 84 77 84 84 77 77 77 
Number of countries 12 11 12 12 11 11 11 
Number of instruments 6 7 7 7 9 10 10 
AR1 test (p-value) 0.402 0.070 0.122 0.093 0.048 0.919 0.985 
AR2 test (p-value) 0.515 0.250 0.655 0.918 0.360 0.933 0.703 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.971 0.535 0.488 0.428 0.494 0.827 0.716 
Notes:  
(1) Robust Standard errors are indicated in the parentheses. 
(2)       Darkened columns have the models which meet all AR(1), AR(2) and Hansen test requirements.  
(3) *, ** and *** represent the level of statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3.4: Results of Robustness Tests using Fixed Effects and Random Effects analysis of panel data  
 
Variables  Model (1)  Model (2) Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6)  Model (7)  
L1.GINI 0.955*** 0.920***  0.991*** 0.992*** 0.938*** 0.914*** 0.882*** 
 (40.17) (30.41)          (41.13)  (43.37) (32.12)  (21.95) (25.03) 
FDI  0.0251 0.0977* 0.0298           0.0158  0.0282*  0.0985 0.0974* 
 (0.60) (2.24)  (0.74)           (0.86) (1.50)  (2.60) (2.55) 
FDISQ -0.00238 -0.0059 -0.00123   -0.00511 -0.00600* 
  (-0.71) (-1.76) (-0.38)   (-1.72) (-2.04) 
RGDP   -2.51e-13   -2.10e-13  -2.06e-13 -2.19e-13 
   (-1.42) (-1.21)  (-0.93)  (-1.25) 
HC   -0.839***     -0.818*** -0.418 -0.783***  
   (-4.23)   (-3.62) (-1.27) (-3.72) 
TRD   -1.456**  -1.492*** -0.0853   
   (-3.18) (-3.30) (-0.14)   
ELC      -0.00692  
      (-1.43)  
INST      -0.200*** -0.230***  
      (-3.64) (-4.50) 
Constant 1.880 5.012*** 0.658  0.630 4.309** 5.772** 5.060*** 
 (1.89)  (3.82) (0.68)  (0.68) (3.30) (2.74) (4.10)  
        
Observations 84 77 84 84 77 77 77 
Number of id 12 11 12 12 11 11 11 
Type of model  RE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
        
Notes:  
(1) Standard errors are indicated in the parenthesis. 
(2) *, ** and *** represent the level of statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
(3)        Type of model is either Random Effects (RE) or Fixed Effects (FE) as chosen based on the Hausmann test.  
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HC has the expected sign in three of the models, and it has been included with a significant 
estimate in model 2. A one-standard-deviation increase in the index of HC from its mean is 
associated with a 0.35% decrease in income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. 
Accordingly, the argument for human capital to help level off income inequality holds in 
terms of the results reported in this study. TRD has the expected sign in all three models 
(models 3, 4 and 5). This signifies that the export sector’s expansion benefits the lower-
income groups, most probably those who moved to cities from the rural areas. Economically, 
a one-standard-deviation increase in exports from its mean is associated with a 1.62% 
decrease in income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. Real GDP has the expected 
sign in all models and is significant in model 4 out of the selected models. Infrastructure 
development represented by ELC has the expected sign in the only model (model 6), and it 
was incorporated. However, the variable is not statistically significant, and the model does 
not pass the Hansen test. The strength of the institutions represented by INST is not 
significant in models 6 and 7. However, INST does not show the expected sign.  
 We perform robustness tests by running both FE and RE models and report the model's 
results selected by the Hausmann test in Table 3. Results in the robustness tests regressions 
show the correct and expected signs consistent with the results obtained using the GMM, 
thereby supporting the validity of our main regression findings. However, in the robustness 
test regressions, some variables which are not statistically significant in the GMM regression 
results have been identified as significant with the correct sign. FDI is significant in models 
2, 5 and 7, and it has the correct sign. FDISQ has a negative sign in model 7 and points to 
evidence for a non-linear relationship between FDI and income inequality. With β1it > 0 and 
β2it < 0, the relationship between FDI and income inequality is an inverted U-shape such that 




HC is significant in models 2, 5 and 7 and it has the correct sign. The only difference from 
the GMM results is the sign of RGDP, which is negative. Nevertheless, the coefficient of 
RGDP is not statistically significant in any of the models. INST, which was found not to be 
statistically significant in the models estimated using the GMM is statistically significant in 
models 6 and 7 for the robustness test results. The coefficient of INST has a negative sign 
suggesting that when institutional quality deteriorates, the level of income inequality 
decreases.  
All the variables have the expected signs in the main and robustness regression results (see 
Table 4). In the main regressions, the models that pass the Hansen test have explanatory 
variables that are statistically significant with the correct sign. The robustness regression 
outcomes establish the findings in the main regressions and demonstrate that some 
explanatory variables have the predictive power over income inequality and predict in the 
right direction, which accords with intuition. An exception is the variable INST, a proxy for 
institutions, which does not support the predictions given by theory.  
The results align with the modernisation theory, which asserts that the FDI-income inequality 
relationship is characterised by an inverted U-shaped or concave relationship between FDI 
and income inequality. Accordingly, the middle-income countries in the SAARC and 
ASEAN regions have the most common pattern of FDI-income inequality relationship 
observed in peer economies elsewhere in the world, as revealed by empirical studies. This 
further explains the underlying argument that FDI flows and MNEs create income inequality 
in the host economies at the initial stages of development until a tipping point is reached.  
The tipping point is calculated using model 7 in the robustness regression where both FDI 
and FDISQ are significant. The tipping point for FDI value that is calculated using equation 3 
is 8.17%. Accordingly, for income inequality to decline with increasing FDI flows, this will 
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take place for average FDI flows over and above 8.1% of the GDP. However, out of the 
selected countries, only Vietnam, Maldives, Malaysia, and Cambodia have secured such high 
levels of FDI as a percentage of GDP in some years in the sample. Therefore, these countries 
cannot sustain that level of FDI-GDP ratio continuously for an extended period.  
The results also show that economic growth has caused the income gaps to widen further. 
This is in line with the theoretical proposition that economic growth can be harmful to 
income distribution. It is also revealed that infrastructure development is a factor that reduces 
the impact of income inequality. As part of their policies to attract FDI, most of the countries’ 
governments established Export Promotion Zones (EPZ) not located in urban areas. The host 
countries also developed infrastructure to provide better geographical connectivity and 
services such as electricity and telecommunications to help production/industrial processes. 
These policies have effectively attracted unskilled workers into the modern sector 
employment and thereby reducing income gaps. On this theme, human capital has helped 
contain the rising income inequality in the sample countries. Notably, the main argument in 
FDI-inequality related literature focuses on the skill premium and the resulting wage 
premium that leads to income inequality (Te Velde, 2002). Given this, managing human 
capital development will be the key to curb rising income inequality resulting from the skill 
premium. The world inequality report highlights the importance of policies devised to 
enhance human capital and identifies more must be done than focusing on ex-post 
redistribution policies (Alveredo et al., 2018). Goldin and Katz (2008) highlight that modern-
day income inequality in the developed world is due to education and governmental failure to 
keep pace with technological progress. They predict that technological progress will widen 
income inequalities if it is not countered by a similar rise in the supply of human capital in 
the labour market. Accordingly, further focus on developing human capital will be significant 
in the policy mix of these countries.  
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Government policies that focus on human capital formation concerning the FDI inflows are 
crucial in addressing the skill premium-induced wage inequality. Te Velde (2002) identifies 
measures such as tax levy on unskilled labour employed by MNEs and using the revenue 
collected to train them to gain the necessary skills. Doh (2018) identifies human capital 
development as the single most reliable way to combat income inequality caused by MNEs. 
Rodrik (2014) contends that in high-income inequality societies, where poor households are 
deprived of economic and educational opportunities, economic growth is depressed. 
Accordingly, even when economic expansion triggered by FDI flows create opportunities, the 
poor will not benefit from it as their human capital development is at elementary or barely 
above subsistence levels.  
 
Another important yet surprising finding is that the stronger the institutions, the worse is the 
income distribution in the sample of countries. In other words, weaker institutions lead to 
better equality. However, this is not widely accepted according to the number of studies on 
income inequality and institutions. According to the theoretical literature, stronger institutions 
lead to better redistributive and more pro-poor policies. However, Acemoglu et al. (2014) 
find evidence suggesting that income inequality increases after democratic reforms are 
introduced under certain conditions. For example, land-based income inequality is high when 
the gap between the poor and the middle class is small. The economy has already undergone 
a substantial structural transformation. They also assert that democracies can implement 
changes in fiscal redistribution and economic structure that have ambiguous effects on 
income inequality. Accordingly, the results relating to the institutions and income inequality 
align with the alternative schools of thought, which assert that the relationship can be vague 




3.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
This paper examines the relationship between FDI and income inequality in 12 middle-
income countries in the SAARC and the ASEAN regions. Income inequality has become one 
of the most debated topics in macroeconomics. Using the system GMM, all else being equal, 
we find that FDI increases income inequality. However, further robustness regression 
analysis shows that this relationship follows an inverted-U curve, suggesting that FDI flows 
increase income inequality below the tipping point but decrease income inequality after the 
tipping point. The findings are in line with modernisation theory which suggests that the 
initial income gap between the modern and traditional sectors of the economy declines when 
growth ensues.  
Human capital development, infrastructure, and trade have also contributed to the decline in 
income inequality. What human capital development brings to the table is a sea of new 
opportunities for the underprivileged and marginalised communities. Even if economies have 
highly skewed income distributions, income inequality can be curtailed as long as there is 
equality in opportunities. With more opportunities for education, both formal and informal, 
people will be able to obtain the required skills demanded in modern workplaces. As the 
results suggest, policies should be introduced to encourage resource reallocation from 
traditional to modern sectors. Better infrastructure facilities such as transport and 
telecommunication will promote development in the rural and underdeveloped areas and 
strengthen their connection and integration to the modernised sector. Export sector 
development has already helped these economies grow faster due to export promotion 
strategies such as the Export Promotion Zones, where MNEs establish their local operations 
in host countries. Our results argue a strong case for continuing such policies.  
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From the policy-makers perspective, it is evident that further improving policies related to 
FDI, human capital development, expansion of the infrastructure facilities and a cautious 
revisit of institutional policies will be instrumental in addressing distributional concerns. The 
results show that what they have been doing in promoting FDI can reduce income inequality 
which would encourage them to continue, or even accelerate, economic reforms through 
greater and engagement with foreign presence in the economy. Accordingly, their external 
sector policies should encourage FDI inflows and sustain them in the long term to achieve 
shared prosperity.  
The findings of this study provide valuable insights for future research by examining the 
reason for the observed non-linear relationship between FDI and income inequality. The 
wage premia that MNEs offer could be responsible for the initial increase in income 
inequality. However, as more FDI flows in, income equality may prevail due to intra-sector 
labour movements, an increase in the skilled labour force in response to the demand for skills 




1. The Kuznets hypothesis (Kuznets, 1955) argues that economic growth may increase 
income inequality during the transition period but will eventually improve the equal 
distribution of income after the transition period. 
2. In the text, the term Multinational Enterprises (MNE) represents foreign-owned companies 
that have received capital through foreign direct investments.  
3. Three data points in the Gini coefficient provided by SWIID for Bhutan were missing. 










CHAPTER 4: ROLE OF FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENTS IN STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION: 
THE CASE OF MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES IN 
SAARC AND ASEAN 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent studies on economic growth reveal different impacts at the aggregate and sectoral 
levels, which is asserted by McMillan and Rodrick (2011), Casellli (2001), and Restuccia 
(2008). Whilst conventional wisdom tends to focus on an economy’s aggregate performance, 
interest has grown in understanding the effect of economic progress at the sectoral level. A 
continuous process of inter-sectoral reallocation of resources within an economic system is 
defined as a structural change or structural transformation. This dynamism in resource 
utilisation across key sectors of the economy can lead to imbalances in how well they 
progress, where some lag behind whilst others make solid gains. Accordingly, focusing on 
standard growth analysis at the aggregate level might fail to understand the impact of growth 
at the sectoral level. This makes the analysis of relationships among sectors of the economy 
in terms of resource allocation worth investigating in detail.  
From a theoretical perspective, insights into structural change have generally been provided 
by the classical school of economic thought rather than the neo-classical and neo-
Schumpeterian schools of thought. Schlogl and Sumner (2020) demonstrate that the classical 
school of economic thought and its more recent iterations find more empirical support for the 
structural transformation than other theories on economic development. This is mainly 
because neo-classical and neo-Schumpeterian theories do not identify the role of sectoral 
development in overall economic growth. Notable early contributions to the theoretical 
literature in this area are those from Kaldor (1967) and Lewis (1954). Kaldor’s concepts 
about development were framed around the theme of structural transformation. He identified 
the manufacturing sector as the engine of growth and argued that economic progress requires 
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successful industrialisation, as the increasing profits made in it are linked to faster growth in 
the wider community. He also asserted that as manufacturing grows, there will be economy-
wide productivity improvements due to positive spillovers. Lewis’s work on the dual 
economy model provides further insights into the theory of structural transformation. He 
argued that the inter-sectoral movement of labour drives capital accumulation where the 
workforce moves from a traditional or non-capitalist sector to a modern or capitalist sector. 
Wages, which are set just above the subsistence level, trigger the labour transfer. 
Subsequently, business owners/entrepreneurs profit from good labour productivity, allowing 
them to plough more money into other investment schemes. Lewis also highlighted the 
difference between productive labour that generates a surplus and unproductive labour that 
does not. Accordingly, the classical school of thought provides a strong theoretical 
underpinning for the structural transformation of an economy.  
The theoretical literature on structural transformation has identified that the reorganisation of 
activity across sectors is important for economic growth. The pioneering work on the 
relationship between structural change and economic growth was done by Baumol (1967) and 
Baumol et al. (1985), who divided the economy into two kinds: firstly, a “stagnant” one that 
uses labour as the only input and produces goods/service as the final output; and secondly, a 
“progressive” one that uses new technology and capital, and grows at some constant rate. 
This led to the term ‘Baumol’s cost disease’, which refers to an indefinite rise in prices and 
the production costs of the stagnant sector caused by factor mobility. Baumol predicted that 
the stagnant sector should attract more labour overtime to satisfy demand if demand is either 
income elastic or price inelastic, but should fade away otherwise. Kuznets (1973), another 
pioneer in this field of study, asserted that structural transformation is one of six 
characteristics he identified as necessary in modern economic growth. He contended that 
structural change comprises several main features: a shift from agriculture to non-agriculture 
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pursuits; from industry to service; a shift from personal enterprise to an impersonal 
organisation of businesses with a corresponding change in the scale of productive units, and 
an associated change in the occupational status and workplace practices of labour.  
However, the empirical literature on structural transformation finds evidence that both 
endorses and dissuades what the theoretical literature predicts. For example, McMillan and 
Rodrick (2011) demonstrate that structural change has been growth-enhancing for Asian 
countries, but this is not the case for Africa and Latin America. They highlight that the main 
reasons for this phenomenon are differences in productivity improvements and the 
contrasting patterns of structural change where labour moves from low to high productivity 
sectors in Asia. However, the opposite is the case for Latin America and Africa. Accordingly, 
identifying factors that cause these patterns and productivity changes is essential for 
understanding their implications for structural change.  
This study aims to examine the role of FDI in the structural transformation of economies that 
are members of two important organisations: the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC); and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The role 
of FDI in economic growth has been a widely researched topic, especially in developing 
economies. However, the role of FDI in structural transformation is a poorly researched area 
in the empirical literature. The main contribution of FDI to the host economy is the fresh 
capital and augments domestic investment. Also, FDI contributes to nations’ economies 
through productivity improvements in the form of positive externalities called ‘spillover 
effects’ (Mehic et al., 2013). These productivity improvements made possible by FDI include 
higher employment, increased reliance on technology, knowledge transfers, and increased 
domestic competition. Spillovers of technology take many forms, including the physical 
movement of labour. For example, Blomström et al. (2001) identified the employees who 
move from foreign-owned Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs) to domestic firms or start their 
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businesses as the agents of such spillover effects that disseminate the technical know-how. 
However, since the trajectory of labour movement generally moves from agriculture to the 
other sectors and the fact that not much FDI goes into the agriculture sector (UNCTAD, 
2019), this will have uneven growth outcomes.  
FDI can enhance productivity in the host industries through new technologies and 
innovations, leading to differences in productivity at the sectoral level. For example, foreign 
acquisition of domestic firms in Spain has led to increased adoption of new technology, 
innovations in processes and products, and increased productivity in labour (Guadalupe et al., 
2012). In contrast, a change from foreign to local ownership leads to a decline in productivity 
(Javorcik and Poelhekke, 2016). Another way in which FDI would help structural 
transformation is by triggering labour movements from sector to sector. McMillan and 
Rodrick (2011) identify labour movement from low productivity to high productivity sectors 
as a key development driver. The high level of skills demanded by foreign-owned companies, 
which is rewarded by earning higher salaries and wages, might encourage labour to move to 
sectors where the pastures are greener. Accordingly, FDI can lead to unbalanced growth 
among sectors because there are productivity differences, and skilled labour could be in 
greater demand in one particular sector compared to another. 
On the other hand, as the economies transform, the relative importance of developmental 
factors might change as various phases of progress are reached. Dabla-Noris et al. (2013) 
assert that the relative importance of FDI depends on the stage of transformation. This is 
because the need to move to the next level of development requires new capital, embracing 
new technologies and business management practices that bring about better productivity. 
FDI is a complete package of all these factors that make it instrumental in helping economies 
progress. Accordingly, FDI is expected to contribute to the transformation that economies 
experience at different stages of development through productivity improvements. 
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As illustrated in the next section (section 2), the data show ample evidence of structural 
transformation in the selected countries since the 1990s, characterised by: firstly, shrinking 
share of value-added in the agriculture sector in Gross Domestic Product (GDP); and 
secondly, the rising share of the service and manufacturing sectors in GDP. A similar trend 
can be observed in various sectors’ total employment numbers but considerably slower. 
Nevertheless, the share of employment in agriculture still constitutes a significant part of total 
employment in the sample countries. Likewise, the countries in SAARC and ASEAN have 
been very successful in attracting FDI in recent decades, thanks to adopting outward-looking 
economic policies and encouraging foreign investors to put their money into specific 
industries. However, there is a distributional aspect of FDI inflows across sectors where most 
of these inflows target the manufacturing and service sectors in developing Asian nations 
(UNCTAD, 2019). Thus, these economies provide case studies worth examining, especially 
what the role of FDI has been in the structural transformation of these countries in the past 
three decades.  
The countries that are members of SAARC and ASEAN have experienced structural 
transformation documented in the literature. Notably, all these countries have experienced the 
first ‘symptom’ of structural change, declining employment in agriculture. This sector is the 
least productive sector and is expected to release its large pool of labour to the other two 
sectors, which are considered more productive. Furthermore, while the process of structural 
change in the world’s advanced economies is well documented (Acemoglu 2008; Buera 
2012; Caselli 2011), its historical and current trajectory in developing economies is yet to be 
investigated in depth. Since the seminal work conducted by Chenery et al. (1986), the 
absence of long-term and detailed sectoral data for developing economies has hindered a 
proper quantitative assessment of the role of structural transformation in accounting for 
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aggregate productivity growth. This paper highlights the importance of examining the 
underlying cause and determinants of structural change in developing economies. 
Our study investigates the structural change in the middle-income countries of the SAARC 
and ASEAN regions, focusing on foreign direct investments. There are five reasons for 
choosing these countries. First, they are all undergoing essential changes and have become 
middle-income countries within the last two decades. Second, the transitions occurring in 
these groups of countries are poorly researched. Third, they reveal signs of being in a middle-
income trap and at risk of economic stagnation, which could undermine the whole purpose of 
structural transformation. Fourth, these nations have historically had more significant 
agriculture industries, which have declined in GDP share. Yet, its workforce is still large but 
not very productive, subsequently leading to poor outcomes. Fifth, they have been recipients 
of voluminous FDI flows compared to other regions of the world, yet little is known about 
the sectoral growth benefits of FDI in these countries.  
 
We use two proxies for structural transformation: the sectoral share of value-added in the 
GDP and the share of employment in each sector. The first proxy is a measure of productivity 
and has been widely used in the empirical literature. The World Bank defines value-added as 
‘the value of the gross output of producers less the value of intermediate goods and services 
consumed in production, before accounting for consumption of fixed capital in production’ 
(World Development Indicators). Our second proxy - sectoral employment shares - is 
important because it reveals changes in labour allocation in all sectors. As with the factors 
that drive structural change, our main interest is to examine the role of FDI. We investigate 
the role of both the inflow and stock of FDI as an agent of structural transformation and the 
role of other factors driving this transformation, namely, human capital, infrastructure, trade, 
and institutions. This paper employs the Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) technique 
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for panel data analysis. Here the objective is to assess the impact of FDI on structural 
transformation in the selected countries.  
We do not find strong evidence to suggest that FDI has helped these economies to transform, 
and in fact, it has been FDI counter-productive to structural change. FDI flows have helped 
greater value addition in the agriculture sector, but not the service sector, and had no 
significant impact on value addition in the manufacturing sector. Human capital development 
has effectively contributed to structural change by taking value away from agriculture where 
it was redundant; but, surprisingly, not contributed much to structural change in the form of 
creating more employment in the service sector. Other determinants such as infrastructure, 
institutions, or trade have not been effective in helping these economies progress to 
subsequent stages of development.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the motivation for this study, 
and it includes a preliminary data analysis of sectoral GDP contribution and employment in 
the SAARC and ASEAN countries. The characteristics of the transformation these economies 
have experienced and their success in attracting FDI in the past few decades are illustrated 
here. Section 3 briefly reviews the literature on structural transformation, evaluating a subset 
of the empirical studies related to determinants of structural change. The theoretical 
arguments are also developed in this particular section. Section 4 reports the data, sources, 
and variables of interest in the model specification and sets up the regression model for the 
empirical study based on the theoretical propositions and relevant literature. Finally, section 5 
discusses and summarises the empirical results before the conclusion.  
The motivation for the study 
The above features of structural transformation are depicted by a sequence of events that 
occurred in the economies chosen for this study. Structural transformation of these economies 
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took falling employment in agriculture, and its workforce moved to the manufacturing sector. 
After a certain point, the process of deindustrialisation occurred when employment shifted to 
the service sector. Figures 1 and 2 depict the three main sectors’ shares of GDP and total 
employment, respectively.  
 
Figure 4. 1: Share of GDP of the agriculture, service, and manufacturing sectors in the 
SAARC countries for the period 1993-2017 
 
Note: The SAARC countries are Bangladesh (BGD), Bhutan (BTN), India (IND), Maldives (MDV), 
Pakistan (PAK), and Sri Lanka (LKA). 
Source: World Development Indicators. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, all countries in the SAARC group indicate evidence of structural 
transformation, with the service sector increasingly dominating the share of GDP while that 
of agriculture declines. From 1993 to 2017, the service sector is the main contributor to GDP 
for all SAARC countries. Agriculture has been steadily losing its share whilst the 
manufacturing sector has expanded rapidly. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are ahead of other 
countries in the classic transformation process, with the share of the manufacturing sector in 
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GDP surpassing that of agriculture. In other countries, manufacturing sectors are expanding 
at the expense of agriculture. However, in Bhutan and Pakistan, manufacturing contributes 
the least to GDP but has remained stable during this period. On balance, evidence on the 
relative changes in the three sectors’ share of GDP suggests that all SAARC countries show 
evidence for the same pattern of transition.  
 
Figure 4. 2: Share of GDP of the agriculture, service, and manufacturing sectors in the 

















































































































































Source: World Development Indicators  
 
In Figure 4.2, we observe that ASEAN countries reveal a similar transition pattern in terms of 
changes in the three sectors’ share of GDP. All countries have a dominant service sector, 
while the agriculture and manufacturing sectors are relatively smaller. Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam have already “completed” their structural transition 
during this period, with the service sector having the largest relative share of GDP, followed 
by manufacturing and agriculture. However, the two laggard nations in the region, namely 
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Cambodia and Laos, have experienced a stagnating manufacturing sector measured in its 
relative share of GDP. This is despite an increase in the service sector and the agriculture 
sector’s share of GDP falling.  
 
Figure 4. 3: Employment share of the agriculture, service, and manufacturing sectors in 
the SAARC countries for the period 1993-2017 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the three sectors’ share of employment. The share of employment is 
slightly different from the share of GDP, albeit the evidence for transition is apparent. Except 
for the Maldives and Sri Lanka, whose GDP depends mainly on the tourism industry, all 
other countries have a dominant agriculture sector that provides the most employment. Sri 
Lanka has experienced a significant transition during this period, where agriculture lost its 
leading position to the service and manufacturing sectors as the primary source of 
employment. All other countries have a similar employment share size dominated by 
agriculture, followed by the service and manufacturing sectors. It can be stated here that all 
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countries display the same pattern, in that employment is rising in the service and 
manufacturing sectors at the expense of agriculture.  
 
Figure 4. 4: Employment share of the agriculture, service, and manufacturing sectors in 
the ASEAN countries for the period 1993-2017 
 
 
Figure 4.4 depicts the employment share of the three sectors in the ASEAN countries. It is 
similar to the transition pattern for the SAARC countries in Figure 4.3, where employment is 
mainly aggregated in the service and manufacturing sectors at the expense of agriculture. Of 
all the countries, Malaysia has undergone a structural transition that closely resembles 
Western economies. Agriculture lost its position to the service sector as the primary 
employment source, followed by the manufacturing sector. This was very evident during this 
period in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, which witnessed the service sector having 
a higher employment share and dominating the other two sectors. Consequently, the sample 
of countries in SAARC and ASEAN experienced a pattern of structural transformation that is 
generally accepted in the literature.  
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A major concern regarding the FDI inflows in developing Asian nations is that cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and ‘greenfield’ FDI projects are primarily concentrated in 
the manufacturing and service sectors (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2).
1
 For example, in 2019, FDI 
inflows to Indonesia, Vietnam, and Cambodia mainly were evident in the manufacturing and 
service sectors (World Investment Report, p. 43). On the other hand, investment in India was 
driven in the last two decades by ICT (Information Communication Technology) and 
construction, while apparel exports stimulated economic growth in Bangladesh. Accordingly, 
the main destinations of FDI inflows in the two regions are the manufacturing and service 
sectors. This shows that FDI can cause unbalanced sectoral economic growth where one 
industry does well at the expense of another, which has implications for a country’s social 
welfare and employment levels.  
 
Table 4. 1: Developing Asia: Cross-Border M&As by sector/industry, 2018–2019 (USD 
mn) 
 




                                                          
1
 The ‘greenfield’ FDI project is a type of foreign direct investment in which a parent company creates 
a subsidiary in a different country, building its operations from the ground up. 
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Table 4. 2: Developing Asia: Announced greenfield FDI projects by sector/industry, 
2018−2019 (USD mn) 
 
Source: World Investment Report 2019, UNCTAD (p. 37). 
 
Accordingly, destination-wise, industries operating in the service and manufacturing sectors 
are greatly favoured by foreign investors. However, too much investment in these enterprises 
will lead to unbalanced economic growth since foreign capital's direct and indirect benefits 
would be enjoyed only by those two sectors. It means, in effect, that agriculture will be 
deprived of productivity improvements. This section illustrates the data related to structural 
change, FDI inflows in the SAARC and ASEAN countries, and how FDI would contribute to 
unbalanced sectoral growth. In the next section, we review the literature on sectoral 
transformation in the aggregate economy.   
 
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the recent theoretical and empirical literature 
on economic structural transformation. First, we look at the methods employed to compile the 
sectoral data. Many approaches have been devised to categorise economic activities 
into different sectors where items sharing similar attributes are aggregated into a common 
104 
 
group or sector. The most common method employed for the sectoral division of the 
aggregate economy is the familiar sectoral trichotomy of agriculture (primary sector), 
manufacturing (secondary sector), and service (tertiary sector). Furthermore, economic 
sectors can be defined according to the levels and types of technology, supply and demand 
characteristics, the nature of an industry’s output and intermediate inputs, or innovations’ 
specific features and their impacts (Nuess, 2018). However, in this study, we employ the 
most commonly used approach, the three-sector economy. Next, we examine the theory 
behind the changes occurring in the sectoral composition of growth, implications for 
structural transformation, and the role of FDI and other determinants in the process of 
structural transformation. 
4.2.1. Theoretical aspects 
Economic scholars have highly debated the role of structural transformation in economic 
growth since this branch of literature began. Three schools of thought have tried to explain 
the relationship between economic growth and the dynamics of sectoral composition: neo-
classical, neo-Schumpeterian and classical (Schlogl and Sumner, 2020). The neoclassical and 
neo-Schumpeterian schools do not identify changes in sectoral composition as an influential 
factor in growth. Instead, they assume it as an unimportant by-product (Echevarri, 1997; 
Schlogl and Sumner, 2020). They assert that output growth rate, real interest rate, labour 
income share, and capital-output ratio are all roughly consistent over time. However, classical 
economists such as Boumol (1985) and Kuznets (1973) contend that changes in sectoral 
composition and the corresponding reallocation of resources could lead to growth outcomes. 
Lewis (1954) argued that the inter-sectoral movement of labour drives capital accumulation 
where the workforce moves from traditional or non-capitalist sectors to modern, 
technologically-driven or capitalist sectors. Wages, which are set just above the subsistence 
level, encourage labour transfer. Business owners will then take advantage of labour 
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productivity to make profits and subsequently engage in reinvestment opportunities. 
Accordingly, structural change can stimulate growth if the resources are allocated to those 
areas where productivity improvements will be evident. 
 
Theoretical literature provides two broad explanations for the reallocation of resources across 
sectors in economic models based on supply and demand factors. Supply factor models argue 
that long-run patterns of resource allocation are caused by different types of capital intensity, 
while differential rates of productivity growth lead to different relative prices (Acemoglu and 
Guerrieri, 2008). The combined effect of differences in capital deepening and factor 
proportions will cause economic growth to be unbalanced. Capital deepening results in an 
increase in the relative output of the sector with a more significant capital share which, 
however, induces a simultaneous reallocation of labour and capital away from that sector. 
Conversely, sectoral labour productivity gaps lead to differences in countries having varied 
rates of structural transformation (Duarte and Restuccia, 2010). Structural change can coexist 
with a constant aggregate growth path where the former is characterised by sectoral labour 
reallocation. However, aggregate growth might hide this underlying shift of employment to 
sectors with low growth rates away from those where a high rate of technological 
development is occurring (Ngai and Pissarides, 2007).  
Economic models arguing that supply factors drive the structural change consider the 
differences in capital intensities, productivity, and the gulf in technological progress as the 
main reasons for unbalanced economic growth. The second explanation argues that due to 
preferences or demand factors, the income effects drive the sectoral reallocation of resources 
(Bopport, 2011; Kongsamut et al., 2001; Echevarria, 1997, 2000). Discrepancies in sectoral 
incomes and non-homothetic preferences lead to unbalanced economic development. 
Significant violations of the generalised balanced growth path constraint produce moderate 
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movements in the real interest rate but change the pattern of sectoral resource reallocation 
dramatically (Echevarria, 1997, 2000). Therefore, structural transformation is a consequence 
of both demand and supply factors within an economy.  
4.2.2. Implications of structural change 
Implications of structural transformation are widespread and are observed in both developed 
and developing nations. The study of structural change provides insights into the income 
distribution effect in an economy caused by differences in sectoral growth. Caselli and 
Coleman (2001) demonstrate that the convergence in regional incomes for the north and the 
south of the United States coincided with a dramatic narrowing of regional differences in the 
employment share in agriculture. Further, the developmental aspects of structural 
transformation which elicit continuous reallocation of resources across sectors and over time 
are widely discussed in the literature. Caselli (2005) asserts that the significant differences 
in living standards across countries are attributable to differences in productivity and 
highlights that developing countries are ones in which most of the workforce toils in low-
productivity agriculture compared to economically advanced countries. Furthermore, the 
premium paid to skilled labour is attributed to where people work once the structural 
transformation is underway, for example, the thriving service sector. There is a threshold of 
per capita income at which an increase in the value-added share for service could be 
observed. This coincides with an increase in the skilled proportion of the workforce and the 
high wages paid to it (Buera and Kaboski, 2012). Accordingly, the structural transformation 
has implications on income distribution due to the imbalances in sectoral growth.   
 
The shrinking of the agriculture sector and the expansion of the manufacturing and service 
sectors are common to many developing countries. However, some countries experience an 
unexpected early decline in manufacturing which is known as deindustrialisation.  Premature 
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deindustrialisation in the developed world has severe implications for structural 
transformation. Tregenna (2015, p. 2) defines premature deindustrialisation as a process that 
begins at a lower level of manufacturing, both as a share of total employment and GDP, at a 
lower level of GDP per capita than is typically observed internationally. This is characterised 
by an ailing manufacturing/industrial base, and it is forced to become a service-dominated 
economy, thus leapfrogging the middle stage of economic transformation. Rodrik (2016) has 
found evidence suggesting labour movement from the manufacturing and service sectors to 
agriculture in the United States is the opposite of what was observed in Asia. However, when 
such deindustrialisation happens in developing countries, it is considered premature. This 
premature deindustrialisation leads to many other serious outcomes, especially if the drop in 
manufacturing sector employment is accompanied by a significant expansion of low 
productivity and non-tradable service, such as the informal sector, which ultimately causes 
lower economic growth. Overall, empirical evidence in recent times suggests that the service 
sector in the developed countries is expanding at the expense of manufacturing, especially in 
Africa and Latin America (Timmer et al., 2015). Accordingly, recent trends in economic 
development in different parts of the world show various implications of structural 
transformation. 
4.2.3. Structural Transformation and Economic Development 
Structural transformation plays a vital role in developing a nation by improving economic 
efficiency through the reallocation of resources. Considerable differences in people’s living 
standards from nation to nation are determined by lower productivity in agriculture in the 
developing countries compared to advanced economies and employing a significant share of 
labour in the developing countries’ agriculture sector. Countries with low productive 
agriculture sectors will have to devote more labour to agriculture even if they employ modern 
technology. This leads to labour being less available to the manufacturing and service sectors 
108 
 
which in turn causes lower aggregate output. This mechanism can account for a large part of 
the cross-country differences in aggregate output, given the observed differences in the share 
of labour allocated to agriculture (Gollin et al., 2002). Also, Echevarri (1997) demonstrates 
that sectoral composition affects per capita income growth rates and vice versa. The 
magnitude of this variation in growth rates is greater than 2%, whereas historically, most 
countries have recorded an average growth rate smaller than 4%. On this basis, the role of 
sectoral composition is important in determining the growth of certain regional economies.  
 
4.2.4. Structural change and different stages of development  
Structural change is a phenomenon characterised by the transition to a modern economy 
made possible by continuous inter-sectoral resource allocations over time. Economic history 
literature provides valuable insights into the nature of economic change. Up to the 18th 
century, agriculture was the most crucial sector in most of the world’s economies, and it 
employed most of the labour force. Clark, Cummins, and Smith (2012) demonstrate that the 
share of England’s workforce in agriculture remained largely stable during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Influential economists in that era, of the calibre of Francois Quesnay, 
considered agriculture to be the only productive sector to create profits whilst calling the 
trade and manufacturing sectors ‘sterile’, relegating them to the sidelines (Kongsamut et al., 
2001). The first signs of widespread industrialisation were observed in England, which 
experienced unusually early structural change. Wallis, Colson, and Chilosi (2018) highlight 
the mid-seventeenth century as a turning point where increasingly urban-oriented industries 
started gradually moving away from traditional agricultural sectors. The reasonably stable 
political conditions of the 18
th
 century enabled the Industrial Revolution to begin in Britain, 
then spread to Europe, followed by the United States and by the end of the nineteenth century 
to Russia and Japan. A plethora of factors caused the breaking away from the Malthusian 
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state in Europe, such as incomes, demographics, institutional and cultural factors, trade 
patterns, colonial/imperial status, public policy (Galor 2005), new inventions, and non-
economic motives of innovation (Mokyr, 1990) or just the forces of accident and 
circumstance (Crafts, 1977). However, the consensus is that industrialisation helped England 
become the economic and financial powerhouse of the world by the eighteenth century. This 
spread to other parts of Europe, leading to an unprecedented increase in efficiency and 
productivity rates that accelerated the process of structural change. 
Although structural transformation has been identified as an essential part of economic 
growth, patterns and speed of such transformation vary across regions and countries, for 
example, in terms of the speed and process of structural transformation. The transformation 
of the developed nations, for example, was characterised by a transition from agrarian to 
industrial-based economies before further turning into service-oriented economies (Dabla-
Norris et al., 2013). Likewise, the transformation of Asia in the latter half of the twentieth 
century was made possible by a fast-growing manufacturing sector at the expense of 
agriculture. However, while the remarkable growth of the Asian ‘Tiger’ nations was 
underpinned by manufacturing, structural transformation in other Asian emerging market 
economies has been uneven and characterised by symptoms of the middle-income trap.   
The empirical evidence highlights a sequence of events in an economy that experiences 
structural transformation: falling employment in the agriculture sector where the workforce 
moves to the manufacturing and service sectors, followed by deindustrialisation characterised 
by labour going to the service sector. Initially, the economies are characterised as having a 
large agriculture sector that uses traditional technology. This means that all labour will 
remain in agriculture as long as traditional technology or methods are used. At some point, 
modern technology started to replace traditional technology with which more could be 
produced and sold more efficiently. This triggers the movement of labour from agriculture to 
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non-agriculture industries. Accordingly, the growth rate of labour in the two non-agricultural 
sectors is determined by the exogenous growth rate of labour productivity in the modern 
agricultural sector. Differences in non-agricultural output entirely drive cross-country 
differences in aggregate production as all countries have the same productivity in agriculture 
in the long term (Gollin et al., 2002). Schultz (1953) asserted that improving agricultural 
productivity in a closed economy to produce a surplus is a precondition for growth.  
Some interesting evidence is provided by the Groningen Growth and Development Centre 
(GGDC) 10-Sector Database, which was compiled by Timmer et al. (2015). It provides 
internationally comparable data on economic activity, that is, employment and nominal 
value-added, at the sector level from 1947 onwards for some countries which are classified 
into six geographic regions. These are North Africa, Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, North 
America, Latin America, and Europe. Considering the structural transformation in the 
developed countries, this database provides some interesting points. As expected, data shows 
the actual data for structural transformation, characterised by a shrinking agriculture sector 
and labour movement from primary to secondary and tertiary sectors. Out of all the changes 
that occur, the industry sector is the most prominent one in which manufacturing wields 
considerable influence. At lower levels of economic development, there is a rise in the shares 
of employment and value addition in an industry sector. In contrast, both shares tend to 
decline at higher levels of development, creating a ‘hump shape’ relationship (Neuss, 2019). 
This process of industrialisation-deindustrialisation is very evident in the world’s developed 
countries.   
The developing countries generally follow the same transformation trend as their more 
developed counterparts. Still, an exception is found in the evolution of the industry sector, as 
revealed by the GGDC 10-sector database. Timmer et al. (2015) demonstrate that relatively 
higher growth in the manufacturing sector witnessed after World War II was linked to a 
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reallocation of resources that accelerated growth throughout most Latin America, Africa, and 
Asia. However, during the high growth phase in the 1990s, workers mainly relocated to 
market service industries, such as retail trade and distribution. These sub-sectors in the 
service sector are much more productive than agriculture but less technologically dynamic 
and lagged behind the world technology frontier. This was more evident in Latin America 
and Africa, which explains the premature deindustrialisation in those regions. 
However, Asia was following the same pattern of transformation experienced by the rich 
countries, even when South Korea and Japan, the more developed countries in the region, are 
removed from the picture. The share of employment in agriculture fell when economic 
development focused on the service sector. Asia’s structural transformation is also consistent 
with the ‘hump shape’ relationship in the nominal value-added and employment shares of 
manufacturing and industry witnessed in the world’s advanced economies. However, the 
Latin American and African countries had manufacturing sectors that functioned differently, 
and many researchers found evidence of premature deindustrialisation (Neuss, 2019). For 
instance, the recent impressive high-growth in sub-Saharan Africa has been accompanied by 
a typical decline in agriculture and the rise of the service sector. In contrast, the 
manufacturing sector has remained mostly unchanged in terms of output. Accordingly, the 
SAARC and ASEAN countries show more robust evidence of the standard transformation 
pattern compared to Latin America and Africa.  
Empirical studies show evidence for the similar direction of structural transformation, with 
agriculture declining and expanding the manufacturing and service sectors. For example, 
Dabla-Norris et al. (2013) assert that the share of manufacturing value-added reaches its peak 
at real per capita GDP at around US$5,000. In contrast, the service sector shows an 
acceleration at the same level of real per capita GDP. They also find that the service sector 
contributes a higher share of total value added even at low levels of per capita GDP. These 
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scholars’ data report that service sector share in GDP and per capita GDP has a positive linear 
relationship in the advanced economies. Still, for the emerging market economies and low-
income countries, the slope is fairly flat at lower levels of per capita GDP. It then rises 
considerably after the per capita GDP reaches approximately US$700. Focusing on the 
regions with a higher concentration of middle-income countries, Asia transformed the most 
from agriculture to manufacturing. In contrast, Eastern and Central European countries 
reflected the standard pattern of structural transformation of the advanced economies into 
fully-fledged market economies, characterised by a decline in agriculture, replacement by 
manufacturing and subsequent reliance on the service sector. In contrast, Latin America 
leapfrogged the middle stages of transformation to reach a service sector-dominated 
development phase. The service, on average, accounted for approximately half the total 
value-added, which occurred as far back as the early 1970s. In the following subsections, we 
look at different determinants of structural change highlighted in the empirical literature and 
how these played an essential role in transforming economies in terms of sectoral share. 
4.2.5. Determinants of structural change 
Our study examines the structural change in middle-income countries in the SAARC and 
ASEAN regions, focusing on the FDI. All these are countries that have transformed into 
middle-income countries in the last two decades. Irrespective of the country, region, or period 
analysed, sectoral shifts are not mechanical processes. Their extent and speed reflect the 
ability and willingness of labour and capital to move from lower- to higher-productivity 
sectors. While literature shows that economic fundamentals play a role in determining 
differences in sectoral share in and between countries, globalisation, structural reforms, 
policies, and institutional variables are also very important when discussing the observed 
patterns of structural change. Dabla-Noris et al. (2013) assert that reforms in the production 
and selling of goods or services lead to better resource reallocation, whilst human and 
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physical capital play a significant role in structural transformation. They also highlight that 
globalisation does not have the same effect across sectors, but it more impacts the service and 
manufacturing sectors. Nevertheless, they find that these variables have heterogeneous effects 
on the sectoral share over time and across economies. They assert that differences in the 
strength of product market reforms in agriculture and networks (communications and 
electricity), financial sector, human capital, trade openness, and other indicators of 
globalisation are essential for explaining sectoral shares of the economy in cross-country 
variations.  
Since structural change is a dynamic process, the relative importance of these factors might 
alter over time. Dabla-Noris et al. (2013) assert that factors like a higher capital stock, 
network reforms, and FDI inflows are more critical for countries with poorly developed 
manufacturing systems and credit. Whilst for countries with highly developed manufacturing, 
tertiary education and agricultural reforms are more pertinent. Yet again, for countries with a 
large service sector share of the economy, the more relevant factors are greater labour market 
flexibility, tertiary education, and product market reforms in agriculture and networks. There 
is a temporal dimension to the development of sectoral share that mirrors the above pattern. 
Before globalisation, the relative importance of determinants such as network reforms, 
transport, and communication, was much more significant in agriculture and the service 
sector. The rise of manufacturing in the 1990s was made possible by liberalising policies and 
practices in the agriculture sector. Similarly, FDI was a critical determinant of increasing the 
service sector’s economy share as the globalisation era got underway. Still, it was equally 
important in agriculture and manufacturing before globalisation proceeded. Increased trade 
openness due to economic liberalisation of commerce and trade also became an important 
driver of manufacturing in the post-globalisation period (Dabla-Noris et al., 2013). Thus, the 
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relative importance of the determinants might vary depending on the stage of an economy’s 
structural transformation.  
4.2.6. FDI and structural change  
FDI has both direct and indirect implications for a transforming economy. In this subsection, 
we review the complexities concerning the nexus between FDI and structural change. One of 
the many interesting aspects related to FDI and structural transformation nexus is the impact 
of FDI on labour market movements. The high wages/salaries paid by foreign-owned 
companies as an incentive to skill premium might cause the workforce to move from one 
sector to another, thus causing structural transformation. Since multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) recruit better-skill workers, the increased demand for better trained and experienced 
employees is matched by higher wages. Thus, an economy going through a structural change 
might experience changes in wages caused by an increase in the demand for skilled labour, 
which is typical of developing countries. For example, when technological progress is 
underway, and new processes are being implemented, firms need to switch to production 
techniques that are skilled labour-intensive. Rodrik (2014) states that despite the dramatic 
increase in foreign direct investment inflows and aggressive liberalisation measures 
introduced in Mexico, employment growth in the formal sector has barely changed. Yet 
employment growth in the informal sector has exploded, further reinforcing the polarised 
nature of a developing economy that is characterised by two differentiable sectors. 
Accordingly, FDI can affect the nature and level of labour reallocation in an economy, 
leading to structural transformation.  
Another role that FDI plays in a developing economy, where the savings and investment rates 
are generally low, is the supplementation of domestic investment. This is an essential 
precondition for early industrialisation since the savings rate drives industrialisation. Laitner 
(2000) demonstrates that an increase in savings rates early in this process would accelerate 
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structural transformation in an economy. Accordingly, if FDI can supplement the domestic 
capital, its effect will be equivalent to increasing the savings rate. Besides, FDI leads to the 
greater economic integration of countries, so that essentially the spread of production across 
national borders means that a closed economy view on structural change is redundant 
(Matsuyama 2009). Rodrik and McMillan (2011) note that overvalued exchange rates can 
hinder the growth of tradable sectors such as modern manufacturing. Because of the 
investment flows that FDI brings in, it might have an indirect impact on structural 
transformation through the exchange rates. However, due to the capital augmentation and 
other cross-border implications, the relationship between FDI and sectoral transformation 
may be more complex than it appears.  
Further, FDI contributes to the economies of host countries by augmenting domestic 
investment and its positive externalities or ‘spillover effects’ in terms of employment 
creation, technology transfers, increased domestic competition, and productivity (Mehic et 
al., 2013). Spillovers of technology take many forms, including the physical movement of 
skilled labour from sector to sector. Employees recruited from the host country and working 
for MNEs are given better and/or extra training than their counterparts in locally owned 
firms. The movement of labour from MNEs to local businesses or people wanting to start 
their enterprise can capitalise on the training they received from MNEs; it leads to the 
dissemination of technical know-how (Blomström et al., 2001). However, it will not have 
much positive effect if the benefits are not widespread. For example, if FDI contributes to the 
technology in the manufacturing sector, agriculture will not benefit from the spillover 
outcomes.  
Moreover, FDI is likely to stimulate the host country’s technological progress and accelerate 
technology diffusion across borders even in the absence of significant physical capital 
infusion. The improvements caused by FDI due to the knowledge and technology spillovers 
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at the firm level, caused by interactions and integration of domestic firms with multinationals 
through subcontracting, would significantly stimulate productivity. For example, foreign 
acquisition of domestic firms generally leads to increased adoption of new technology, 
innovations in processes and products, and better productivity in sales and labour in Spain 
(Guadalupe et al., 2012). Conversely, when the ownership of a firm changes from foreign to 
domestic, this leads to a decline in total factor productivity, output, and much less export-
import activity (Javorcik & Poelhekke, 2016). Moreover, productivity improvements move 
along the supply chains due to backward integration where domestic producers who supply 
inputs to foreign-owned multinational companies commit to improve their products and 
processes so that they can remain competitive (Bajgar & Javorcik, 2014). Consequently, there 
will be ‘super productive’ pockets in the domestic economy integrated into global value 
chains through MNEs. However, when these productivity improvements are not widely 
distributed across the sectors, they could follow different growth trajectories.  
Structural change is triggered when new technology replaces old ways of doing things and 
innovations are successfully diffused. FDI is a source of new technology and innovation that 
host economies can use. Dewick et al. (2006) demonstrate that the development and diffusion 
of new bio and nanotechnologies cause new industries to emerge while others decline. Their 
survey of industry experts finds that the impact of technology on the industrial structure of 
the EU and US is likely to be similar. However, the stated effect in China is expected to be 
lower by 2020 compared to the US and EU, but they will all be at the same level by the year 
2050. Bloch and Metcalfe (2018) highlight that structural change in a given industry, and the 
economy in general, is driven by the combined effect of differences in firm growth and the 
interaction of innovators with competitors and customers. This creates the conditions for 
economic revolution. Accordingly, new technology and innovation brought about by FDI 
could drive structural change in an economy.  
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Also, the productivity changes generated by foreign-owned firms can be explained from a 
new entrant-incumbent perspective. MNEs operating in host countries establish entirely new 
firms or through mergers and acquisitions whilst bringing in new technology, means of 
production, and entrepreneurship. The difference between the incumbent and a new entrant is 
that incumbents mainly attempt to strengthen their current specialisation in the locality while 
new entrants strive for unrelated diversification. Whilst the growth, decline, and even the 
industry switching by an incumbent would only align them further with the local economy, 
the unrelated diversification that triggers structural change is generated by new firms, 
especially those of non-local origin (Neffke, 2018). New entrants have to cope with a 
challenging business life cycle despite introducing possibilities for the host economy. As a 
result, there is a higher risk of failure in the environment than incumbent firms. Nevertheless, 
if the new ventures are successful, the novel activities they introduce will lead to substantial 
changes in the local economy, thus leading to structural change. In this way, FDI could be an 
agent of change through the new economic activities they introduce to the locality. 
4.2.7. The human capital development and structural change 
Structural change leads to increasing differentiation and complexity of economies, and 
human capital development provides impetus to those processes. An increase in physical 
capital stock also leads to a rise in the marginal productivity of human capital and vice-versa. 
Both forms of capital complement each other (Caselli and Coleman, 2006). Krishna and 
Levchenko (2013) demonstrate that human capital plays a vital role in the specialisation drive 
in an economy. They argue that as the complexity of the goods produced in an economy 
increases, more challenging tasks will be completed that require better skills.  
Both FDI and human capital act as triggers of growth, whereas FDI brings in new capital that 
contributes to the domestic capital whilst human capital augments the physical capital. The 
growth effect of FDI and human capital are interlinked.  The productive specialization of 
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economies depends on their endowment factors, whereby technologically more advanced 
industries will tend to locate in countries with a high stock of human capital. In the context of 
developing countries, the literature suggests that any beneficial impact of FDI on economic 
growth is conditional on the characteristics of the host economy, which determine the 
absorptive capacity (De Mello 1999). Borensztein et al. (1998) have revealed that, overall, 
FDI brings about positive effects on the growth of the recipient economy, even though the 
available stock of human capital determines the magnitude of these effects. They also assert 
that direct FDI for countries with deficient levels of human capital could be harmful. They 
found that FDI will contribute to growth only when the recipient economy can adequately 
absorb advanced and new technology without crowding out domestic investment. Similarly, 
Blomström, et al. (2001) find that the benefits of FDI to economic growth could be 
capitalised on only when an adequate level of education is available to the workforce in the 
recipient country. Accordingly, the impact of FDI on the transformation of the economy 
would be accelerated by human capital, especially when both have uneven distribution across 
sectors.  
As a prerequisite to absorb the benefit of FDI, the technological catch-up through the 
adoption of new technology also depends on the human capital. A country with a higher level 
of human capital is likely to absorb technology from developed economies more effectively 
(Benhabib and Spiegel 1994). Transfer of knowledge and skills also depends on an 
economy's absorptive capacity in transformation. Teixeira and Fortuna (2011) highlight a 
minimum human capital development threshold for such transfer. Gürbüz (2011) 
demonstrates that the accumulation of human capital is necessary for a virtuous structural 
change. Innovative and creative processes required greater stocks of human capital 
(Vandenbussche et al. 2006). Accordingly, in addition to enhancing the effect of physical 
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capacity and absorbing the spillover effects of FDI, human capital provides a launchpad for 
technological enhancement, which helps economies transform.  
Moreover, human capital development contributes through the demand side to the structural 
change by transforming the consumer's needs to more sophistication. Consumers with a 
higher level of education are generally able to secure better employment with higher rewards. 
With the higher income and better education, they are likely to chase modern high tech 
products and attempt to keep up with the ever-changing consumer technology. This will 
create a higher demand for new technology and innovation leading to a virtuous cycle of 
structural change (Justman and Teubal, 1991). Accordingly, the effect of human capital on 
structural transformation has both demand and supply dimensions. 
4.2.8. Institutions and structural change 
Often understood as “rules of the game”, institutions are a combination of formal rules, 
written laws, shared beliefs about the world, and informal behavioural norms. Strong 
institutions create a conducive environment for economic activity to thrive, which leads to 
transformation in the economy. Dabla-Noris et al. (2013) assert that the institutional and 
policy environment strongly influences the speed and extent of sectoral shifts, reflecting 
capital and labour's ability and willingness to operate in higher-productivity sectors. As the 
institutional framework is instrumental in determining the structure of economic incentives, 
explaining economic transformation requires a close look at institutional change (North, 
2006). Changes in the productive system cause institutions to transform and reinforce 
structural change in a cumulative way. Dávila-Fernández et al. (2020) demonstrate that an 
economy’s capacity to adapt depends on how public policies and institutions are designed. 
They further assert that institutions are ultimately the result of people's sentiments and 
attitudes towards change itself.  
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4.2.9. Other factors that influence structural change 
Several other macroeconomic variables highlighted in the literature make an impact on 
sectoral transformation. For example, financial development can facilitate resource allocation 
throughout the economy by enabling greater diversification, investment in higher 
productivity activities, and risk-sharing (Levine, 2005). Alagided et al. (2020), in their study 
of 8 countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over the period 1988 to 2015, find evidence that 
trade and financial integration significantly add value to the manufacturing and agricultural 
sectors. Another measure of the influence of structural transformation is the productivity 
differences among economic sectors. Duarte and Restuccia (2010) find that country-level 
differences in productivity are more significant in service and agriculture than in 
manufacturing. They argue that productivity catch-up in the industry explains about 50% of 
the gains in aggregate productivity across countries. In contrast, low productivity in service 
and the lack of catch-up explain all the experiences of slowdown, stagnation, and decline 
observed across countries. Accordingly, financial development, trade, and productivity 
differences might also have a bearing on structural transformation. In the next section, we 
explain the data and the methodology employed in this study.  
4.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.3.1. Data  
Data are collected for the period 1993 to 2017 for several reasons. The first concerns data 
availability, and for the second, this period represents an era where most countries in the 
selected group underwent structural changes. Third, by the mid-1990s, almost all of these 
countries started introducing economic reforms that encouraged much more competition, 
decentralisation and allowing market forces to shape the economy. 12 countries were selected 
out of the 14 middle-income level countries in the two regions based on data availability. 
These countries are listed in Table 1.  Following the existing literature, sample data for all 
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variables are used as three-year averages. Accordingly, the data set comprises 8 data points 
for each variable and 12 countries.  
 
Table 4. 3: Lists of the studied countries 
SAARC ASEAN  
Bangladesh Malaysia 
Bhutan Indonesia 
India Lao PDR (Laos) 
Pakistan Vietnam 
Sri Lanka Thailand 
 Cambodia 
 The Philippines 
 
Data for the independent variables are obtained from Penn World Tables and World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank. Regressions of the growth components involve 
choosing regressors to be used along with the FDI as independent variables. Following the 
literature, we select other independent variables: trade, human capital, infrastructure, and 
institutions. To avoid using similar types of variables and highly correlated variables, a 
correlation analysis is employed to select the independent variables from each category in the 
regressions. 
The proxy representing the structural change in this study is the value-added in each sector as 
a percentage of GDP. We use two measures of FDI as our main regressors, FDI net inflows 
as a percentage of GDP and FDI stock as a percentage of GDP. The human capital (HC) 
variable is the index compiled based on years of schooling and returns to education as in 
PWT9. We obtain these data from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. 
Trade (TRD) is represented by the share of merchandise exports (at current purchasing power 
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parity) in the GDP provided by the Penn World Tables (PWT). Instead of including a variable 
that combines imports and exports, an exports-related variable was chosen for two reasons. 
Firstly, all the economies aggressively expanded their export sectors during the study period 
through export promotion zones; secondly, the FDI-related investments occurred mainly in 
export-related industries. Institutions (INST) are proxied by a combined index formed by 
averaging the Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL) indices of the Freedom House 
Institute. PR and CL are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest 
degree of freedom and seven the lowest. Freedom in the World, which is an annual report 
published by Freedom House, analyses the electoral process, political pluralism and 
participation, the functioning of government, freedom of expression and belief, associational 
and organisational rights, the rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights for 
each country and territory (Freedom House, 2018). Our proxy for the institutions is ranked 
from 1 to 7 where countries with the most robust institutions are rated at 1. Accordingly, we 
use the reciprocal value of the rank to represent the impact of institutions in the model. 
Infrastructure (ELC) is proxied by the availability of electricity, that is, access to electricity as 
a percentage of the population provided by the WDI.  
 
4.3.2. Model 
It is difficult to measure this phenomenon since structural change is characterised by the 
evolving sectors’ share in total economic activity. Consequently, different approaches have 
been employed in the empirical literature to identify how activities within the three sectors 
have evolved. For this reason, the aggregate economy needs to be split into different sectors, 
and then the economic activity must be measured at the sectoral level. The three common 
methods are sectoral value-added, shifts in sectoral employment, and consumption 
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expenditure. The first two are production-based measures, whilst the third is a consumption-
based measure. 
In this study, sectoral value addition as a share of GDP is considered the proxy for structural 
change. It is a measure of productivity and has been widely employed in the empirical 
literature. The World Bank defines value-added as ‘the value of the gross output of producers 
less the value of intermediate goods and service consumed in production, before accounting 
for consumption of fixed capital in production’.  Furthermore, as suggested in the empirical 
literature and illustrations documented in the introduction, countries in the sample have 
shrinking agriculture sectors and expanding manufacturing and service sectors, both in terms 
of employment and value addition. There could be economically important connections 
between the three sectors in the economy. For example, since resources are limited, one 
sector expands at the expense of the resources previously employed by the other two sectors. 
Any economic model that examines the sectoral transformation needs to control these 
interlinkages. Accordingly, this study uses a simultaneous equations model approach to 
econometric analysis where the following structural equations are estimated. 
Based on the empirical and theoretical literature reviewed in the previous sections, the 
following baseline econometric model is estimated and written as equations based on Cobb-
Douglas function:  
AGRIVAit = α0 + α1 MANVAit+ α2 SERVAit  + α3 Z’1it + ε1it  ------------------(1)  
MANVAit = β0 + β1 AGRIVAit+ β2 SERVAit  + β3 Z’2it + ε2it……………(2) 
SERVAit = γ0 + γ1 AGRIVAit+ γ2 MANVAit + γ3 Z’3it + ε3it……………(3) 
These three structural equations constitute a simultaneous equation model with three 
endogenous variables. Structural change is proxied by three dependent variables - AGRIVA, 
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MANVA, and SERVA in each structural equation - which are the value additions in the 
agriculture, manufacturing, and service sectors, respectively, as a share of GDP.  Given the 
Z’, ε1it, ε1it and ε1it, these three equations determine AGRIVA, MANVA, and SERVA. Z’ 
represents the other independent variables, which are considered exogenous as they are 
determined outside the model. From a statistical standpoint, Z1, Z2, and Z3 are uncorrelated 
with the structural error terms ε1 ε2 and ε3.  
Z’ is a vector of other control variables employed in this study, these being, FDI 
infrastructure (INFR), trade (TRD), institutions (INST), and Human Capital (HC). FDI is our 
primary independent variable of interest, and this research examines the relationship of both 
stock and the flow of FDI with the structural transformation. Since FDI is believed to bring in 
fresh capital and other fringe benefits that help the transformation, it is expected that FDI 
plays a negative role in agriculture but a positive one in the manufacturing and service 
sectors. Agriculture is less productive and is expected to simply serve as a source of labour to 
the other sectors. The same pattern is expected concerning human capital development as it 
helps the populace gain knowledge and skills to engage in more sophisticated manufacturing 
networks and technology-based employment. Infrastructure is expected to positively impact 
the manufacturing sector as these economies have set up special economic zones to attract 
new enterprises, including multinational enterprises. Stronger institutions that ensure the rule 
of law are expected to contribute to the transformation process positively.  
 
4.3.3. Estimation Technique 
Since AGRIVA, SERVA and MANVA have possible linkages, and there is a problem of 
endogeneity in the economic model. An explanatory variable that is determined 
simultaneously with the dependent variable correlated with the error term leads to 
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inconsistency and bias in the ordinary least squares estimation (OLS). Accordingly, OLS 
estimates suffer from simultaneity bias. Pair-wise correlation tests were done to identify the 
correlations between the main three variables, which showed they are correlated as suspected. 
Accordingly, an alternative approach addressing the problem of endogeneity has to be 
employed. Thus, this study uses the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method to solve the 
endogeneity problem. The challenge of this approach is to find appropriate instruments as 
three instruments that could be used in the structural equations in place of the structural 
variables have to be identified (Wooldridge, 2002). A valid instrument must meet two 
important conditions: (1) the instrumental variable is correlated with the endogenous 
regressor of interest, and (2) the instrumental variable is uncorrelated with the error term of 
the regression of interest (Villas-Boas and Winer, 1999). This study will empirically test 
these conditions using the F-statistic of the first-stage regression and the Hansen–Sagan J-
statistic (Sargan’s statistic) for over-identifying restrictions. For the overidentified equations, 
the lag of the instrument also served as one of the instruments in the estimated equation.  
The identification of instruments was based on both literature and statistical underpinning.  
Here the method to select the instruments involved a trial and error approach. The selection 
criteria demonstrated the correlation with only one of the three structural variables at the 5% 
level in the correlation tests. Accordingly, COMM (Communications, computer, etc., as a 
percentage of total service exports), TRDSRV (Trade in service as a percentage of GDP), and 
INF (Inflation) were identified as instruments for SERVA, MANVA, and AGRIVA, 
respectively. Next, we demonstrate the empirical validity of these instruments.  
 
COMM is directly related to the service sector value addition as it forms a part of value 
addition in the service sector. Trade in service is linked to the manufacturing sector, as the 
recent economic reforms in the sample’s countries also encouraged the absorption of foreign 
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expertise and technical know-how into the manufacturing sector. Gage and Lesher (2005) 
demonstrate that the increasingly globalised nature of fragmentation, partly due to the 
liberalisation of service, has redefined how domestic manufacturers interact with 
international service supplies. Furthermore, restrictions in the service trade might lead to a 
drop in manufacturing exports (Hoekman and Shepherd, 2017). Accordingly, there is a close 
link between the trade in service and value addition in the manufacturing sector.  
 
 Regarding the link between the agriculture sector value addition and inflation, the increasing 
income levels in the selected countries and the subsequent changes in the consumption 
behaviour might lead to food inflation. Bhattacharya and Gupta (2015) demonstrate 
significant pass-through effects from food to non-food to headline inflation in India. They 
also highlight that the rise in wages, which forms a part of value addition in the agriculture 
sector, is responsible for food inflation. They also assert that the rising per capita income and 
diversification of Indian diets that have raised the demand for high-value food products also 
add to the food inflation. Not surprisingly, there is a close relationship between the value 
addition in the agriculture sector and inflation.  
 
Having established the empirical relevance of the instruments employed in the analysis, we 
look at the other measures we adopt to ensure the results’ robustness. The prior 2SLS analysis 
is exactly identified as there are two endogenous variables and two instruments. This causes 
the model to be exactly identified where it is not possible to obtain Sargan’s (1958) statistic 
to determine the validity of the instruments. Following Joraporn et al. (2014, p. 521), we add 
the lag of the two instruments for the overidentified equations, enabling the generation of 
Sargan’s statistic. Instruments will be valid if Sargan’s statistic is not statistically significant. 
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We use fixed effects in the 2SLS estimation since we do not have time-invariant variables as 
regressors and check the model’s validity using the over-identification tests.  
 
4.3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 4 summarises the results of the estimates of three simultaneous equations in the second 
stage. We also report the first stage results in Annex II of the thesis. First, the validity of the 
instruments is established based on the Sargan statistic. We observe that Sargan’s statistic is 
not statistically significant in all the models we test. This confirms the validity of the 
instruments that were employed in the study. Next, we have to test whether the instruments 
are weak. To establish that the instruments are not weak, we use the F-statistic of the first-
stage regression. The rule of thumb proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997) to identify weak 
instruments is that the first stage regression will have an F statistic of less than 10. However, 
all models have the first stage significant F statistic over 10, which signifies strong 
instruments. 
Since we use two regressors to represent FDI, namely, FDI flows and stocks, each sector 
contains two sets of results leading to the outcomes shown for six models. Our main finding 
is that FDI stock has no significant impact on the value addition of any of the sectors.  Also, 
FDI flows have no significant effect except for the value addition in the manufacturing 
sector, in which FDI flows negatively affected the value addition. This is somewhat 
surprising given that the countries in the sample have been: firstly, recipients of relatively 
















Table 4. 4: Results of Two-stage Least Square Estimation  
 




Model 2    
(AGRIVA-FDIF) 
Model 3      
(MANVA-FDIS) 
Model 4              
(MANVA-FDIF) 
Model 5                 
(SERVA-FDIS) 
Model 6      
(SERVA-FDIF) 
MANVA -0.198 -0.329   0.429 0.611* 
 
(0.542) (0.515)   (0.293) (0.324) 
SERVA 0.879 0.834** -0.104 0.0112   
 
(0.456) (0.418) (0.277) (0.222)   
AGRIVA   0.270 0.185 0.242 0.225 
   (0.225) (0.192) (0.229) (0.226) 
FDIF 
 0.233  -0.282*  0.110 
 
 (0.285)  (0.153)  (0.199) 
FDIS 
0.0166  -0.0473  0.0215  
 
(0.0597)  (0.0323)  (0.0386)  
INST 
-24.60** -26.60** -2.280 -1.826 19.84*** 19.42*** 
 
(12.19) (11.09) (7.696) (6.833) (6.874) (7.037) 
HC 
0.891 1.676 -5.537* -7.554** 7.227* 9.477** 
 
(6.362) (6.678) (3.201) (2.983) (3.925) (4.444) 
TRD 
0.0330 0.0330 0.0769*** 0.0748*** -0.0603** -0.702*** 
 
(0.0548) (0.0548) (0.0169) (0.0145) (0.0237) (0.0253) 
INFR 
-0.405*** -0.423*** 0.131 0.117 0.110 0.0886 
 
(0.0587) (0.0641) (0.0969) (0.0886) (0.0924) (0.0968) 
Constant 11.10 14.81 16.93* 18.06** 10.22 4.998 
 
(17.81) (15.92) (8.797) (7.514) (13.51) (13.51) 
Sargan (p) 0.259 0.463 0.470 0.257 0.849 0.567 
N 84 77 77 84 84 77 
Notes: (1) Robust Standard errors are indicated in the parentheses. 
               (2) *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Looking at the linkages among the instrumented endogenous variables, we observe 
some synergies among the sectors. Service sector value addition contributes positively 
to value addition in agriculture. This could be due to many reasons, such as the 
expansion of the tourism subsector in the service sector, which sources food mostly 
from domestic agricultural enterprises, the rise of ‘agro-tourism’ and microfinance 
programmes aimed at rural agricultural households.  Apart from this, manufacturing 
value addition is positively related to the service sector value addition, possibly 
explained by the demand generated for services such as banking, insurance, engineering 
service from an expanding manufacturing sector. However, value addition in agriculture 
exerts no significant impact on the other two sectors. This could be due to the failure to 
embrace new technology and other efficiency issues that lead to stagnant or declining 
productivity. Accordingly, agriculture appears to be the more independent sector and 
lagging behind the other two. Our results also do not find any significant contribution 
from the service sector to adding value in the manufacturing sector and the 
manufacturing sector to the value-added in the agriculture sector. These findings 
underpin the links between the sectors. They also substantiate our model specification, 
which included the value addition in the other two sectors as explanatory variables in 
each structural equation to examine these links further.  
The role of institutions in the structural transformation has been quite diverse across the 
sectors. Institutions have had a significant negative effect in the agriculture sector, a 
positive one in the service sector, and no significant impact on the manufacturing sector. 
Accordingly, developments in the institutions have been influential in the structural 
transformation because they have helped guide the economy along the path predicted by 
theory, namely, shrinking the agriculture sector and expanding the service sector. 
Accordingly, stronger institutions favour the value addition in the more formal service 
130 
 
sector, which is generally concentrated in urban areas and employs skilled labour, than 
informal, rural-based agricultural sectors that employ less unskilled labour. It is 
generally accepted that capacity for adaptation depends on how public policies and 
institutions are designed and practised (Dávila-Fernández et al., 2020). Accordingly, 
this may also provide evidence of policy bias in policy formulation where expansion in 
the agriculture sector is discouraged while promoting the service sector. Nevertheless, 
we find evidence that suggests the strengthening of democratic institutions and 
maintenance of the rule of law drives the structural change in the selected economies.  
We find a slightly similar impact on the structural transformation caused by human 
capital development, which determines the skill level of the labour in an economy. 
Although it has no significant effect on the agriculture sector, it has contrasting impacts 
on the manufacturing and service sectors. Human capital development contributes 
negatively to value addition in the manufacturing sector, which is not surprising because 
the manufacturing sectors in the selected countries consist of industries that produce less 
sophisticated goods and services such as garments and semi-conductors. Their 
production does not require highly skilled labour. In contrast, human capital 
development has a positive impact on value addition in the service sector. This is 
plausible given the higher skill level required for employment to service this particular 
sector. On the other hand, the sector that employs better skilled and more productive 
labour will outperform others and can secure such labour continuously by paying higher 
wages, thus forming a virtuous cycle.  
Also, the infrastructure, proxied by access to electricity, has a negative relationship with 
value addition in agriculture. This is despite the electrification projects undertaken in 
recent decades in rural areas in the sample countries where agriculture is the primary 
sector. A possible reason could be the inefficient use of transport facilities and 
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technology made available through infrastructure development, such as electronic 
farming equipment. Infrastructure development has no significant impact on value 
addition in the manufacturing or service sectors. This finding leads to the question 
concerning the efficacy of infrastructure projects undertaken in these countries. Since 
significant infrastructure projects are either publicly funded or foreign-financed, such 
projects' completion and expected benefits may not be up to the expected level despite 
being so costly.  
The impact of international trade has contrasting effects on value addition in the three 
sectors. International trade has no significant influence on value addition in agriculture. 
This sector may cater primarily to domestic consumption or crops grown for subsistence 
purposes rather than the export market, so it is unaffected by the demands of 
international trade. However, international trade has a significant positive impact on the 
manufacturing sector. This is not a surprise as almost all the countries in our sample 
have flourishing export-oriented manufacturing sectors. As the manufacturing export 
industries are part of global value chains, significant imports are required for production 
that causes increased trade volumes. However, international trade harms value addition 
in the service sector. This is because the service sector comprises non-tradeable sub-
industries such as banking and construction, which have been expanding in recent 
decades without significant links to international trade. In the next section, we draw 
some conclusions from our findings. 
 
4.4. CONCLUSIONS 
Some of the questions of central importance in economics are why there are differences 
in economic growth from country to country and how economic growth evolves. The 
economic literature on structural change, both theoretical and empirical, attempts to 
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answer such questions based on the relationship between the expansion of an economy 
and changes in the composition/method of production. This paper attempts to explain 
the reasons for the structural change evident in the middle-income level countries in the 
SAAARC and ASEAN regions. It employed the 2SLS method to analyse FDI and 
human capital development and their impact on the structural transformation in the 
chosen countries. 
Our study found evidence suggesting that resource reallocation happens in the direction, 
patterns, and styles predicted by theoretical and empirical literature. It is, in other 
words, an initial transition from agriculture to manufacturing and subsequent 
transformation into an economy characterised by a dominant service sector. This study 
also highlighted the presence of linkages or synergies among the three sectors in the 
economy. However, FDI flows or stocks have not played any influential role in the 
structural transformation that sample countries have gone through. Notably, FDI flow 
has been counterproductive in adding value to the manufacturing sector, debuting the 
widespread belief that FDI supports the manufacturing sector-driven economic growth. 
On the other hand, human capital development has effectively contributed to the 
structural change by increasing value addition in the service sector, having no impact on 
value addition in agriculture, and reducing it in the manufacturing sector. In addition, 
human capital development has contributed to skills transformation, triggering further 
resource reallocation in the direction predicted by theoretical and empirical literature. 
Another significant determinant of structural transformation identified in this study was 
the institutions. Robust institutions contribute to the transformation by reducing value 
addition in the agriculture sector and increasing it in the service sector, guiding the 
economy on the right path. Accordingly, democratic institutions, governance, and 
maintenance of the rule of law will contribute positively to the countries’ structural 
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transformation. Infrastructure development only remotely contributes to the structural 
transformation, although it leads to less value added in agriculture. International trade 
offsets the transformation by contributing positively to value addition in the 
manufacturing sector at the expense of that in the service sector.  
From the viewpoint of policy applications, human capital development and institutions 
can drive an economy’s positive structural transformation. Accordingly, promoting 
education and skills training, consolidating democratic institutions, and maintaining law 
and order are critical economic outcomes. The agriculture sector needs to be more 
interconnected with the other two more advanced sectors. Governments need to be more 
aware of the quality of service delivery and ensure that infrastructure development 
contributes positively to the transformation of the economies.  
This is one of the least researched areas in the developing Asian countries, and there is 
much potential now to explore the themes covered here in more detail. Better data such 
as sectoral FDI flows could have improved the study further. A database such as The 
GGDC 10-Sector Database, which provides a long-term internationally comparable 
dataset on sectoral productivity performance, if extended to cover the countries in this 
grouping, would create more opportunities for in-depth analysis of this topic. There is 
also a second proxy for sectoral transformation, that is, changes in sectoral employment 
share. It represents the changes in the allocation of labour in each sector. Internal labour 
flow reflects the sectoral wage differentials, which lead to decisions to maximise 






CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this chapter is to make some concluding remarks on the thesis. This 
thesis consists of three contributing chapters that focus on different aspects of economic 
growth-related issues regarding foreign direct investments (FDI) in middle-income 
countries part of the SAARC and ASEAN regions. We answered three questions: (1) 
through which channels does FDI generate growth; (2) what is the relationship between 
FDI and income distribution; and (3) what is the impact of FDI on structural 
transformation in the selected countries. First, provided here is a summary of key 
empirical findings and highlighted policy implications, leading to important 
recommendations. Then, we illustrate the essential contributions of this thesis to the 
empirical literature, given that it examines hitherto poorly or non-researched areas. 
Next, we highlight some limitations that had to be dealt with, especially data 
availability. Finally, we shed light on possible paths that future research on this topic 
should consider and build on our findings.  
5.2. SUMMARY OF KEY EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The first contributing chapter of the thesis focuses on identifying channels through 
which FDI flows generate growth. It argues that each component of economic growth 
works as a channel of transmission. The econometric analysis comprises three steps: 
firstly, identifying the best production function that explains the growth in the selected 
group of countries; secondly, decomposing growth into three components - capital, 
labour, and productivity; and thirdly, running regressions using each growth component 
as the dependent variable. The most important finding was that the growth effect of FDI 
is transmitted only through the labour growth channel and not through the capital or 
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productivity channel. This is due to the rising employment triggered by FDI flows, 
especially skilled employment. FDI increases the demand for skilled labour, and 
multinational enterprises (MNE), usually foreign-owned companies, compete with 
domestic firms for such labour. This leads to a vacuum in the market for a skilled 
workforce that has to be filled by hitherto unemployed or those already employed 
elsewhere but has the required expertise or skills. This might also cause labour to move 
away from the primary (agriculture) sector, the most informal sector, which is the 
bedrock of the selected countries’ economies, into the two ‘more formal’ sectors, 
namely, manufacturing and service.  
Also, institutions play a crucial role in growth transmission through the capital channel. 
This is because better institutions are characterised by strong democracies, maintenance 
of the rule of law, and upholding property rights, which are believed to enhance 
economic growth. We also find evidence to suggest that human capital development and 
international trade contribute to economic growth via the productivity channel. For 
example, a better skilled and more educated workforce is going to contribute to 
productivity growth more effectively. In addition, the export sector, which represents 
international trade, needs to keep up with the ever-evolving global technology frontier 
to remain competitive, contributing to productivity improvements.  
Another key finding from this chapter is that FDI has no role in economic growth that 
stems from productivity improvements. There are two implications of this finding. First, 
as suggested by endogenous growth theory, productivity improvements play a crucial 
role in economic growth underpinned by empirical research, especially in developing 
countries. Second, due to the many peripheral benefits that FDI introduces, it is believed 
that FDI is productivity-enhancing. Accordingly, this finding comes as a surprise, and to 
some extent, our findings debunk the widespread belief that FDI contributes to growth 
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through productivity improvements. Nevertheless, we could not entirely deny the role of 
FDI in economic growth through productivity as we find evidence it does contribute to 
productivity growth through ‘more peripheral’ ways. This is through human capital 
development and international trade. MNEs’ demand for skilled labour triggers human 
capital development through skills training and education. Also, the efficiency-seeking 
type of FDI flows mainly targets the economy's tradable sectors that help with 
productivity improvements linked to international trade.  
The second contributing chapter of the thesis sheds light on the distributional impact of 
FDI. It examines how FDI flows affect income inequality in the recipient economy, and 
it is concluded that FDI and income inequality have a non-linear relationship. We find 
evidence suggesting that the FDI-triggered inequality follows the proposition of 
modernisation theory; that is, FDI increases inequality as the volume of FDI flows 
increases until it reaches a maximum of 8.1% of the GDP and then falls. The rise in 
inequality at lower levels of FDI flows mainly due to the distributional impact of FDI. 
This is characterised by skill premium in the form of high salaries or wages on offer 
from MNEs for skilled employees, competing with domestic businesses for market 
share. These MNEs are located in economic hotspots, and they provide skewed and 
biased incentive schemes. Also, some unfavourable characteristics of the host countries, 
such as policy bias, aggravate the negative distributional impact of FDI.  
Also, our study supports the proposition that human capital development helps to level 
off income inequality as it has a negative relationship with income inequality. With 
education and skills training, people from low-income groups can earn higher incomes 
by working in more productive and attractive sectors. Economic growth has also been 
responsible for increasing inequality, which aligns with the theoretical proposition that 
economic growth can be harmful to income distribution at the initial stages of economic 
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take-off. International trade and infrastructure development have helped reduce income 
inequality. Generally, these factors help reduce rural poverty and trigger labour 
migration from the primary sector to other sectors, subsequently improving the 
underprivileged economic opportunities. However, robust institutions have contributed 
to increasing income inequality in the selected countries.  
In the third contributing chapter, we examine the relationship between FDI and 
structural transformation. We use value-added in the three sectors as a percentage of 
GDP as the proxy for structural transformation. All countries in our sample have 
transformed rapidly during the study period, characterised by agriculture having a 
shrinking share of GDP while the shares of GDP from the manufacturing and service 
sectors are increasing. We employ a simultaneous equations model, which accounts for 
the links between the sectors. These connections show the extent of resource 
reallocation among the sectors where one enjoys more resources only at the same 
expense in the other two. We also use both flow and stock variables of FDI in this 
study. Our main finding is that neither FDI stock nor flows significantly impact the 
value-added of any sectors except for the negative impact of FDI flows on the 
manufacturing sector. The countries we examine are middle-income ones that are 
supposed to be helped by FDI to break through the ‘glass ceiling’, as termed by Ohno 
(2009), to reach the next level. Unfortunately, this has not yet occurred, and it is 
alarming, given that most of the FDI inflows end up in the manufacturing and service 
sectors. 
In terms of the inter-sectoral linkages, we find that the service sector value-added 
contributes positively to value-added in agriculture whilst manufacturing value-added is 
positively related to that in the service sector. Agriculture appears to be more detached 
from the other two as its value-added has no significant impact on the other two sectors. 
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We do not find a contribution from the service sector to the value-added in the 
manufacturing and agriculture sectors. This provides evidence that structural 
transformation in the selected countries does not reflect the theoretical propositions that 
the relative share in the value-added in the agriculture sector to be falling whilst that in 
the other two is increasing.  
We find that robust institutions, strengthening democratic practices, and the rule of law 
drive structural change in the selected economies, among the other explanatory 
variables. Better institutions have helped guide the economy along the path predicted by 
theory: shrinking the agriculture sector and expanding the service sector. Human capital 
development contributes negatively to value-added in the manufacturing sector whilst 
positively impacting value-added in the service sector. It has no significant impact on 
the value-added in agriculture. This is entirely plausible as the service sector employs 
more skilled and better-educated employees than the other two. Also, infrastructure has 
a negative relationship with value-added in agriculture whilst having no significant 
impact on value-added in the manufacturing or service sectors. Finally, international 
trade reveals a positive relationship only with the manufacturing sector whilst having no 
effect on agriculture and negatively impacting the service sector. This shows further 
evidence that domestic agriculture has failed to remain competitive in international 
trade. In the next section, we discuss the policy implications of our findings and draw 
some recommendations for policymakers' use. 
5.3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The first contributing chapter examined the growth transmission channels of FDI and 
demonstrated that it occurs only through the labour component of growth. The key 
takeaway is that the true growth potential of FDI is yet to be tapped as there had been no 
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significant transmission through the other two growth components, namely, capital and 
productivity. Therefore, policies encouraging employment need to persist whilst better 
policy focus needs to be done to enhance the contribution of FDI to economic growth 
through capital and productivity. The lack of FDI contribution to economic growth via 
capital could be due to the MNEs resorting more to domestic capital sources than 
bringing in fresh capital from abroad. This not only crowds out financing options for 
domestic firms but also fails to meet new capital's expected infusion. Accordingly, 
whilst it could be challenging to convince the already established firms to infuse more 
capital, new entrants need to be encouraged to bring in new capital as much as possible. 
Also, since robust institutions contribute to economic growth through capital 
accumulation, government policymakers must maintain the rule of law, property rights, 
and democratic institutions. 
Contributions of FDI to productivity growth are well documented, such as transferring 
new and sophisticated technology, management know-how, and skills. Governments 
need to encourage MNEs to introduce new technologies and other productivity 
improvements through tax breaks. Human capital development contributes to the 
growth component of productivity. A more educated and better-skilled workforce helps 
with economic growth through productivity improvements. Accordingly, policymakers 
must encourage better education of the young from primary right through to university 
learning. They also need to give incentives for skills development through technical 
education. International trade tends to improve the growth component of productivity. 
Governments need to support trading policies and processes to remain competitive in 




A widening income gap would be a concern to any society and the second chapter was 
able to discover several factors that contribute to the income gap. We demonstrate that 
FDI at lower levels as a share of GDP tends to increase the income gap, but it reduces 
income inequality at higher levels. Accordingly, the best way to contain the negative 
impact of FDI on income distribution is to have more of it as a GDP share. To this end, 
selected countries have already mastered the art of attracting FDI in a competitive 
environment, and the policies have to be streamlined and strengthened to attract more 
FDI. In addition, governments need to avoid policy bias and encourage locating 
offshoots of MNEs in geographically remote areas through incentive schemes to address 
rural poverty and lack of employment opportunities.  
We find that human capital development, international trade, and infrastructure 
development have been instrumental in reducing income gaps. Economic opportunities 
and better economic prospects for educating the citizenry tend to reduce income 
distribution gaps. International trade, especially new employment opportunities in the 
manufacturing exports sector, has increased the income levels in communities and 
reduced poverty, as witnessed in almost all sample countries. Accordingly, 
policymakers will have to invest more in education and promote international trade. 
Infrastructure development is beneficial in working as a conduit for widespread 
economic growth. Since the proxy used for infrastructure development was access to 
electricity, projects such as rural electrification might have created new economic 
opportunities and helped transfer new technology and efficient diffusion of market 
information. Institutions harming income distribution mean that governments would 
have to rethink the institutional structure related to economic policies.  
The third chapter focused on the structural transformation and role of FDI in such 
transformation. Concerning the inter-sectoral linkages, agriculture appears to be 
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lagging. This is not a surprise, as the transformation process allocates resources away 
from the primary sector. However, this forces the agriculture sector to improve 
productivity continuously, given the limited resources available and release of resources 
to other sectors. Surprisingly, FDI has no role to play in helping countries to transform. 
However, given the overall benefits of FDI, it is not prudent to discourage FDI because 
it does not help countries change their economic system. Governments would have to 
use other policy tools to contain such negative impacts of FDI. We found that value-
added in agriculture has no significant relationship with international trade due to the 
domestic agriculture sector's lack of international competitiveness. There will be many 
potentials in value addition in agriculture if it is more linked to international trade. 
Infrastructure projects have not been effective in structural transformation. This 
demands better pre-assessments and governments advocating those projects which are 
best suited for economic transformation. Governments will have to invest in human 
capital development and consolidate institutions to provide impetus to the 
transformation process.  
Overall, policymakers and social planners will continue encouraging FDI inflows as 
their benefits far outweigh the shortcomings. Human capital development has many 
benefits, such as enhancing economic growth through productivity, reducing income 
gaps, and helping the economy change structurally. International trade has contributed 
to economic growth through the productivity channel, helped combat the widening 
income gaps, and positively affected the value-added in the manufacturing sector. 
Despite increasing income inequality in the selected countries, institutions have helped 
promote economic growth through the capital component and assisting economies to 
change for the better. Notwithstanding its role in reducing income inequality, 
infrastructure development plays no significant role in growth transmission or structural 
142 
 
transformation. Accordingly, policymakers will have to continue devising progressive 
policies in human capital development and international trade but will have to rethink 
the institutional and infrastructure-related policies. Next, we discuss some of the 
contributions to the literature.  
5.4. CONTRIBUTIONS AND RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE 
FDI and its issues relating to economic growth are among the most heavily researched 
areas in economic literature. Traditional studies on FDI focus on the perpetual question 
of how FDI contributes to economic growth, which is examined in the context of 
different groupings of countries in various geographic areas or distinct developmental 
stages. However, this thesis goes off the beaten track and examines hitherto non-
researched areas relating to FDI. Also, it analyses the middle-income economies, which 
is very timely given the recent interest in such economies. Accordingly, it makes several 
significant original contributions to the empirical literature in FDI, and these are 
described in more detail below. 
(1) Out of the three areas covered by the thesis, the structural transformation 
concerning FDI examined in the third paper is an entirely new research topic 
that would ignite many researchers' interest. Middle-income countries are greatly 
concerned about the perpetual transformation of their economies because of the 
fear of the middle-income trap phenomenon, where the economy remains 
stagnant for a long time. This research provides some insights into this topic.  
(2) To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research done on FDI-inequality 
nexus concerning the middle-income economies or any grouping of countries in 
the Asian region. Also, this area of research is yet to feature in a peer-reviewed 
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high-ranked research journal. This study revealed many factors and FDI that 
affect the income distribution in the selected economies.  
(3) Growth transmission of FDI has been a new research area, and this is the first 
time it has been examined in the context of middle-income economies in the 
Asian region. The significance is that, despite many studies which examine the 
FDI-growth nexus, the exact mechanism through which the FDI leads to growth 
is not extensively researched. Thus, this study provides insights into how exactly 
the growth impact of FDI translates into real output growth.  
(4) This thesis produces novel findings in FDI-related research. The first paper, 
which examines the growth transmission channels of FDI, demonstrates that the 
growth effect of FDI is transmitted only through labour in the sample of 
countries.  This contradicts the proposition that FDI augments the domestic 
capital, which leads to higher growth. It also debunks the idea that FDI plays a 
vital role in enhancing productivity due to its many peripheral benefits termed 
the spillover effects.  
(5) Another significant finding is demonstrated in the second paper, which 
illustrates that the FDI aggravates the economies' income disparities at lower 
levels of GDP share. This leads to a policy dilemma since, despite its many 
benefits, promoting FDIs might lead to possible distributional effects that might 
lead to social issues.  
(6) The third paper demonstrates that FDI has not played any significant role in the 
structural transformation despite the biased nature of the recipient sector, 
receiving large volumes of FDI flows in the manufacturing and service sectors. 
These findings contribute to the research debate by challenging some pre-
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existing empirical propositions, suggesting that FDI helps countries transform 
due to its central role in the secondary and tertiary education sectors.  
The following section explains some of the limitations experienced during the 
research.  
5.5. LIMITATIONS 
The main limitation this study had to deal with was the lack of data availability in some 
countries for certain economic variables. This study used two data sources: World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank and Pen World Tables. This study was 
affected to some extent by the data availability, given the following.  
(1) The period for which data were collected covered the years 1993 to 2017. 
However, the findings could have been made more relevant if more years were 
taken into account so that a more extended period could have been assessed.  
(2) The other shortcoming of lack of data availability was the flexibility of the 
methods that could have been used to analyse the data. For example, when the 
GMM method is employed, the number of instruments that could be used is 
conditional on data availability. Having to deal with 12 countries – some 
infamous for having insufficient data - made the task much more difficult.  
(3) Lack of data availability also made it challenging to select the grouping of 
countries. Ideally, this could have been done considering two separate groupings 
of countries. However, we had to consider two groupings in one group, given the 
minimum group requirements applicable for certain econometric approaches. 
Nevertheless, we took measures to ensure that countries with similar 
characteristics are selected whilst providing the grouping variability.  
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In the next section, we show some paths for future research to consider. 
5.6. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
A novel three-stepped approach was employed to examine the transmission channels of 
FDI in the first paper. However, several other methods could be used for that purpose. 
For example, the stochastic frontier approach could be employed in the growth 
decomposition step and serve as a robustness check. The second paper used only FDI 
flows as the primary independent variable to examine the FDI-inequality nexus. It is 
possible to employ FDI stock data as well to analyse the said relationship. The third 
paper opened up a path for an entirely new research area that can be examined in the 
context of different groupings of countries or country-specific studies. In the third 
paper, a second proxy could have been used for structural transformation: sectoral 
labour shares. However, finding proper instruments for this variable was challenging, 
and obtaining data on sectoral wages proves to be a challenge. This is a possible 
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Appendix 1: Economic Liberalisation experience of 




Before the mid-1980s, India followed a highly centralised quasi-socialist economic 
policy characterised by import substitution, the dominance of state enterprises and a 
lack of private entrepreneurship or free-market principles. Early signs of economic 
liberalisation were observable from the mid-1980s with the removal of quantitative 
restrictions on imports (Panagariya, 2004). However, major economic reforms were 
introduced starting in 1991. Licensing requirements for all industries was abolished 
under a new industrial policy. Public sector enterprises lost their monopolies in many 
sectors, and a new FDI policy was adopted where foreign ownership up to 51% and 
approved under the automatic route. The trade regime also underwent many reforms, 
and the rupee was made convertible under current account liberalisation in 1994. This 
momentum continued through the 2000s, focusing on macroeconomic stability and 
growth. Fiscal discipline was restored under the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget 
Management Act in 2004, and the Reserve Bank adopted the inflation targeting 
monetary framework in 2015. Capital markets are now opening up for institutional 
investors, and the limits on FDI were primarily removed during 2015-2018 (Goretti et 
al., 2019).  
Sri Lanka  
Since independence in 1948, Sri Lanka lacked consistency in its policies related to FDI 
as the national economic policies were influenced by the ideologies of political parties 
that attained power. The country had periods of liberalisation from time to time but then 
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a closed economy, such as from 1970 to 1977 characterised by import and exchange 
controls and promotion of public sector enterprises. Nevertheless, Sri Lanka was the 
first in South Asia and one of the pioneers in the developing world to introduce reforms 
commencing from 1977. The Greater Colombo Economic Commission (GCEC), the 
predecessor of the Board of Investment, was established under which Free Trade Zones 
were devised with attractive incentives for foreign enterprises undertaking export-
oriented production. The exchange rate was devalued, and legal protection of foreign-
owned assets from nationalisation was granted in the form of a state guarantee. This 
made Sri Lanka an 'IMF success' story following the 'Singapore model' of an open 
economy (Herring, 1987). The second wave of liberalisation coupled with more open 
trade occurred in the 1990s and opened up more areas for foreign investment such as 
plantations and telecommunications. However, the civil war had a considerable impact 
on the country's economic fortunes, disconnecting a large geographical area from 
liberalised economic activities. Although the civil war ended in 2009, the reform 
momentum remained sluggish, lacking progress in liberalising major state-owned 
enterprises and increases in import taxes to supplement a narrow tax base (Goretti et al., 
2019).  
Bangladesh 
After gaining independence in 1971, economic policies were characterised by state 
control and import substitution policies. However, a reversal of the inward-looking 
policies could be observed from the 1980s onwards. Focusing on manufacturing 
exports, there was a significant investment in the country’s garment industry. 
Successive governments introduced structural reforms that included unification of the 
exchange rate, easing import restrictions, financial liberalisation, and food and 
agricultural subsidies (Mahmud, Ahmed, and Mahajan, 2008; World Bank, 2007). A 
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Board of Investments was established in the FDI front, and the controls on profit 
repatriations on foreign investments were removed (Hossain, 2013). In the early 1990s, 
Bangladesh had to resort to an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility from the IMF, 
where fiscal reforms aimed at the increased budgetary allocation to alleviate poverty, 
develop human capital, and value-added taxes were implemented. Over the past decade, 
Bangladesh has been working on further liberalisation measures, including those related 
to FDI, strengthening its fiscal policies and modernising the monetary policy regime 
(Goretti et al., 2019). 
Maldives  
The Maldives is the only economy in South Asia to have reached upper-middle-income 
status. The main component of the economy is tourism which accounts for 60% of 
foreign income and 27% of the GDP. Accordingly, FDI receipts were mainly in the 
tourism sector, accounting for approximately 90% of FDI. Since 1989, the government 
has liberalised the fisheries sector and lifted import quotas, allowing the private sector 
to engage in fisheries exports, and allowing FDI. In addition, the country’s authorities 
are considering further opening up the economy for foreign investment and its 
diversification (Goretti et al., 2019).  
Nepal  
Like its South Asian peers, Nepal had a mostly inward-looking economic policy 
framework until the early 1990s. The public sector dominated the economy with state-
owned enterprises in all industries (Basnett et al., 2014). The first wave of reforms in 
the early 1990s included removing the dual exchange rate and export duties and the 
liberalisation of import restrictions by lowering the tariff slabs and rates. Also, up to 
100%, foreign ownership was permitted in sectors such as banking, hydropower, and 
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airlines under the Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act, which was enacted 
in 1992 (Goretti et al., 2019). 
Vietnam 
Vietnam initiated policy reforms from the mid-1980s onward under renovation (doi 
moi), which accelerated in the late 1980s as it lost aid from the Soviet Union. Vietnam 
has been one of the most successful developing countries to have gained an advantage 
from opening the economy to foreign investment. The Foreign Investment Law was 
introduced in 1987 which prompted a surge in FDI flows, from UAD 60 mn in 1988 to 
over 2 bn by the mid-1990s. The country was one of the largest recipients of FDI as a 
percentage of GDP in the world for several years in the 1990s. The sectoral composition 
of FDI during the 1990s changed from natural resources to services and manufacturing. 
However, unlike most developing countries, Vietnam’s state-owned enterprises 
continued to dominate the economy, forcing foreign investors to form partnerships with 
them (Hill and Athukorala, 1998). On the trade front, major trade reforms were 
introduced from 1989, starting with removing import duties on some industrial inputs. 
Vietnam entered into free trade agreements with its major trading partners, which 
prompted further FDI into the country. Another breakthrough was the introduction of 
Export Processing Zones (EPZs) and Industrial Parks (IPs) (or Economic Zones - EZs) 
in 1991 to promote exports. In 1995, the US economic blockade of Vietnam ended, and 
it became a member of ASEAN. In 2006, Investment Law was introduced, permitting 
FDI to cover all investment forms and promoting agreements between local and foreign 
firms. Further, in 2014 the requirement for investment registration certificate related to 




Since independence in 1965, Malaysia has identified the importance of foreign 
investments as part of its economic reforms. The first significant measure introduced to 
promote FDI occurred during the New Economic Policy (NEP) period implemented in 
1970, leading to a Free Trade Zone Act enacted in 1971 to attract export-oriented FDI. 
Subsequently, 10 free trade zones were established with duty-free access to imported 
inputs and capital goods, subsidised infrastructure, fast-tracked custom formalities, and 
removal of export taxes. In the 1980s, the ‘Look East’ policy promoted heavy 
industries, fertilisers, petrol, chemical manufacturing, and steel. In 1983, tax incentives 
were granted to companies engaged in Research and Development (R&D) (Sharma et 
al., 2012). In 1991, further incentives were given to foreign investments in capital 
intensive and higher value-added industries. Malaysia experienced a slump in FDI flows 
during the East Asian crisis, but the net inflows remained positive, possibly due to 
restrictions imposed on repatriations (Athukorala, 2007). There was a significant 
increase in FDI in the form of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
(Krugman, 2001). FDI flows during the 2000s also reflect structural changes in the 
economy as the share of FDI in the mining and agriculture sectors shrank from 56% in 
the mid-1980s to 18% by the mid-2000s. 
Thailand 
With the introduction of the first Economic Development Plan (1961-1966), post-world 
war Thailand experienced a transition from state capitalism characterised by state 
monopolies in imports and exports to a more liberal system that promoted private 
investment. Policies were mostly inward-looking, emphasising import substitution 
where tariffs were in place with a high level of protectionism. Nevertheless, a Board of 
Investment was established, which extended tax concessions to some industries. The 
third Economic Development Plan (1972-1976) introduced export promotion policies 
164 
 
with exemptions granted to intermediate goods and raw materials to export industries. 
However, the Alien Business Law of 1972 prohibited foreign ownership in several 
industries (Tangkitvanich et al., 2004). The Investment Promotion Act of 1977 and its 
subsequent amendments helped the export industries with tax incentives, and industrial 
and export-processing zones were established with amendments in 1987. With the rising 
income disparities very evident in the late 1980s, the sixth Economic Development Plan 
(1987-1991) introduced measures that aimed to improve the distribution of wealth 
throughout society. In the early 1990s, several policies were introduced to promote 
industrial growth decentralisation, giving businesses incentives to locate in rural areas. 
Economic recovery after the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis was supported by an IMF-
led reform package under which further liberalisation measures were implemented. 
Under the Foreign Business Act of 1999, full foreign participation was permitted in 
most manufacturing activities, and additional measures to accommodate FDI continued 












Appendix 2: First stage results of the 2SLS regressions 
 
 














































































































































































 Notes: (1) Robust Standard errors are in the parentheses 
            (2) *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
            (3) 1.COMM denotes one-period lagged COMM. 































































































































































































Notes: (1) Robust Standard errors are in the parentheses 
            (2) *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 











































































































































































        Notes: (1) Robust Standard errors are in the parentheses 
            (2) *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
            (3) 1.INF denotes one-period lagged INF 
 
 
